Gheorghe Cliveti
Abstract. To those who might be tempted to believe that some observable similarities between the course of phenomena in nature and those in society are not purely coincidental, it seems only natural that the evolution of international relations should comprise – after moments of maximum tension – states of relative relaxation. The great powers, in particular, had good reason to shrink from the prospect of a general conflict. Fearful lest a new European order jeopardise their position in international relations and each feeling that the bi- or multilateral approaches attempted or achieved in 1867–1868 (i.e., the Russo–Prussian and Franco–Austrian–British rapprochement) were inert and therefore without prospects, the high courts were – not by chance – advocates of the European peace. The primary directions in which the great politics seems to have acted to avert the risks of a general conflict – the eventuality of which, thanks to improvements in combat techniques, was already prone to taking on apocalyptic dimensions in the collective mindset – would thwart any attempts to undermine the order in the East and, above all, prevent the dangers of insurrection in Central and Southeastern Europe. The Romanian question was at the crossroads of these directions. Hence, the particular concern of the guaranteeing powers “pour détourner le cabinet roumain de toute tentative ambitieuse ou révolutionnaire.” Furthermore, the guarantors in Bucharest had an effect as moderate or conservative elements – in other words, those who favoured the path of political-diplomatic regulations for matters involving the Romanian State’s relations with external factors – were advancing to the forefront of Romanian political life. Understandably, not all the internal forces could agree with such a path, particularly the radicals who – although withdrawn from the government – still held a parliamentary majority for a while. However, despite the internal tension, which grew in step with the tense international situation, the primary exponents of the executive power in Bucharest (i.e., Prince Carol and the successive cabinets until March 1871) well understood that the position of Romania toward the Franco–German war and the consequences of a such complicated event, must be that of the neutrality. Through that position Romania proved sympathy toward France, but was finally pressed to deliver explanations in order to relax the repressive observations over Romania’s behaviour, expressed by the German Government.
Keywords: the Franco–German war, the Romanian’s neutrality, the challenge of the European order, the sympathy of the Romanians toward France, the reactive observation s expressed by the German Government, the status of the Black Sea, Romania and the Guaranteeing Powers.