

METTERNICH, PALMERSTON, THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION, AND EUROPE 1830–1834: IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

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Abstract

From a structural historical perspective there are certain main determinants which play an important role in the political, economic, military and security decision-making process. For the present essay four determinants were selected. They will allow to analyze and compare two important 19th century statesmen and their management of the European crises of 1830 to 1834 (the status and role of a power in the European States System; internal and external security interests; political culture and political beliefs; the role and action of persons—friendships, animosities, hatred and mistrust between members of the ruling political elites). Metternich the “Coachman of Europe” and Palmerston “Lord Firebrand” clashed over differing perceptions of European security, European crises management and the status and role of their states in the international system of the time. Their political views and attitudes were shaped by the impact of the French Revolution of 1789 and its long term consequences, but also by the influence of their teachers at the universities they attended. An important element in Metternich’s and Palmerston’s relation was their personal animosity and dislike, especially as far as Palmerston was concerned (“Metternich is going to play the devil in Germany”). Both were responsible for the ideological block formation in the crisis years between 1830 and 1834, from the Revolution of July to the conservative and liberal alliances of 1832 and 1834. The examples selected for this essay focus on the Revolution of July 1830 and its aftermath, the Belgium-Luxembourg Question, the impact on the German Confederation and the constitutional states, on Austrian policy toward the German confederation and the impact of the uprisings in Italy and Poland. The breakup of the Quadruple Alliance of Chaumont 1814—renewed in 1818 and 1830 (Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia)—in 1832/34, created war scares and the danger of an all-European war. It made it difficult to solve international crises. Therefore, e.g. the Belgium-Luxembourg Question could only be solved after the 1839 rapprochement of the members of the Alliance of Chaumont and the end of the Anglo-French liberal alliance.

Keywords: Europe, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, international relations.

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1. Preliminary Considerations¹ and Methodological Aspects²

The timeframe given does not allow for a detailed discussion on an interesting and highly complex and much debated topic. Therefore, I decided to focus on certain elements and their interdependence which will show how the state actors of 1830–34, especially Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston, reacted to the challenge of the Revolution of July and its European aftermath³ which led to the breakup of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, the founding of the Kingdom of Belgium, to uprisings and revolts in Italy and Poland, and caused unrest as well as political and social tensions, constitutional debates in so called “stormy diets,” and constitutional changes in some member states of the German Confederation.⁴

¹ Enlarged and updated paper given at the 39th Conference of the Consortium for the Revolutionary Era 1750–1850 in Atlanta, Georgia (28 February–2 March 2019). Dedicated to Professor Rudolf Gräf, PhD, on the occasion of his birthday on 26 January 2020. The Impact of the French Revolution of July on France, on Europe and on the states of the German Confederation as well as the differing reactions of leading European politicians have been largely neglected in historical research. Metternich and Palmerston were affected by the ‘trois glorieuses’ and its aftermath in developing their policy. Cf. Wolf D. Gruner, “Großbritannien und die Julirevolution von 1830: Zwischen Legitimationsprinzip und nationalem Interesse.” In: *Francia* 9/1982, p. 369–410 (printed version of the paper given at the 15th International Congress of Historical Sciences 1980 in Bucharest, August 1980).

² For methodological questions cf. in more detail the still inspiring book by Pierre Renouvin / Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*. Paris: Armand Colin 1991 – Wolf D. Gruner, “The Reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna System: Some structuralist considerations.” In: *Consortium for Revolutionary Europe: Selected Papers*, edited by the CRE. Tallahassee: Florida State University 1998, p. 553–564 – Wolf D. Gruner, “Europa in der Krise von 1830/31: Entscheidungsprozesse zwischen Systemstabilisierung und Eigeninteresse.” In: Wolf D. Gruner / Markus Völkel (Eds.), *Region - Territorium - Nationalstaat - Europa: Beiträge zu einer europäischen Geschichtslandschaft*. (Rostocker Beiträge zur Deutschen und Europäischen Geschichte 4). Rostock: University of Rostock 1998, p. 199–244, p. 199ff.

³ For the broader framework and historical background cf. inter alia: Robert D. Billinger, *Metternich's Policy toward the South German States, 1830–1834*. PhD University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) 1973 – Idem, *Metternich and the German Question. States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820–1834*. Newark London Toronto: University of Delaware Press 1990 – Idem, “The War Scare of 1830 and Prussian-South German Plans for the End of Austrian Domination in Germany.” In: *CEH* IX/1977, p. 209–219 – Gruner, Großbritannien und die Julirevolution von 1830 (note 2) – Idem, The Revolution of July and Southern Germany. In: *CRE* 13th Proceedings 1983, ed. by C. B. Davis Athens / Ga. 1985, p. 509–546 – Idem, Europa in der Krise von 1830/31 (note 3) – Eberhard Weis, *Der Durchbruch des Bürgertums 1778–1847*. Berlin: Propyläen 1975, p. 367ff. – Winfried Baumgart, *Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung. Internationaler Beziehungen 1830–1878*. Paderborn: Schöningh 1999, p. 271ff. – Jacques-Alain de Sédouy, *Le concert européen. Aux origines de l'Europe 1814–1914*. Paris: Fayard 2009 – Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*. Oxford: Oxford UP 1994 – Jean Tulard, *Frankreich im Zeitalter der Revolutionen 1789–1851*. (Original: *Histoire de France. Les Révolutions de 1789 à 1851*. Paris: Fayard 1985) Stuttgart: DVA 1989, p. 339ff. – Guillaume Bertier de Sauvigny, *La Révolution de 1830 en France*. Paris: Armand Colin 1970 – Willibald Steinmetz, *Europa im 19. Jahrhundert*. Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer 2019, p. 271ff.

⁴ For the broader context cf. J. C. Boogman, *Nederland en de Duitse Bond 1815–1851*. Deel I: *1815–1848*. Groningen Djakarta: J.B. Wolters 1955, p. 3ff. – Ralf Zerback (Compiler), *Quellen zur*

My focus will be on the German Confederation, but, as we know German history cannot be discussed without keeping in mind that German history has been and will always be at the same time European history, i.e., in discussing and analyzing German history we always have to deal with three interacting levels: the level of the single state, the German national level—in our case the level of the German Confederation—and the European-international level.⁵ As far as the period from 1830 to 1834 is concerned, the Revolution of July had an impact on the states of the German Confederation. This also holds true for the breakup of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands and the founding of a Belgian state, as well as for the uprisings in Italy and Poland. Therefore we have a highly complex international situation. In this Metternich and, since November of 1830, Palmerston were playing a prominent role as State Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

If we consult history textbooks or even general histories of Europe for the period between 1815 and 1848/49 we will find that during that period and later the *principle of legitimacy* prevailed in international relations, being responsible for the breakup of the Vienna System by the early 1850s, which was not true. The principle of legitimacy was introduced by Prince Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna as the “vrai principe” and, from his perspective, could be used as a political tool in order to shape a post-Napoleonic political landscape which could serve French national interests. Because of his flexibility, his interpretative capacity and with French national interests having always been his political guideline, Talleyrand managed to serve four masters in four conflicting political systems (Foreign Secretary 1797–1799 during the Directory; 1799–1807 Napoleon’s Foreign Secretary; 1814/15 Foreign Secretary of King Louis XVIII. and French delegate at the Congress of Vienna;

Geschichte des Deutschen Bundes, Abteilung II: 1830–1848, vol. 1: *Reformpläne und Repression 1830–1834*. Munich: Oldenbourg 2003 – H. T. Colenbrander (Ed.), *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840*. Esp . Vol. X, 1-5. ‘S-Gravenhage (The Hague): Martinus Nijhoff 1918–1922, the volumes are also accessible online: <http://www.resourcehuysgens.knaw.nl/retroboeken/gedenkstukken/#page=0&accessor=toc&view=homepane> accessed 5 September 2019. – Helmut Rumpler, *Österreichische Geschichte 1804–1914. Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa*. Wien: Ueberreuter 1997 – Wolf D. Gruner, “Die belgisch-luxemburgische Frage im Spannungsfeld europäischer Politik 1830–1839. Überlegungen zu den politischen, wirtschaftliche, sozialen und ideologischen Bestimmungsfaktoren der Interessen des Deutschen Bundes, Großbritanniens und Frankreichs.” In: *Francia* 5/1978 (1977), p. 299–398 – Idem, *Der Deutsche Bund 1815–1866*. München: C. H. Beck 2012, p. 54ff. – Idem, “Die deutsche Politik Ludwigs I.” In: *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 49/1986, p. 449–507 – Heinrich Lutz, *Zwischen Habsburg und Preußen. Deutschland 1815–1866*. Berlin: Siedler 21998 (1985) p. 79ff. – Peter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire. A New History*. Cambridge / Mass.: Harvard UP 2016, p. 112ff.

⁵ I have discussed this issue, which has interested me for many years, in more detail in: Wolf D. Gruner, “Mecklenburg im deutschen und europäischen Rahmen der Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts: Das Modell der drei Ebenen. In: Idem / Gunther Viereck (Eds.), *Kolloquium zum Gedenken an Prof. Dr. phil. habil. Ilona Buchsteiner* (Rostocker Beiträge zur deutschen und europäischen Geschichte 14). Rostock: Universität Rostock 2004, p. 33–46.

1830–1834 French Ambassador to London and negotiator at the London Conferences on Belgium).⁶ It was Talleyrand himself who confessed that the principle of legitimacy had never been used as a doctrine. It was used as a political tool to serve French interests in creating the International System after the Congress of Vienna.⁷ It never dominated international relations and European politics. In a private letter to Melanie Princess Metternich, Metternich's wife, of 1 March 1831, he stated:

*“L’histoire de l’Europe est celle des interventions [...] Dans toutes les occasions les Puissances ont agi selon leur besoins et leur intérêts en se couvrant quelquefois de la doctrine comme prétexte. Mais n’étant jamais dirigé par elle comme règle de leur conduite.”*⁸

There are certain dominant determinants from a structural methodological approach and point of view, which play an important role in the political decision-making process.⁹ They offer a reasonable methodological framework for historical analysis.

In analyzing the various determinants playing a major role for the decision-making process and political action of the European great powers and also of the powers of the second order, such as the Kingdom of the United Netherlands and the German middle states, we may identify similar factors. The significance of these determinants in the decision-making process differs. We shall see that the boundaries between these factors are fluid.

⁶ For Prince Talleyrand cf. Johannes Willms, *Talleyrand. Virtuose der Macht 1754–1838. Eine Biographie*. Munich: C. H. Beck 2013 (2011) – Alexandra von Ilseman, *Die Politik Frankreichs auf dem Wiener Kongreß. Talleyrands außenpolitische Strategien zwischen erster und zweiter Restauration* (Beiträge zur deutschen und europäischen Geschichte 16). Hamburg: Krämer 1996 – Duff Cooper, *Talleyrand*. Frankfurt a. M.: Insel 1982.

⁷ On Talleyrand's position as to how to combine the idea of the “balance of power” and the principle of “legitimacy” as a basis for a new Public Law of Nations and the new international system cf. *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Paris* (hereinafter *AMAE*) Mémoires et Documents (hereinafter: M.D.) France 672.

⁸ Prince Talleyrand – Princess Melanie Metternich, 1 March 1831 (*Hertfordshire County Record Office*, Panshanger Collection D/EP Box 28 – “The history of Europe is one of interventions [...] On all occasions the powers have acted according to their aims and interests which they often concealed under the pretext of legitimacy, but they have never used it as a guideline for their actions and political behavior at an international and national level” [Translation from the French WDG]).

⁹ For the determinants in the decision-making process cf. in more detail: Renouvin / Duroselle, *Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationales* (note 3), p. 5ff. (Les forces profondes), p. 284ff. (L’Homme d’État) – Wolf D. Gruner, “The Vienna System – Reconstruction of Europe beyond Power Politics, 1812–1820: Reflections on New Approaches to International Relations.” In: Peter Krüger / Paul W. Schroeder (Eds.), *The Transformation of European Politics*. Münster: LIT 1998, p. 165–185 – Idem, “The Congress of Vienna and the Transformation of Europe.” In: *CRE 1750–1850. Selected Papers 2012*. Louisiana State University Shreveport 2015, p. 174–194.

In dealing with the crises occurred between 1830 and 1834 and in analyzing the role of legitimacy and security interests for European crisis management, we need to consider the following levels of approach:

1. The international system of the day, the multipolar international order established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the so-called Vienna System, and its impact on international, European, national and regional policies,
2. The socio-political and economic system at a national and regional level and its influence on the international system at large,
3. The domestic and international security interests¹⁰ and, finally,
4. The point of view of political elites, i.e. the views and perceptions of the political actors at state level, their means of gathering information, their personal relations and their ideological convictions.

Taking the European-international, national and personal level as a basis we shall highlight a number of generally dominating determinants which shaped political strategies, defined national security interests, determined collective common international political actions, affected economic and social interests and thus highly influenced the decisions-making processes.

We identify the following determinants:

1. *The National and Regional Setting*, i.e. the economic, social, political, institutional, cultural, intellectual and security background (national trade and industry, social structures, the respective state of modernization, political culture, security culture, public opinion, the constitutional framework, the psychological and mental state of the nation and also the prevailing ideological beliefs).

2. *The Overall Potential of a State Actor at an International Level*. This will be decisive for its significance, role and influence in international relations. The overall potential consists of elements such as the manpower at its disposal, the material resources, the state of its revenues and finances and its size and geographic position within the international and the regional system.

3. *The Domestic and External Security Perception and National Security Interests*. Security has to be measured in an *objective* and in a *subjective sense*, namely as being perceived as a means to protect the country against all attempts and all threats to its territorial possessions, or to its political institutions and its political system, or to its system of values and historical traditions; in a subjective sense it may be perceived as the fear of attack on these objects and values.

¹⁰ Cf. the introduction on European Security Culture in: Beatrice de Graaf / Ido de Haan / Brian Vick (Eds.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon 1815 and the European Security Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2019, p. 1ff. – Ibid., Matthias Schulz, “Cultures of Peace and Security,” p. 19ff. – Ibid., Eckart Conze, “Historicing a Security Culture,” p. 40ff. – idem, *Geschichte der Sicherheit. Entwicklung – Themen – Perspektiven*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2012 – Mareike de Goede, *European Security Culture: preemption and precaution in European Security*. University of Amsterdam. Inaugural Lecture 2011.

4. *The Foreign Policy Interests*, i.e. the aims and interests in foreign relations. Under this heading we would also have to put elements like trade interests, neutrality, intervention or non-intervention as well as power political aims.

5. *The Character of the International System of the Period*. In dealing with the structure of the international system we must keep in mind that there is systemic change over time, i.e. any international system is not static but is permanently undergoing change. If we take this assessment for granted we shall accept that there is an impact of the international system on domestic policies. On the other hand domestic and regional events, developments and crises enormously influence the state and structure of the international order.

6. *The Political Elites' Perception of National, Regional and International Determinants and their Conceptualization of Policy*. In this context it seems to be of major importance to analyze the channels of information available to policy makers and their quality. They will show to a larger extent how this knowledge is being used in the decision-making process. As far as this determinant is concerned we have to take into account dynastic relations—like the relations between the Dutch House of Orange and Tsarist Russia—the capability of diplomats to speak and read the language of their respective host country and thus gather information from various sources, but also the friendships and animosities between members of the political elite in different countries, which could have an impact on foreign policy actions. To underline this I would like to give you just one example from the period we are dealing with. Lord Palmerston, the longtime British Foreign Secretary, deeply disapproved of Prince Metternich's German and European policies. He deemed them to be reactionary, insensible and therefore dangerous to the peace of Europe. In a private letter to the British ambassador in Vienna in June 1832 he stated:

I am afraid Metternich is going to play the devil in Germany [...] I see no reason why Metternich should sally forth like Mahomet with the Koran of Vienna in one hand and Martial Law in the other and dragoon all Europe into passive submission to what he thinks and they not, the perfection of human society, that is a State of Things, when Reading and Writing & Talking are Faculties to be exercised only con Lingua Dei Superiori [...] If Metternich would leave people a little alone he would find his crop of Revolutions which he is nursing up with so much care very soon die away upon the Stalk [...] But he is suffering under Monomania [...] and there is no more chance of persuading him out of the Imminence of Universal Revolution than was of convincing the Man in St. Luke's that he was not a teapot about to be filled with boiling water.¹¹

¹¹ *Broadland Papers (Palmerston Papers), Southampton University Library* (hereinafter USL-BP), General Correspondence (hereinafter G.C.) BE (Beauvale i.e. Frederick Lamb) 419: Palmerston – Lamb (private) 30 June 1832.

This statement is a very good example of Palmerston's dislike of Metternich. It could have never appeared in any official document. Therefore in the case of Palmerston his private correspondence gives his real views on events and on persons. As his correspondence shows, he often wrote private instructions to his diplomats abroad which differed widely from his official correspondence, one of the reasons being that quite often documents had to be submitted to Parliament. There are many examples in Palmerston's private correspondence concerning Metternich which highlight how important personal relations in politics were and still are. Palmerston himself suffered in his career that he was not promoted to a Cabinet position because King George IV refused Palmerston's nomination. Therefore, he got his chance after the death of George IV in 1830 and the fall of the Wellington government.

Metternich's and Palmerston's non-relationship was to some extent responsible for the buildup of tensions, not only during the crisis of 1831, but also in the years to come, concerning Italy,¹² Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland and Germany. In the 1830s it quite often contributed to tensions in international relations influenced by ideological creeds, thus establishing a "liberal camp" and a "reactionary camp" with Belgium joining the liberal side and the Kingdom of the Netherlands being supported by the conservative great powers.¹³

In using these determinants as a methodological framework I would like to discuss some aspects concerning the European decision-making processes in 1830/1831 and beyond. I shall focus my considerations on the impact of the crisis over Belgium and Luxembourg, trying to show the interaction between the determinants and to analyze the differing motives why the governments of the great powers of the day acted the way they did, thus avoiding the Great War which would have brought to an end the multipolar international system established in 1815. I will have to concentrate on determinants which, from my perspective, played a major role in the national decisions.

I shall select four determinants out of eleven and will discuss and outline four cases (the Revolution of July 1830—the Belgian-Luxembourg-Question—the German Confederation—the Uprising in Italy, and how Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston dealt with these crises). The determinants will allow us to analyze and compare the beliefs, perceptions, political background, role and action of the Austrian Chancellor Clemens Prince Metternich and the British Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, during the period of European crises between the French Revolution of July in 1830, the War Scare of 1831, the meeting

¹² Cf. Miroslav Šedivý, *Si vis pacem para bellum: The Italian Response to International Insecurity 1830–1848*. Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 2021 (in print).

¹³ Cf. Heinz Gollwitzer, "Ideologische Blockbildung als Bestandteil internationaler Politik im 19. Jahrhundert." In: *Historische Zeitschrift* 201/1965, p. 306–333 – Gruner, "Belgisch-Luxemburgische Frage" (note 5), p. 379ff.

at Münchengraetz in 1833 and the formation of the Quadruple Alliance between Britain, France, Spain and Portugal in 1834:

1. The Status and role of the European great powers in the post-1815 system,
2. The internal and external security interests,¹⁴
3. The political culture¹⁵ and political beliefs¹⁶ and
4. The role and interaction of politicians and rulers in crises.

The main focus will be on two leading statesmen of the period and their perceptions of domestic and international security as well as national and economic interests and their political and ideological beliefs. Palmerston was British Foreign Secretary since late 1830. Until his death in 1865 he served several times as Foreign Secretary and British Prime Minister.¹⁷ The Austrian Chancellor Prince

¹⁴ Cf. de Graaf et al., *Securing Europe after Napoleon* (note 11), p. 1ff. – Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*. Cambridge New York: Cambridge UP 1991, p. 114ff., 138ff. – Christoph Daase, *Der erweiterte Sicherheitsbegriff (Sicherheitskultur im Wandel Working Paper 1/2010)*. Goethe Universität Frankfurt a.M. (<http://www.sicherheitskultur.org/WorkingPapers/01-Daase.pdf> Zugriff 5.9.19) – still quite useful: Daniel Frei, *Sicherheit. Grundfragen der Weltpolitik*. Stuttgart Berlin Mainz: Kohlhammer 1977, p. 9 ff. – Franz Xaver Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*. Stuttgart: Enke 1973 – Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991 – Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol.” In: *Political Science Quarterly* 67/4 (1952), p. 481–502.

¹⁵ Classic: Gabriel Almond / Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton UP 1963 – cf. also: Richard Wilson, “The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches.” In: *World Politics* 52/2000, p. 246–273 – Avner Greif, “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies.” In: *The Journal of Political Economy* 102/5 (1994), p. 912–950 – David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven: Yale UP 1988 – Stephen Chilton, “Defining Political Culture.” In: *The Western Political Quarterly* 41/3 (1988), p. 419–445 – Brendon Swedlow, “Political Culture.” In: *Encyclopedia of Modern Political Thought*. Ed. by Michael T. Gibbons, London: Wiley Blackwell 2014, p. 624–626 – Gunnar Folke Schuppert, *Politische Kultur*. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2008 – Karl Rohe, “Politische Kultur und der kulturelle Aspekt von politischer Wirklichkeit. Konzeptionelle und typologische Überlegungen zu Gegenstand und Fragestellung Politischer Kultur-Forschung.” In: Dirk Berg-Schlösser / Jakob Schissler (Eds.), *Politische Kultur in Deutschland. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1987, p. 39–49.

¹⁶ Cf. Mark L. Haas, *Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989*. Ithaca / NY: Cornell UP 2005 – Michael Freedman / Lyman Tower Sargent / Marc Stearns (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2013.

¹⁷ The classic study still is: Sir Charles Kingsley Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841*. 2 vols. London: Bell 1969 – Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*. London: Panther 1972 – David Stuart Brown, *Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1846–1855*. Ph.D. University of Southampton 1998 – Idem, *Palmerston*. New Haven: Yale UP 2010 – Donald Southgate, ‘*The Most English Minister*’: *The Policies and Politics of Palmerston*. London: Macmillan 1966 – Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830–1902*. Oxford: Oxford UP 1970, p. 26–46 – Algernon Cecil, *British Foreign Secretaries 1807–1916. Studies in Personality and Polity*. London: Bell and Sons 1927, p. 133–225 – Palmerston’s private papers, The Broadland Papers, are stored in

Metternich held office as Foreign Secretary and State Chancellor between 1809 and 1848.¹⁸ Together with Lord Castlereagh he was one of the architects of the Vienna System of 1815. Between 1830 and 1834 Palmerston and Metternich clashed over different perceptions of security and European policy. Palmerston's and Metternich's ideas on international policy, on European security, on the best political system and how to solve domestic and international problems differed widely. This can be explained by analyzing these examples:

1. The Revolution of July 1830,
2. The question of Belgium and Luxembourg,
3. Crisis management in the German Confederation 1831/32,
4. The uprisings in Italy and Poland of 1830–31.

It was in essence a question of European security, but also a question of the role and status of their respective states, Austria and Britain, in the European system.

Their relation was poisoned by personal animosity. They did not appreciate each other and the British Ambassador to Vienna, Frederic Lamb, quite often had to mediate, to explain Metternich's motives and to try to convince Palmerston that his political positions were exaggerated and not appropriate. Palmerston and Metternich were ideological opponents, the Liberal against the Conservative. Both men were to a large extent responsible for the formation of ideological blocks in Europe in 1833/34 and beyond. It was the first time that the Chaumont Quadruple Alliance of 1814 split. It culminated in the formation of ideological blocks in Europe.¹⁹ When the Franco-British alliance was formed in 1832²⁰ Metternich was

the University of Southampton Library (hereinafter USL-BP) . They are especially interesting for the correspondence with Frederick Lamb (Lord Beauvale), Frederick Villier (Lord Clarendon), Lord Bulwer and Lord Minto (also National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh [hereinafter NLS] Minto MSS 12023, 12025 – F. Roy Bridge / Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–1914*. London: Pearson Education / Routledge 2005, 2013 (1980), p. 86ff. – Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale*. London: The Athlone Press 1974.

¹⁸ Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *Metternich. Staatsmann und Diplomat im Zeitalter der Restauration*. Munich: Diederichs 1996 – Idem, *Metternich et la France après le Congrès de Vienna*. 3 vols. Paris: Hachette 1968-1971 – Alan Palmer, *Metternich. The Councillor of Europe*. London: Faber and Faber 2010 (1997) – Idem, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann Europas*. Munich: Claassen 1986 – Wolfram Siemann, *Metternich. Staatsmann zwischen Restauration und Moderne*. Munich: C. H. Beck 2010 – Idem, *Metternich, Stratege und Visionär*. Munich: C. H. Beck 2016 – Idem, *Metternich. Strategist and Visionary*. Cambridge London: Harvard UP 2019 – Miroslav Šedivý, *Metternich. The Great Powers and the Eastern Question*. Pilsen: University of West Bohemia 2013 – Idem, *The Decline of the Congress System. Metternich, Italy and European Diplomacy*. London: I. B. Tauris 2018 – Idem, "Metternich and the Italian League Myth in 1833." In: *Prague Papers in the History of International Relations* 2/2015, 7–15 – Alan J. Reinerman, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*. 2 vols. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press 1979/1989.

¹⁹ Still valuable and enlightening is Heinz Gollwitzer, "Ideologische Blockbildung als Bestandteil internationaler Politik in 19. Jahrhundert." In: *Historische Zeitschrift* 201/1965, p. 306-333 – Idem, "Der erste Karlistenkrieg und das Problem der internationalen Parteigängerschaft." In: *Historische Zeitschrift* 176/1953, p. 479–520.

not alarmed. “He feels it to be impossible” he mentioned to the British ambassador to Vienna “that it should ever be carried to an extent which would be dangerous to the rest of Europe.” Therefore Metternich “has no uneasiness upon the subject.”²¹ The support of the King of the Netherlands in the Belgian question and the acceptance of King Leopold by France led to a “cordial good understanding” between Britain and France. Palmerston believed that the cooperation between Britain and France could “preserve peace and stability in Europe.”²² From Palmerston’s point of view the basis of this Entente “was not belief, but practice. Like the Foxites, he saw the union of the two powers as a security against the despotism and aggression of the eastern powers. For Palmerston, however, it was also a means whereby England could contain France, forcing her to accept a secondary role, particularly in Western Europe. Palmerston saw the *entente as an unequal relationship*, England leading and France following.”²³ It was an entente not an alliance. For Palmerston therefore it was not an ideological cooperation but an entente for British interests. It was pragmatic, security and economy oriented.

The Eastern powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia) signed the Convention of Münchengrätz in September 1833.²⁴ It was the commitment of the conservative powers to the principle of intervention. Palmerston’s predecessor as Foreign Secretary in the Wellington government, George Hamilton Gordon Earl of Aberdeen held differing views on the state of Europe and how to preserve European peace. Whereas Palmerston was using foreign policy to “cultivate a liberal image in public”²⁵ Aberdeen “consistently sought to smooth over tensions with other countries. He was much more sympathetic to the existing settlement in Europe than Palmerston.”²⁶ When the convention of Münchengrätz was concluded, in a letter to Princess Lieven Aberdeen he expressed his satisfaction with the meeting of the Emperor of Austria and the Czar of Russia and the cooperation of the Eastern powers, “because it held out the prospect of arresting the progress of revolution in Europe; [...] It is on the cordial and intimate union of the

²⁰ Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (note 18), p. 6ff. – Bourne, *Foreign Policy of Victorian England* (note 18), p. 32f.

²¹ Lamb – Palmerston 20 December 1832 / 4 January 1833 (USL BP GC BE 68).

²² Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (note 18), p. 7.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 7f.

²⁴ Cf. AMAE M.D. “Note sur la politique du gouvernement français en Allemagne” Avril 1834 – *ibid.*, “Reunion de Munchengraetz” 1834 mémoire – *ibid.*, “Plan d’une convention secrète entre les Cabinets de St. Petersbourg, de Vienne et de Berlin a l’égard de la situation politique actuelle de l’Europe et de règles trancées pour les Cours de second Ordre qui suivent leur Système” – Frédéric F. Martens, (Ed.), *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Étrangères*. Vol. 4.1. St. Petersburg: A Böhnke 1878, p. 445–449 – Webster, *Foreign Policy of Palmerston I* (note 18), p. 349ff. – Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (note 19), p. 549ff. – Sédouy, *Le Concert Européen* (note 4), p. 238ff.

²⁵ History of Government: Lord Aberdeen (<https://history.blog.gov.uk/2016/06/29/lord-aberdeen> accessed 9 September 2019).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Northern Powers that the chance is afforded of preserving the tranquility and happiness of Europe against the disorganizing and revolutionary policy of the present Governments of England and France. The present government of England is revolutionary by choice; that of France by necessity.”²⁷ As a reaction to Münchengraetz, in 1834 the Western powers concluded the Quadruple Alliance between the liberal powers of Britain, France, Spain and Portugal.²⁸ When he was working on a concept for a Quadruple Alliance, Palmerston considered the positive outcome. In a private letter to the British ambassador to Austria, Frederick Lamb, he spoke about the advantages of such an alliance: “We shall soon be able to add Spain & Portugal to the Anglo-French Alliance. It will be Western Europe against Eastern Europe, the Liberal and Constitutional against the Despotic States. The Contest will be a moral one only, because the West will not wish for War, & the East will not dare to make it. But the West will gain upon the East, & the East will be obliged to be more moderate in their tone and their measures. The Western Union will have a natural attraction for other associates, the Eastern a natural repulsion.”²⁹ Palmerston hoped that the quadruple alliance, the liberal alliance, would have a wider and also more lasting significance than the special case of the Iberian Peninsula.³⁰ He carried his “quadruple alliance through the Cabinet as a *coup de main*, taking them by surprise and leaving them no time to make objections” he wrote to his brother Sir William Temple.³¹ He reckoned that this alliance would be “a great stroke. In the first place it will settle Portugal and go some way to settle Spain also. But, what is of more permanent and extensive importance, it establishes a quadruple alliance between the constitutional states of the west, which will serve as a counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the east.”³² In a private letter to the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Granville, Palmerston wrote that he was convinced, that the Treaty of 22 April 1834 “would have a more powerful effect in Europe.” Beyond settling the affairs of the Peninsula it would “create a moral and Political Force in the West which would effectually counterbalance the Eastern League.”³³ Palmerston also planned to set up a free trade era for the liberal alliance of the West which would include Britain, France,

²⁷ Aberdeen – Princess Lieven 8.11.1833 British Library (hereinafter BL) Additional Manuscripts (hereinafter Add. MSS) Aberdeen Papers 43052.

²⁸ Treaty between Great Britain, France, Portugal and Spain, for the Pacification of the Peninsula. Signed London, 22nd April, 1834. In: Michael Hurst (Ed.), *Key Treaties of the Great Powers 1814–1914*, Vol. 1: 1814–1870. Newton Abbot: David & Charles 1972, p. 332–335, p. 325–237 (Additional Articles 18 August 1834) – cf. also: Ridley, *Palmerston* (note 18), 225ff. – Copy of the Convention between Britain, France, Spain and Portugal of 22 April 1834 (The National Archives London, Public Record Office (hereinafter: NA PRO) F.O. 244/45).

²⁹ Palmerston – Lamb (Vienna) 14 November 1833 private (USL-BP GC/BE 459).

³⁰ Cf. Bullen, *Palmerston Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (note 18), p. 1–25.

³¹ Palmerston – Temple private 21 April 1834 (USL-BP / GC/ TE 219).

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Palmerston – Granville private 11 April 1834 (NA PRO Granville Papers 30/29/415).

Spain, Portugal and Belgium. The tension between the liberal Western powers and the conservative Eastern powers until 1839 was one of the elements that precluded a final solution to the Belgium–Luxembourg question, pending since the foundation of a sovereign Belgian national state in 1830/31. It finally came about when there was a rapprochement between Britain and Russia as far as the Eastern question was concerned.³⁴ In the summer of 1839 Palmerston realized that the Entente with France “had failed in the Near East as in Western Europe, but he was not however ready to acknowledge its failure publicly.”³⁵ When the Russian diplomat Ernest Philip Baron Brunnow came to London in September of 1839 and again in December to negotiate the Eastern question with the British government, Palmerston immediately responded positively to the Russian overture.³⁶ Since France still supported Mehmed Ali the ruler of Egypt, Britain and the Eastern Powers in July 1840 concluded a convention on the Eastern question without France.³⁷ Thus Metternich and Palmerston found a common ground for handling the crisis of the Eastern Question and the Rhine Crisis of 1840.³⁸

In this essay I would like to draw attention to a highly complex, “structuralist” approach. My first case will deal with the impact of the French Revolution of July and the European war crises between 1830 and 1832. The European great powers tried to avoid military confrontations and tried to find the means to quell the seemingly revolutionary threat in France and elsewhere in Europe. It will be exemplified by analyzing the direct and indirect impact of the events in France on society and state in the member states of the German Confederation, in the United Netherlands, and all over Europe.

2. The Clash of Personalities: Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston

Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, was born in London in 1784. “His lifetime had been a period of extraordinary change, and a link between two different eras.”³⁹ He was born when Louis XVI was still King of France, Frederick

³⁴ Cf. Webster, *Palmerston*, vol. 2 (note 18), p. 619ff. – Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (note 19), p. 777ff. — Idem, *Crisis among the Great Powers. The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question*. London New York 2017, p. 49ff.

³⁵ Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (note 18), p. 19.

³⁶ Ridley, *Palmerston* (note 18), p. 313f. – Baumgart, *Europäisches Konzert* (note 4), p. 298 – Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (note 19), p. 779–781.

³⁷ Convention between Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Turkey, for the Pacification of the Levant, signed at London, 15th July, 1840, in: Hurst, *Key Treaties I* (note 29), No. 38, p. 252.253.

³⁸ Šedivý, *Crisis among the Great Powers* (note 35), p. 37ff. – Wolf D. Gruner, “Der Deutsche Bund, die deutschen Verfassungsstaaten und die Rheinkrise. Überlegungen zu einer deutschen und europäischen Krise.” In: *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 53/1990, p. 51–78.

³⁹ Ridley, *Palmerston* (note 18), p. 15.

the Great ruled Prussia and Katherine the Great was Czarina of Russia. His family belonged to the British and Irish (Anglo-Irish) aristocracy. From 1792–1794 the Palmerston family travelled on the Continent and visited France and Italy. Thus he experienced the impact of the Revolution in France. On his Continental Tour Palmerston especially enjoyed Italy. He learnt to speak and write Italian. Palmerston was educated at Harrow and studied political economy at the University of Edinburgh. There he was a student of Professor Donald Stewart. He accepted the doctrines of Stewart and Adam Smith “wholeheartedly, and never changed his views on economics [...] Throughout all the years at the Foreign Office, he was always ready, at the least excuse, to include in his dispatches to foreign governments an exposition of Stewart’s views on the merits of free trade.”⁴⁰ At Cambridge he studied for a “Noble’s degree” Master. In 1802 he succeeded to the Irish peerage of his father and beginning with 1807 was a member of the House of Commons. From 1809 to 1828 he served in different British governments as Under-Secretary at War. He joined the government when Lord Castlereagh had to resign after his duel with Canning. Castlereagh served as Foreign Secretary after 1812 and as the Leader of the House of Commons until his suicide in 1822.⁴¹ Alongside Metternich, he was one of the architects of the new European order and of the international multipolar system which came about in 1815, and closely cooperated with Metternich. Palmerston for a long time supported Castlereagh’s foreign and domestic policy. After Castlereagh’s suicide he was lamenting his death: “There could not have been a greater loss to the government [...] and few greater to the country at the present moment, in the House of Commons we cannot replace him. I conclude Canning must come in.”⁴² Despite this suggestion that Canning should succeed to Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary—which was the case—Palmerston never became a real Canningite. When Canning died his death was welcomed by Metternich, who considered him as a man who was “a whole revolution in himself alone” and he “thanked the merciful Providence for delivering Europe and the World from this ‘malevolent meteor’ and ‘Scourge of the world’,”⁴³ and Friedrich von Gentz wrote that this was “an event which may transform the whole policy of Europe.”⁴⁴ Palmerston was “one of Canning’s men.”

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 32f.

⁴¹ On Castlereagh cf. Sir Charles Kingsley Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812–1815*. London: Bell and Sons 1950 – Idem, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822*. London: Bell and Sons 1925 – Algernon Cecil, *British Foreign Secretaries 1807–1916* (note 18), p. 1–51 – John W. Derry, *Castlereagh*. London: Alan Lane 1976 – Christopher John Bartlett, *Castlereagh*. London: Macmillan 1966 – John Bew, *Castlereagh. The Biography of a Statesman*. London: Quercus 2014.

⁴² Palmerston – Sullivan, Palmerston’s brother-in-law, quoted from Ridley, *Palmerston* (note 18), p. 112.

⁴³ Metternich quoted in: Harold W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827*. London: Frank Cass 1966 (1925), p. 446 (Metternich’s instructions to England). Ibid., p. 446 (Gentz).

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 446 (Gentz).

For “twenty years he stuck where he was, a relatively minor figure, uncertain of his future and largely ignored in the political infighting that went on around him.”⁴⁵ He did not have a seat in the Cabinet. In 1827 King George IV, who disliked Palmerston, objected to the nomination of Palmerston for the Treasury and other posts, like Home Secretary, in the Cabinet. When the Wellington government had to resign after they lost their majority in the general parliamentary elections of 1830, Lord Grey formed a coalition government of Whigs and Tories. Palmerston after some delay in November of 1830 took over the Foreign Office.⁴⁶ He had welcomed the Revolution of July. In a letter to his wife he wrote: “This event is decisive of the ascendancy of Liberal Principles throughout Europe; the evil spirit has been put down and will be trodden under foot. The reign of Metternich is over.”⁴⁷ Palmerston had a different perception of a European balance of power and the role of the Concert of Europe than Castlereagh. Castlereagh rested his balance policy on the Vienna arrangements. “The idea of security against aggression through a system of common defence of a stable territorial order was Castlereagh’s contribution to the balance of power theory of the Concert of Europe. Later statesmen, with less experience of coalition war and European reconstruction had other ideas. Palmerston’s references to the doctrine of the balance of power were more explicit than Castlereagh’s. In the age of European war and peace congresses, when the idea enjoyed general acceptance, it was possible to take its meaning for granted. Castlereagh could let it pervade his European thought without attempting to extract it for definition and analysis.”⁴⁸ Being one of the architects of the Vienna system, maintaining “the balance to him meant upholding the existing boundaries. It was this identification of European balance of power with the established distribution of territory which enabled him to combine the balance of power theory with the conservative theory of the Concert of Europe.”⁴⁹ Whereas “Castlereagh was a good European, Palmerston was a passionate nationalist.”⁵⁰ Palmerston perceived the concept of the Concert of Europe rather as an instrument for maintaining the balance of power. For him the idea of the Concert of Europe was less important than for Castlereagh’s thinking. However, both “statesmen thought of the Concert of Europe as a means for maintaining balance of power. But their notions of the end differed almost as much as their concepts on the means. Palmerston’s idea of the balance of power was less static than Castlereagh’s. [...] Palmerston saw the idea of the balance of power

⁴⁵ Bourne, *Foreign Policy of Victorian England* (note 18), p. 26.

⁴⁶ Webster, *Foreign Policy of Palmerston I* (note 18), p. 5ff.

⁴⁷ Mabell Countess of Airlie (Ed.), *Lady Palmerston and her times*. 2 vols. London: Hodder and Stoughton 1922, vol. 1, p. 173 – also cited in Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente cordiale* (note 18), p. 5 (there are several reprints 2017).

⁴⁸ Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe. A Study in German and British International Theory 1815–1914*. London: Longman 1970, p. 138.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

transcended the reality of the established distribution of territory. When adherence to the political principle conflicted with the respect for the legal fact, he put politics above law.”⁵¹ During his time as Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the 1830s he resorted to the European Concert “when there was a danger of a great power subduing a weaker state.”⁵² His means to counter aggression, dominating influence or threats of invasion was, like in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, to call a conference to keep the peace of Europe.

Count Clemens von Metternich was born in 1773 in Koblenz.⁵³ He was the descendant of an old noble family of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in the Rhineland. From 1788 to 1790 Metternich studied Public Law and Diplomacy at the University of Strasbourg. He was a witness to the French Revolution of 1789 when studying in Strasbourg. In 1790 he moved to the University of Mayance. When Mayance was occupied by French Revolutionary troops Metternich fled to Brussels in the Austrian Netherlands. There, again, he experienced the occupation of the Southern Netherlands by the French. Like his father, Metternich escaped to Vienna and entered the Austrian diplomatic service. At his first diplomatic post at Dresden he met Friedrich Gentz,⁵⁴ who had translated Burke’s book into German and had written many articles on the balance of power, who discussed with him the principle of the

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 141.

⁵² Ibid., p. 139.

⁵³ For biographical data about Prince Metternich cf.: Siemann, *Metternich: Staatsmann* (note 19) – Idem, *Metternich: Strategie Visionär* (Metternich. Strategist and Visionary) (note 19) – Idem, *Der Wiener Kongress 1814/15. Restauration, Rekonstruktion oder imperiale Neuordnung Europas?* Vienna: Picus 2017– Enno E. Kraehe, *Metternich’s German Policy Vol. 1: The Contest with Napoleon 1799–1814*. Princeton: Princeton UP 1963 – Idem, *Metternich’s German Policy. Vol. 2. The Congress of Vienna 1814–1815*. Princeton: Princeton UP 1983 – Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*. 3 vols. München: Bruckmann 1925–1952 – F. J. Grobauer, *Ein Kämpfer für Europa. Metternich*. Wien: Union Verlag ¹¹1961 – Alan Palmer, *Metternich. Eine Biographie* (Orig. Metternich, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1972). Düsseldorf: Claassen 1972 – David Ward, 1848: *The Fall of Metternich and the Year of Revolution*. London: Hamish Hamilton 1970 – Alan Sked, *Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan 2008.

⁵⁴ Cf. Friedrich Gentz, *Ueber den Ursprung und Charakter des Krieges gegen die Französische Revolution*. Berlin: Heinrich Frölich 1801 – Idem, *Fragmente aus der neuesten Geschichte des Gleichgewichtes in Europa (Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe*. Translated from the German of the Chevalier Fred. Gentz. London 1806). St. Peterburg: ²1806 (Reprint in: Günther Kronenbitter (Ed.), *Friedrich von Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften* vol. IV. Hildesheim Zürich New York: Olms Weidemann 1997) – Idem, *On the State of Europe before and after the French Revolution being an answer to the work entitled De l’État de la France à la fin de l’an VIII*. London 1804 – Paul Robinson Sweet, *Friedrich von Gentz. Defender of the Old Order*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1941 – Raphael Cahen, *Friedrich Gentz 1764–1832. Penseur post-lumière et acteur du nouvel ordre européen*. Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg 2017 – Harro Zimmermann, *Friedrich Gentz. Die Erfindung der Realpolitik*. Paderborn: Schöningh 2012 – Golo Mann, *Friedrich von Gentz. Gegenspieler Napoleons, Vordenker Europas*. Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer 2011 (1995 / 1947).

balance of power. Gentz and Metternich were considered the two leading advocates “of the conservative ideas of the Concert.”⁵⁵ In 1809 Metternich became Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post he held until 1848. Together with Lord Castlereagh he was the architect of the European post-1815 order, the European Concert and creator of a multipolar international system based on a secure balance of power.

For Metternich the experience and impact of the French Revolution, the occupation of the Habsburg Netherlands by the French Revolutionaries, the escape to Vienna and the influence of his academic teachers at Strasbourg and Mayence and also his friendship with Gentz played an important role in shaping his political ideas. Most recent research has shown that Metternich was rather a “visionary” and can no longer be labeled as a “reactionary.”⁵⁶ One of the reasons to hold the final Congress of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Vienna was to demonstrate that Austria was still an important European great power, despite the state bankruptcy (“Staatsbankrott”) of 1811. Since a reformed structure of the Old Empire headed by an Austrian Emperor did not come about, it was of high priority that the successor organization to the Old Empire, the German Confederation, could be used as a power base for Austria. In 1831 the French envoy to Frankfurt reported home that the Austrian policy towards the Confederation was following the “axiome: “La Confédération Germanique, c’est l’Autriche.”⁵⁷ From Metternich’s point of view the German Confederation was considered as a backup for securing Austria’s interests as a European great power. During the War crisis of 1830/31 when Prussia tried to form a military convention between the South German states and Prussia, Metternich in the autumn of 1830 was considering to dissolve the German Confederation.

In October 1831 the Hamburg representative to the German Diet in Frankfurt, Karl Sieveking, asked the British envoy if he had any information concerning an Austrian project to dissolve the German Confederation: “The project appears to be, to extent to the Minor German States, the System of Neutrality which has been acknowledged in Belgium, and if the Confederation were to be dissolved under such Circumstances. The defensive position of Austria with respect to France would only be strengthened by the interposition of Bavaria, Wirtemberg and Baden as neutral powers between them.”⁵⁸ Was Austria fatigued of the German Confederation? Austria was a German power and therefore the German Confederation was highly important for Austria’s standing as a European power. From Metternich’s point of view “Austria had a decisive and very special role to play in connection to the issue of whether another revolution would take place. If a revolution would take hold of all Germany, it would also reach Italy and then

⁵⁵ Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe* (note 49), p. 16.

⁵⁶ For more details cf. Siemann, *Metternich. Stratege und Revolutionär* (note 19).

⁵⁷ Alleye – MAE. Frankfurt 4 May 1831 (*AMAE C.P. Allemagne 777*).

⁵⁸ NA PRO F.O. 30/35 No. 133 secret Cartwright – Palmerston Frankfurt 22 October 1831.

Austria. That would also mean the end of the German Confederation.”⁵⁹ Austria would stay a German and European power if Germany was lost. The threat to withdraw from Germany was a “*déjà vu*” in Metternich’s lifetime ever since the Peace Treaty of Basle in 1795. For Metternich “this sort of situation was a recurring challenge.”⁶⁰ This was also true for the 1830s. Metternich could not prevent the introduction of constitutions in the South German States and the establishment of a bi-cameral representative system in 1818, 1819 and 1820. The constitutional states thus created for themselves room to maneuver in the affairs of the Confederation. The liberals in the Landtage (Diets) were asking for more rights in 1830/31. At the Hambach Festival on Pentecost in May 1832⁶¹—originally planned to commemorate the Bavarian Constitution of 1818—some speakers were demanding a united Germany and an all-German parliament. Therefore Metternich was fighting for the monarchical principle, against the surge of liberalism and the scourge of revolution. The threat to dissolve the German Confederation was a means to get the support of the smaller German states which feared for their existence if the Confederation was disintegrated. Till after the revolutions of 1848/49 the non-constitutional German great powers cooperated in the affairs of the German Confederation. They could always use the fear of the smaller German states to vote with Austria and Prussia, like in the Rhine Crisis of 1840.⁶²

3. The French Revolution of July, the International System, the European Crises of 1830/31 and the Member States of the German Confederation 1830–1832

One week before the outbreak of the French Revolution on 27 July 1830 the Hanoverian chief minister Count Munster wrote in a letter to his ministers in Hanover that France remained in the limelight of political interest. Anyone besides the king and Polignac was agitated. The king was optimistic. He placed his confidence in the Army. In short: James II of England was back on stage. Munster’s final remark was: “If only this could pass for Europe peacefully.”⁶³ It did not for France. Charles X’s and Polignac’s plan to purge the liberal majority of the Upper Chamber and to limit the electorate provided the climate for revolution.

⁵⁹ Siemann, Metternich. Strategist and Visionary (note 19), p. 596.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München (hereinafter BHStAM) Ministerium des Innern (hereinafter MI) 46025-46025 – ibid Ministerium des Könighchen Hauses und des Äußern (hereinafter MA) 99503 – ibid. (Bayerische Gesandtschaft Bundestag (hereinafter Ges. BT) 326 – J. G. A. Wirth, *Das Nationalfest der Deutschen zu Hambach*. Neustadt a. H.: Philipp Christmann 1832.

⁶² Cf. Gruner, “Der Deutsche Bund, die deutschen Verfassungsstaaten und die Rheinkrise von 1840” (note 39), pp. 66ff.G

⁶³ Münster – Bremer, London 21 July 1830 (Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv Hannover (hereinafter NHStAH) Dep. 110 / A 149).

After the “trois glorieuses” Paris was under the control of the revolutionaries. The grand bourgeoisie, however, managed to channel the revolutions towards peaceful changes. The news of the successful revolution in France spread all over Europe. The European and also the German governments feared that the revolutionary spirit and the spark of revolution would sweep across the French border into Germany and other bordering states. Would the successful revolution in France encourage the liberals and radicals all over Europe to follow France? How would the events in France influence political opinion in the States of the German Confederation and other European states?

To deal with these questions I have chosen for Germany the “model of the three levels.” For methodological purposes as well as for analytical reasons it is quite useful to use this approach. I would like to emphasize that there does exist a firm interdependency

... between the contemporary international system and the impact of the Revolution of July on the system,

... the German Confederation and the impact of the Revolution of July on its political and constitutional system and

... the impact of the Revolution in France on the state members of the German Confederation, especially the South German states of Baden and Bavaria which have a direct borderline with adjacent revolutionary France and also on the non-constitutional states of the Confederation like the Electorate of Hesse, the Kingdoms of Hanover and Saxony and on the city states of Lübeck, Bremen, Hamburg, and Frankfurt.

3.1. The International System and the Revolution of July

One of the basic ideas of the peacemakers of 1814/15 had been not to dismember France in the Treaty of Peace, but to readmit France as a European great power as soon as possible to the inner circle of the major European powers. Thus France after the 1814 Paris Treaty of Peace was invited to participate at the Congress of Vienna. After the second Treaty of Peace with France in 1815 Northern France was occupied by allied troops.⁶⁴ This was a setback for France. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 it returned into the European Concert. France was, as a “matter of necessity not of courtesy,” treated as an equal partner of the “European Security Council” by the victorious allies.⁶⁵ In 1818 Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia had agreed on secret articles which renewed the

⁶⁴ Cf. Beatrice de Graaf, *Tegen terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werde na Napoleon*. Amsterdam: Prometheus 2018. Esp. p. 117 ff.

⁶⁵ Roger Bullen, “France and Europe 1815–1848. The Problem of Defeat and Recovery.” In: Alan Sked (Ed.), *Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848*. London: Macmillan 1979, p. 122–144, p. 129.

Quadruple Alliance of 1814 and 1815. Any Revolution in France or any aggressive military policy of France should be answered by a common military action of the allies of Chaumont in order to maintain and secure the peace of Europe. The members of the “European Security Council”⁶⁶ were—because of differing national interests—divided on many European issues. The four great power signatories to the treaty of Chaumont of 1814 had in common, however, the fear of French aggression and a new revolution in France, despite the containment of France through a security system.⁶⁷ France, however, still considered herself as being the “Queen of the Continent” and the “puissance principale du continent européen” as a French memorandum of 1819 stated.⁶⁸ From this point of view it was of vital interest for France that the “pacte fédéral” of the German Confederation was not violated by Austria and Prussia⁶⁹ since this would “changerait tout en tout la grandeur relative de la France. L’unité d’influence produirait le meme effet [...] Il est donc, pour la France d’une importance extrême que l’Allemagne ne soit pas abandonnée aux seule influence de deux puissances préponderantes.”⁷⁰ As far as Germany was concerned France considered herself as guardian of the treaties of Vienne. The interventions of France in 1832, 1834 and 1851 underlined this perception. After the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle France built up her naval forces and her army for an armed peace and for strengthening her power political position on the continent. In the early 1820s it participated in actions of the European conservative powers. On the other hand France wanted to exploit the rivalries of the other great powers in Europe and overseas for French recovery and new predominance. Since the differences between Great Britain and Russia were growing, France in the 1820s wanted to promote a Franco-Russian rapprochement. In the late 1820s France considered Anglo-Russian tensions and Austro-Russian differences over a peaceful settlement of the Greek question as the best “opportunity to revive (her) [...] suit at St. Petersburg.”⁷¹ The long term aim of

⁶⁶ Cf. Matthias Schulz, *Normen und Praxis. Das europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815-1860*. Munich: Oldenbourg 2009.

⁶⁷ Cf. Wolf D. Gruner, “The German Confederation: Cornerstone of the European Security System. In: de Graaf et al., *Securing Europe after Napoleon*.(note 11) , p. 150–167.

⁶⁸ *AMAE Mémoires et Documents* (hereinafter M.D.) 121 “Note sur les affaires de l’Allemagne,” 30 January 1819 – cf. also Wolf D. Gruner, “Frankreich in der europäischen Ordnung des 19. Jahrhunderts.” In: Idem / Klaus-Jürgen Müller (Eds.), *Über Frankreich nach Europa*. Hamburg: Krämer 1996, p. 201–271, p. 210 ff.

⁶⁹ The first French envoy to the German Confederation, Count Reinhard, was instructed in connection to the secondary German states, the ‘Third Germany,’ to “faire sentir aux états secondaires combien il serait fâcheux pour eux de eglier une occasion de se lier par un pacte fédérale propre à affermir leur indépendance, et que les grandes puissances qui, ne pouvant en faire partie, verraient avec un très grand plaisir” (*AMAE C. P. Allmagne 752 Instruction pour Reinhard 5 December 1815*).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Bullen, “France and Europe” (note 54), p. 135.

French policy up to the Italian War of 1859 was to break up the Vienna settlement of 1815 and to replace it by a revision of the treaties in her favor. As a result of the Russian-Ottoman War France expected a division of the Ottoman Empire and a territorial reorganization of Europe. France wanted to regain her “natural boundaries.” This was a French long-term aim to regain “ses anciennes limites et une partie de la rive gauche du Rhin.”⁷² In a memoire “sur un progrès de partage de l’empire Ottoman,” written in September of 1829, the French Foreign Secretary Polignac stated: “L’acquisition de la Belgique est strictement défensive qu’elle a pour objet de mettre à couvert la capitale de la France, qui est trop proche de la frontière et par conséquent sous le coup d’une invasion possible.”⁷³ These plans failed when Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Adrianople.⁷⁴ The French expedition to Algiers to “relieve” Europe in 1830 was no real success. One of the major reasons for the failure of French ambitions in 1829/30 was due to the fact that the other great European powers were afraid of the French potential. They feared that an improved potential would enable France to create the twin-headed monster of revolution and war,⁷⁵ or as the radical French newspaper *Le National* stated in August 1831: the capability of the French to call for the war of the people of Europe against the kings of Europe.

These fears made co-operation of the allies of “the late war against France” a necessity, i.e. in periods of “French danger” they were prepared to set aside power political and ideological differences. It had already become clear since the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle that the great European powers did not want to dogmatize the principle of legitimacy. Legitimacy had become a means to justify ideological, power political or national interests. Thus, the international system had gained an adaptability which allowed it to survive for almost a century. The news from Paris shocked the ruling elites in Europe, although there were many, especially in the constitutional states, who believed that the Bourbons, having violated the Charte of 1814 “richly deserved their fate” (Greville). The revolutionary explosion of the “trois glorieuses” and the bourgeois takeover constituted the clear success of the dominating class in trade and industry. It was also most important for the leaders of the European powers that the new “king of

⁷² AMAE M. D. 121: “Note sur les affaires de l’Allemagne,” 30 January 1819 – cf. also Guillaume Bertier de Sauvigny, *La Restauration. (The Bourbon Restoration.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1967). Paris: Flammarion 1993 (1955), p. 375 ff. with references to political documents and articles in the press. Martens.

⁷³ AMAE C. P. Russie 179: Mémoire sur un progrès de partage de l’empire Ottoman, note rédigé pour le Dauphin, lettre confidentiel du Prince de Polignac au Duc de Montemare, Paris Septembre 1829, also quoted in Karl Hammer, *Die französische Diplomatie der Restauration und Deutschland 1814–1830.* Stuttgart: Paul Hiersemann 1963, p. 155ff., p. 159.

⁷⁴ Cf. also Šedivý, *Metternich and the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (chapter 9 – note 19), p. 285ff.

⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 409ff.

the French,” though “assuming the character of a Jacobin King and acting like an American President and thus unbecoming a descendant of Louis XIV” as Greville complained in his diary, had replaced Charles X and not a President of the French republic.⁷⁶ As the British envoy to the Federal Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt had reported to London the establishment of a republic in France would have been considered by the courts of Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg “as an event which would entirely change the view which the (Courts) [...] take of the subject (i.e. revolution in France, WDG), and, that in that case, not only would an intervention be looked upon as necessary and probable, but, that [...] England would join in such an intervention.”⁷⁷ The expulsion of the legitimate French king and the election of the Duke of Orleans as Louis Philippe by the *Assemblée Nationale* as “roi des Français” sworn in on the new French constitution put the European powers in an embarrassing position. The dethronement of Charles X and the revolution in Paris according to the secret treaties of 1815 and 1818 demanded the *casus foederis*, i.e. an allied intervention. For the time being the European powers, for various reasons, did not want to intervene, i.e. they did not want to materialize their obligations under treaty for the maintenance of the principle of legitimacy. Russia alone was prepared before the uprisings in Poland in November 1830 to intervene militarily in favor of the Bourbon king. The Russian foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, wanted to restrain the tsar from an intervention in Western Europe. He argued that Russian intervention under the cover of the abstract principle of legitimacy would neither mean the slightest advantage nor further territorial acquisitions. At Carlsbad Metternich and Nesselrode had agreed that the European powers should not intervene if France would respect the borders fixed in 1814/15 and 1815, and if she would not intervene into the domestic affairs of other European states.⁷⁸ All great powers were more or less willing “to avoid giving rise to any expectations or apprehensions.” Their national interest for security—domestic and European—social and military expenditure demanded peace. To prevent a radicalization of the revolution in France and to foster the spread of a great democratic spirit, it was Great Britain who took the lead in recognizing the new regime in France. Prime Minister Wellington in a Memorandum in mid-August 1830 discussed the international situation after the revolution in France and British options. An allied intervention could mean a civil war in France and the outbreak of a general European war. British national, global, economic and security interests made it imperative that the regime in France,

⁷⁶ BL Add. MSS Greville Papers 41102 (August 14–20, 1830).

⁷⁷ NA PRO F.O. 30/41 Chad – Aberdeen Frankfurt 9 August 1830.

⁷⁸ Cf. Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch*. 3 Bde. München: Bruckmann 31957 (1925, 1954), vol. 1, p. 649 – Ernst Molden, *Die Orientpolitik des Fürsten Metternich 1829–1833*. Wien: Eduard Hölzel Verlag. 1913, p. 119 (text of ‘Chiffon de Carlsbad’).

although lacking legitimacy, be recognized in order to avoid further radicalization.⁷⁹ He argued “that the only feeble hope that we have in maintaining the peace of the world is in the character and moderation of the Duc d’Orléans.” Good policy requires “that we should recognize the Duc d’Orléans as king at an early period.”⁸⁰ The early recognition of Louis Philippe by the British government⁸¹ speeded up the recognition by the other great powers and avoided a Four-Power Conference on France which Prussia was proposing.⁸² Especially the Austrian Chancellor Metternich and the Prussian government, for various, reasons were not willing to intervene, despite the treaties concluded in 1814, 1815 and 1818. This was an important step for stabilizing the domestic situation in France. The willingness of the British to cooperate allowed for an influence on French politics. The British decision had a favorable impact, because after the Brussels rising and the events that later on would lead to the separation of the Southern Netherlands from the Kingdom of the United Netherlands and the creation of the Kingdom of Belgium, Britain’s security, political power and economic interests would have forced British involvement in any case of French intervention. The crisis over the question of Belgium and Luxemburg became a dominant element of international relations in Europe between 1830 and 1839.⁸³ The Luxemburg question would become still more important for the states of the German Confederation because the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was one of its member states.⁸⁴ The July Revolution had widespread repercussions not only on the Belgian provinces of the Netherlands but also on the western parts of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Soon after the July Revolution there were revolts and uprisings in other European states: the November Uprising 1830 in Poland,⁸⁵ in Italy⁸⁶, in

⁷⁹ The Duke of Wellington, Memorandum “Upon the existing state of the relations with France” 14 August 1830 (BL Add. MSS 41102).

⁸⁰ BL Add. MSS 43059: Memorandum abgedruckt in: A. R. Wellesley, Second Duke of Wellington (Ed.), *Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Duke of Wellington from 1818 to 1832*. 8 vols. London 1867, vol. VII, p. 162-169.

⁸¹ Cf. NA PRO F.O. 7/220 No. 24 Aberdeen-Cowley (Vienna) 27 August 1830 – NA PRO F.O. 244/25 and NA PRO F.O. 208/11 Copies. Notification e.g. to Bavaria: Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv München (hereinafter BStAM) MA 399.

⁸² NA PRO F.O. 244/25 – PRO F.O. 30/31 e.g. No. 45 of 9 September 1830.

⁸³ Boogman, *Nederland en de Duitse Bond*, Vol. 1: 1815–1848 (note 5), p. 14 ff.

⁸⁴ For a detailed study of this complex question cf. Gruner, *Die belgisch-luxemburgische Frage* (note 5), p. 299ff.

⁸⁵ Cf. Clive H. Church, *Europe in 1830*. London: George Allan & Unwin 1983, pp. 107 ff. [For his book the author made use of the results of the contributions to our section at the XVth International Congress of Historical Sciences in Bucharest in 1980].

⁸⁶ ⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 127 ff. – Franco Della Peruta, *Storia dell’ Ottocento. Dalla Restaurazione alla ‘belle époque’*. Florence: Le Monnier 1992, pp. 157ff. – E. Morelli, *Note sul Biennio 1831–2*. Florence: Sansoni 1958 – Simonetta Soldani, “Il 1830 in Europa: dinamica e articolazioni di una crisi generale.” In: *Storie Storici* 1/1972, pp. 34–92 and *ibid*, 2/1972, pp. 338–372 – Marion S. Miller, “Rivoluzioni Mancate – Italian Revolutionary patterns.” In: *CRE Selected Papers 1977*. Athens:

Switzerland,⁸⁷ in the Southern Netherlands,⁸⁸ Luxembourg and as well as in the non-constitutional states of the German Confederation. The liberal movement gained momentum as did the radical-democratic and democratic camps. The reasons for unrest in the German states differed according to region. On the level of the industrial and agrarian strata, however, such occurrences can be attributed to social and economic factors (development of prices and wages, taxes, and tariffs).

3.2. *The German States, the Revolution in France and Its Consequences*

In September 1830 some of the non-constitutional states of the Confederation such as the Duchy of Braunschweig,⁸⁹ the Electorate of Hesse and the Grand Duchy of Hesse were the first states to be affected by the disturbances, followed by areas of the Prussian Rhenish province close to the French and ‘Belgian’ borders, parts of Saxony as well as parts of the Kingdom of Hanover.⁹⁰ For the constitutional states of the South there was danger that the various disturbances in the two Hesses could spread to their own states, especially to Bavaria’s Rhenish province, which was “among the first regions in Central Europe to experience, in an especially acute form, tension between the state and society, or a modernization crisis.”⁹¹

University of Georgia 1978, pp. 67–82 – idem., “The Italian Revolution and the Musical Arena.” In: *CRE Selected Papers 1987*. Athens / Georgia 1987, pp. 607–617 – Idem, *The Italian Revolutions and Regional Popular Culture*. (MS from the author, paper given at the Southern Historical Association Conference at Louisville Kentucky 1984) – Idem., “The Revolutions of 1831 in Italy” (Paper prepared for the XVth International Congress of Historical Sciences in Bucharest 1980) – Emilia Noether, “Risorgimento and Revolution.” Comment. In: *CRE Selected Papers 1987*. Athens, Georgia 1987, pp. 619–628 – Wolf D. Gruner, “Italien zwischen Revolution und Nationalstaatsgründung 1789–1861.” In: Idem / Günter Trautmann (Eds.), *Italien in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Hamburg: Krämer 1991, pp. 105–155, pp. 127 ff.

⁸⁷ Church, *Europe in 1830* (note 86), pp. 59 ff.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 80 ff. – Els Witte / Jan Craeybecks / Alain Meynen, *Political History of Belgium. From 1830 onwards*. Brussels: ASP 2009, pp. 19 ff. – E. H. Kossmann, *The Low Countries 1780–1940*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978, pp. 151 ff.

⁸⁹ Wolf D. Gruner, “Die deutschen Klein- und Mittelstaaten. Ein Sonderfall in der europäischen Geschichte? (The German Small and Middlestates. A Special Case in European History?)” in: Henning Steinführer / Gerd Biegel (Eds.), *1913 – Braunschweig zwischen Monarchie und Moderne*. Braunschweig: Appelhaus Verlag 2015, p. 37–71, p. 50ff.

⁹⁰ Cf. Hans Gerhard Husung, *Protest und Repression im Vormärz. Norddeutschland zwischen Restauration und Revolution*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht 1983, p. 49ff. (Braunschweig), p. 74ff. (Hanover), p. 105ff. (Hamburg), p. 118ff. (Bremen), p. 126ff. (Oldenburg) – Manfred Bullik, *Staat und Gesellschaft im hessischen Vormärz*. Cologne Vienna: Böhlau 1972, p. 43ff. – Michael Hammer, *Kleinstaatliche Revolution in Sachsen 1830/31*. Rede anlässlich des Horst Springer-Preises 1995. (<http://library.fes.de/fulltext/historiker/01132.htm>) (Access 15 September 2019). – Heinrich Volkmann, *Die Krise von 1830. Form, Ursache und Funktion des sozialen Protestes im deutschen Vormärz*. Berlin: Diss. FU 1975, p. 171ff.

⁹¹ Karl H. Wegert, “Ideology and Action: The Liberal Movement and Popular Politics in the Palatinate, 1830–1834 (Paper presented at the Conferences on ‘Liberalismus und Gesellschaft in der Zeit des Hambacher Festes’, Trier May 20–22, 1982. I would like to thank Karl Wegert for making

In Electoral Hesse, corruption, maladministration and moral indignation at a misalliance of the elector were met with opposition by large sections of the population. Social and economic discontent changed into political action. There were disturbances at Fulda, Kassel, Hanau, Hersfeld and around Marburg.⁹² The British envoy to Frankfurt, in a private letter to London, stated that scarcely “a day passes that we do not hear of some new excesses in the immediate vicinity of Frankfurt: the Electorate of Hesse and the Grand Duchy of Hesse are the principal theaters—and the subject of complaint, the douanes.”⁹³ This was especially true of the Grand Duchy. There were also commotions at Heidelberg and Mannheim in the Grand Duchy of Baden against “war taxes.”⁹⁴ The insurrectionary spirit in the Electorate of Hesse was assuming a more serious character. It was reported that the Government at Cassel seemed “paralyzed and fast approaching to dissolution.” The States General sitting at Cassel were drafting a Constitution. They took the “last French one for a model.”⁹⁵ At the end of September the Diet decided to interfere into the affairs of Electoral Hesse.⁹⁶ The Bavarian government, for various reasons, instructed its representative to the German Diet at Frankfurt, Baron Lerchenfeld, to vote against an Austrian proposal for an unlimited federal right—by delegation of the member states of the Confederation—for “neighborly help” (*Unbeschränkte Delegation zur nachbarlichen Hilfeleistung*). This would weaken especially the medium-sized states like Bavaria (militarily, financially, economically) and force

his paper available for me. – cf. also: Karl H. Wegert, *German Radicals Confront the Common People. Revolutionary Politics and Popular Politics 1789–1849*. Mainz: Zabern 1992, pp. 101ff. – For the influence of the Revolution of July in Germany cf. inter alia: BHStAM MA 1617 (Revolution in France and Popular Movements 1830–1831), MA 1618 (Disturbances Netherlands, Rheinisch Prussia), MA 1620 (Hamburg), MA 1621 (Hesse), MA 1623 (Saxony), MA 1624 (Saxony-Altenburg), MA 1626 (Hanover, 1831) – NHStAH Hann. 92 XLI, 136, 139 (1,2), Hann. 92/970 (Brunswick 1830) – cf also Wolf D. Gruner, “Die deutschen Klein- und Mittelstaaten. Ein Sonderfall in der europäischen Geschichte.” In: Henning Steinführer / Gerd Biegel (Eds.), *1913 – Braunschweig zwischen Monarchie und Moderne*. Braunschweig: Appelhaus Verlag 2015, p. 37–72, p. 52ff.

⁹² Manfred Bullik, *Staat und Gesellschaft im hessischen Vormärz* (note 91), p. 43ff. – Hans Werner Hahn, “Wetzlar und die Entstehung des Zollvereins.” In: *Mitteilungen des Wetzlarer Geschichtsvereins* 27/1980, p. 41–111.

⁹³ NA PRO F.O. 30/32 Milbanke – Aberdeen, Frankfurt, 29 December 1830; Milbanke – Aberdeen, private, Frankfurt 27 September 1830 – cf. also BHStAM MA 1621.

⁹⁴ BHStAM MA 1619: Stichaner (head of the provincial Palatinate Government) – Armansperg, Speyer, 18 September 1830.

⁹⁵ NA PRO F.O. 30/32: Milbanke to Aberdeen, Frankfurt, 29 September 1830 – For the constitution of the Electorate of Hesse cf.: Hellmut Seier, “Zur Entstehung und Bedeutung der der kurhessischen Verfassung von 1831.” In: Walter Heinemeyer (Ed.), *Der Verfassungsstaat als Bürge des Rechtsfriedens. Reden im hessischen Landtag zur 150-Jahr-Feier der Kurhessischen Verfassung*. Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag 1982, p. 1–71, p. 1–5.

⁹⁶ PRO F.O. 30/32 Milbanke – Aberdeen 30 September 1830 and 4 October 1830 – Bundesarchiv Berlin – Deutscher Bund (hereinafter BAB-DB) Protokoll der Bundesversammlung (hereinafter Prot. BV) 29th Session 1830, 30 September 1830 – BHStAM MA 1631: Baron Lerchenfeld – King Ludwig I. 1 October 1830.

them to surrender their own free will to the German great powers.⁹⁷ Lerchenfeld tried to convince his government, which was the only one to reject the Austrian motion, that Bavaria's position might be interpreted as a death-blow to the Confederation and asked for a revision of his instructions. The ministry in Munich, however, in fear of military and financial overtaxation and considering the state of the Bavarian army, refused.⁹⁸

When the news of the successful French Revolution reached Southern Germany their monarchs were prepared for disorder to spread to their constitutional states, especially since Bavaria and Baden had established common borders with France in 1815. Within short notice, preparations were made to improve military training and armament to combat a possible French invasion of German territory. Prussia put her troops in her Rhenish provinces on a war footing, although the Prussian government tried to avoid any military movements or actions which might be interpreted by the French as a provocation and a first step to military intervention in the affairs of France. In September 1830 the Confederation decided to bring the troops of her members into a state of readiness according to the obligations of the Federal Military Constitution ("Bundes-Kriegsverfassung").⁹⁹

The South German states, especially the Bavarian ministry and King Ludwig I, felt that a war with France was likely to break out. Although Ludwig I believed that the constitutional states of the South, for ideological reasons, had less to fear from revolutionary France, the king and his ministers were aware of French revisionist demands, undisputed in all strata of French society, for the reoccupation of the left bank of the Rhine.¹⁰⁰ Reports from the French border area indicated that the French were quite confident that the territories on the Rhine would be recaptured and that the call for "Landau and the Rhine" had been repeatedly heard in Paris.¹⁰¹ If war should come the ministry in Munich accepted a proposal from Fieldmarshal Prince Wrede that the Federal Army and the armies of the allies of 1814–15 according to the treaties of 1815 and 1818 should lead a preventive strike against France and invade that country to restore law and order. From Bavaria's point of view a successful war against France might further positive results for

⁹⁷ BHStAM Ges. BT 197 and MA 1631 no. 4.: Armansperg / Weinrich – King Ludwig I., 2 October 1830 – for Bavaria's relation to the German Confederation cf. George S. Werner, *Bavaria in the German Confederation 1820–1848*. Rutherford Madison London: Associated UP 1977, p. 87ff. – Wolf D. Gruner, "Die deutsche Politik Ludwigs I. in: *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 49/1986, p. 449–507, p. 474ff.

⁹⁸ BHStAM Abt. IV. Kriegsarchiv (hereinafter KAM) OP 74796 Wrede subfile: Wrediana: Prince Charles – Prince Wrede, 17 September 1830.

⁹⁹ BAB-DB) Prot. BV 30. Session 1.10.1830 – BHStAM MA 1631 Ministry – King Ludwig I. 4 October 1830 – KAM B 1830-1832 (Disturbances in the Palatinate) 726.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Hanns Helmut Böck, *Karl Philipp Fürst von Wrede als politischer Berater König Ludwig I. von Bayern* (Miscellanea Bavarica Monacensia 8). Munich: Stadtarchiv 1968, p. 144f.

¹⁰¹ Cf. BHStAM MA 1617 annex to piece 33.

Bavarian revisionist aims. A disintegration of France would recapture for Germany the old Imperial territories of Lorraine and Alsace which British intervention in 1815 had prevented. Thus territories would be available to settle peacefully, by territorial exchange, the Bavarian-Badenian dispute pending since the Napoleonic wars. King Ludwig I hoped to retake the old Bavarian Palatinate (i.e. the territories around Heidelberg and Mannheim) and thus to achieve the territorial link between Bavaria's Rhenish province and her *rechtsrheinische* parts.¹⁰²

When the news from Paris reached Germany, Bavaria and Baden were carrying on negotiations on the subject of the union of their respective douanes, and for a peaceful solution to the so-called *Sponheimer Surrogat* (Sponheim Question). These negotiations took place in Berlin. The plenipotentiary of Baden at the negotiations, however, was recalled to Karlsruhe in October of 1830. It appeared, as the British secretary to the British mission at Frankfurt Ralph Milbanke reported to the Foreign Office, "that the disturbances in the neighbouring States have had the effect of putting a stop to negotiations which were carrying on between Baden and Bavaria [...] The Grand Duke of Baden has, it seems, wisely thought it better to give up his project, which had excited universal dissatisfaction throughout the Grand Duchy, than to risk the same effervescence of popular feeling as was agitating the adjoining States—some symptoms of which, though on a small scale, had been already exhibited within his own dominions."¹⁰³

When King Ludwig I of Bavaria received a report concerning the Berlin negotiations he was greatly disappointed. He told his ministers to inform Prussia and Württemberg that—as a proof of his "patriotic German attitude" (*Teutsche Gesinnung*)—faced with those difficult times for *Teutschland* he was willing to abstain from his demands for an equivalent to Sponheim on the Rhine for the time being. The king concluded: "What I cannot get in negotiations I shall acquire by sword as a result of the forthcoming war against France."¹⁰⁴

When Louis Philippe, in his letter of ascension to the throne, stressed the non-aggressive nature of French foreign policy and requested from the

¹⁰² Böck, *Wrede* (see note 101), p. 145f. – Lieselotte Hörmann, *Der bayerisch-badische Gebietsstreit 1825–1832*. Berlin Husum: Matthiesen Verlag 1936 – Wolf D. Gruner, "Tendenzen der britischen Deutschlandpolitik im Vormärz. Überlegungen zu einem Memorandum des britischen Geschäftsträgers in Frankfurt aus dem Jahre 1827. In: *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 18/1975, p. 75-98.

¹⁰³ NA PRO F.O. 30/32: Milbanke to Aberdeen, Frankfurt, 4 October 1830 – For the negotiations cf.: Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg – Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe (hereinafter GLA) 40 (Prussia) 2143, 2144 – BHStAM Ges. Karlsruhe 244

¹⁰⁴ Translation WDG – Kommission für bayerische Landesgeschichte (Commission of Bavarian History) – Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften München (Bavarian Academy of Sciences), Signatensammlung Ludwig I., Signat of 24/25 October 1830, Signat No. 333 (Signaten collection SSL I folder 1828–1848) – also quoted in Wolf D. Gruner, *Das bayerische Heer 1825–1864*. Boppard: Boldt 1972, p. 138.

Confederation an assurance of her continued *friendship*,¹⁰⁵ the federal plans for military action against France lost their immediate importance. At the same time South German fears of French attack gradually faded. The threat of war, however, should become a characteristic feature for the following years. In 1831 the war scare reached its climax due to European tensions in the Low Countries, Italy and Poland.¹⁰⁶

Out of military necessity and according to political principles, the events in Paris revived the idea of a *Sonderbund* (“Special Union”) of the South German states. In August 1830 the Bavarian liberal Ludwig von Hornthal published a booklet on the question of a possible intervention of the constitutional states into the affairs of France.¹⁰⁷ He argued that the French had defended their constitutional rights against princely despotism. No foreign power should be allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of France. The chambers of the German constitutional states had the means to prevent military action by cutting the military budget. In case of a war against France he pleaded for a union of all constitutional German states for a declaration of neutrality and non-interference and if need be for an armed neutrality. The basic idea was that in case of a full-scale European war the South German states would provide the battleground for a war of principles and they would “emerge the ultimate losers, whatever the outcome.”¹⁰⁸ From this point of view the Bavarian foreign minister, Count Armanberg, favored an independent military and foreign policy of the South German states and Prussia. His policy was therefore anti-Austrian and also directed against the German Confederation. The further existence of the Confederation was called into question. In 1830 and 1831 the South German courts were increasingly interested in Prussian-South German military, economic and political co-operation.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ BAB-DB Prot. BVSession 9 September 1830, § 204.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Robert D. Billinger, “The War Scare of 1831 and Prussian-South German Plans for the End of Austrian Dominance in Germany.” In: *Central European History (CEH)* IX/1977, p. 203–219 – Robert D. Billinger, *Metternich’s German Policy toward the South German States, 1830–1834*. PhD University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 1973 (University Microfilm International, Ann Arbor London 1977) – Robert D. Billinger, “The German States, Austria, and the Revolutionary Crisis of 1830–1832.” In: *Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe*. Tallahassee 1978 – Gustav Huber, *Kriegsgefahr über Europa (1830–1832): Im Urteil der Zeit und 100 Jahre später*. Berlin: Matthiesen Verlag 1936 – Kurt M. Hoffmann, *Preußen und die Julimonarchie 1830–1834*. Berlin: Matthiesen 1936 – Alan J. Reinerman, “Metternich, the Powers, and the 1831 Italian Crisis.” In: *CEH* X /1977, p. 206–219 – Franz Werner Richter, *Das europäische Problem der preußischen Staatspolitik und die revolutionäre Krisis von 1830–1832*. Berlin: Matthiesen 1933.

¹⁰⁷ Franz Ludwig von Hornthal, *Werden die deutschen Bundesfürsten überhaupt, insbesondere die konstitutionellen, in die innern Angelegenheiten Frankreichs sich einmischen, an einem Krieg gegen Frankreich theilnehmen?* Nürnberg August 1830.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. Translation WDG.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. BHStAM MA 24076 (Military Conferences at Berlin 1831) – Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt (hereinafter StAG) G 1: 13/1–3 (Stuttgart, Berlin) – WHStA E 9 Bü.

All plans for a neutrality pact or projects for a *Sonderbund* of the South German constitutional states in the German Confederation failed for various reasons.¹¹⁰ One of them had been the changing European situation. The Five-Powers Conference on Belgium and the Netherlands in London had agreed in a protocol on 20 December 1830 on the bases of separation between the Northern Netherlands and Belgium and a neutralization of Belgium. From Palmerston's point of view this was necessary in order to avoid war. Then in October 1831 the Five-Power Conference on Belgium had agreed to a peaceful solution of the Belgian problem.¹¹¹ In November the European great powers had agreed in principle as far as a general European disarmament was concerned.¹¹² Thus the Prussian-South German plans for the end of Austrian dominance in Germany were collapsing at last.¹¹³ To some extent this was also true for the political situation in Europe.¹¹⁴ Prince Metternich had started a political offensive. He hoped "to regain the direction of policy in the South German courts. He had long seen the need to reach some understanding with the kings of Bavaria and Württemberg,"¹¹⁵ he also decided to destroy the influence of his opponents, the Austrophobic and liberal advisers to the Prussian king and also to the kings of Bavaria and Württemberg. Metternich wanted to prevent Austria's exclusion "from active participation in the affairs of the German Confederation."¹¹⁶ He sent memoranda to Berlin, Munich

25/8 – Billinger, War Scare (note 107), p. 205ff. – Robert D. Billinger, *Metternich and the German Question. States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820–1834*. Newark London: University of Delaware Press – Associated University Presses 1991, p. 70ff. – Roswitha Gräfin Armansperg, *Joseph Ludwig Graf von Armansperg. Ein Beitrag zur Regierungsgeschichte Ludwig I. von Bayern*. Munich: MBM 67 Stadtarchiv München 1976, p. 188ff. – Lawrence J. Baack, *Christian Bernsdorff and Prussia. Diplomacy and Reform Conservatism 1818–1832*. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP 1980, p. 165ff., p. 329ff.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Peter Burg, Der Bund des konstitutionellen Deutschland in der europäischen Mächtekonstellation nach den Plänen aus der Zeit der Revolutionen von 1830 und ihrer Folgewirkungen. Paper presented to the Working Group on the Revolutions of 1830 at the XVth International Congress of Historical Sciences at Bucharest 1980 – Idem, "Die französische Politik gegenüber Föderationen und Föderationsplänen deutscher Klein- und Mittelstaaten 1830–1833." In: Raymond Poidevin / Heinz-Otto Sieburg (Eds.), *Aspects des relations franco-allemandes 1830–1848*. Metz: Publications du Centre de recherches relations internationales de l'université de Metz 1978, p. 17–45.

¹¹¹ Cf. NA PRO F.O. 10/19 Treaty of 15 November 1831 between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, and Belgium, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland – Hurst, *Key Treaties* vol. 1 (see note 29), No. 26, p. 203–214 – Gruner, Belgisch-Luxemburgische Frage (see note 5), p. 374ff. – Webster, *Foreign Policy of Palmerston I* (see note 18), p. 143ff.

¹¹² Cf. Werner Näf, *Abrüstungsverhandlungen im Jahre 1831*. Bern: Haupt 1931 – Gruner, Belgisch-Luxemburgische Frage (see note 5), p. 372ff.

¹¹³ Billinger, War Scare (see note 107), p. 218.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Eugène de Guichen, *La révolution de Juillet 1830 et l'Europe*. Paris 1916, p. 341–409 – Hoffmann, Preussen und die Julimonarchie (note 106), p. 56–83 – Billinger, Metternich and the German Question (note 106), pp. 70ff.

¹¹⁵ Billinger, *Metternich and the German Question* (see note 107), p. 83.

¹¹⁶ Billinger, War Scare (see note 107), p. 215.

and Stuttgart by way of General Clam-Martinitz and Prince Schönburg, which were presented directly to the monarchs. It was argued that it was necessary to reestablish the monarchic principle and the security of the German Confederation. These “conservative particularists,” the monarchs of Bavaria and Württemberg, were reminded “that the existing German Confederation was their best bulwark” against France and therefore “the Austrian-chaired federal diet [was] the logical vehicle for joint action.”¹¹⁷ Metternich proposed a “general monarchic conference.” It was also argued that in case of war a Prussian-South German alliance and cooperation would not be sufficient to secure the security of the German Confederation. Prussia would be better off cooperating with Austria. It was Metternich’s intention to come to an understanding between the two German great powers in order to reestablish the security of the German Confederation and secure Austria’s leading position.

For Metternich, after the late summer of 1830, it was a priority to fight the chimère of revolution, especially the uprisings in the Southern Netherlands, in Poland, Italy and in the smaller states of the German Confederation and to preserve the monarchic principle. His minister of finance warned him during the crises that spending more than 50 percent of the budget on the military would ruin the finances of the monarchy. Despite of the state of Austria’s financial resources it was more important for Metternich, however, to proceed successfully against the “hydra of revolution.”¹¹⁸ The political and social architecture of the Vienna system of 1814/15 was in danger. Austria’s leading role in the German Confederation was questioned. The possible loss of its power-political basis in Central Europe and Europe, ideological considerations and Metternich’s overall political aims overruled the warning of the Minister of Finance concerning the financial problems of the Habsburg Monarchy. Metternich’s aims were also closely connected with Austrian security interests.¹¹⁹ In November 1831 Prince Metternich confided in a private letter to the Austrian envoy to Stuttgart, Prince Schönburg: “The Prussian and South German clubs—for these ministries deserve this name too—believed they could surely maneuver Austria out of the Confederation. As nothing is so thoughtless and awkward as a German doctrinaire and *Freithümmler* these good people have forgotten a few things. For example, Austria is a ponderous mass that one cannot easily shove to one side. If Austria set itself to one side, a tremendous

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 216 – Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (hereinafter HHStA) Staatskanzlei (St.K). Württemberg 42: Metternich to Schönburg 21 April 1831, annex; Political and Military Memorandum – HHStA St.K. Preussen 142 Metternich to Clam-Martinitz 11 September 1831.

¹¹⁸ Note of the Austrian Minister of Finance to Metternich of 15 January 1831, printed in H. T. Colenbrander (Ed.), *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840*. Den Haag 1905–1922, vol. X.4, p. 150.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Instruction of Metternich to Wessenberg 3 October 1830, printed in: *Gedenkstukken X.3* (see note 119), p. 161–163 – cf. also Gruner, *Europa in der Krise von 1830/31* (see note 3), p. 232–235.

breach would develop that could not easily be filled with theories. Finally, the day of the victory of their plan would also be that of the downfall of the German princes.”¹²⁰ Attached to Metternich’s private letter was a memorandum “On the Present State of Affairs of the German Confederation.”¹²¹ From Metternich’s point of view the representative constitutions led to alarming restrictions of the sovereign authority of the monarchs. Austria and Prussia, responsible to maintain the German and European mandate of the German Confederation, proposed common federal measures to the Diet. The proposed measures were to strengthen the monarchic principle against the principle of the sovereignty of the people and the representative system. As a consequence of the “July Days of 1830,” Metternich stated that a certain number of German states were already in a state of revolutionary dissolution. The memorandum grouped the German states into three categories.

... States where revolution has already reached legal forms (“Staaten, wo die Revolution bereits in gesetzliche Formen eingekleidet ist”)

... States in which representative forms have been abused against the meanings of the laws

... States in which monarchs to a certain degree could maintain their position.

Whereas the Electorate of Hesse belonged to the first group, Bavaria and Baden were in the second category. Only Württemberg belonged to the third group,¹²² whose monarchs could maintain their position to a certain degree.¹²³ The reason for this state of affairs in Metternich’s understanding was the fact that most German Princes disregarded the laws of the German Confederation. They insisted on ensuring their state sovereignty. Thus they strengthened the party which demanded the unity of the Germans in one state.¹²⁴

3.3. The Constitutional States, the Non-Constitutional States and the Revolution of July

The July days provided encouragement for liberals and radicals alike to demand further constitutional concessions, to form a German nation state, to depose the princes and establish a republic. The diets in the southern

¹²⁰ HHStA St.K. Württemberg 42, Metternich to Schönburg, private, 2 November 1831. English translation quoted from Billinger, *War Scare*, (see note 107) p. 217f.

¹²¹ Memorandum “Der Stand der Dinge im Deutschen Bund,” attached to Metternich to Schönburg 24 October 1831 (HHStA St.K. Württemberg 42).

¹²² Cf. Paul Sauer, *Reformer auf dem Königsthron. Wilhelm I. von Württemberg*, Stuttgart: DVA 1997.

¹²³ HHStA St.K. Württemberg 42 annex to Metternich to Schönburg 24 October 1831.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

constitutional states were tumultuous during 1830 and 1831. The Liberals in the Second Chambers in Southern Germany gained self-confidence. They were asking for constitutional concessions like requiring the army to be sworn in to the constitution as well as ministerial responsibility, the abrogation of press censorship and the public character of lawsuits. The two German great powers, Austria and Prussia—both of which had failed to adhere to their promises of constitutional institutions (*Verfassung, landständische Verfassung*) made in 1814–15—nervously observed the spread of the influence of liberalism and politicization, especially as these affected the constitutional states of the South whose constitutions and laws were—according to the opinion and interpretation of the absolutist powers of the Confederation—incompatible with the Federal Act (*Bundesakte*). Above all, Metternich was of the opinion that the growth of the liberal movement represented a danger to the German Confederation to the benefit of its common enemy “the all-devouring revolution.”¹²⁵ The dissolution of the German Confederation was given repeated consideration in Vienna as of the end of 1830. Those German states which lacked great power status were to be neutralized in similar fashion to that of Belgium—something which was not at all to their liking—if we read the plans for a neutrality pact, of a constitutional *Sonderbund* etc. Particularly important in this respect was Austria’s disillusionment with recent developments in the Confederation:

... The Custom Unions contracted between several of the member states of the Confederation and the role of Prussia to lead this “Sonderbund” (Special Confederation),

... the special relations within the Confederation,

... the ideas about neutrality pacts and the refusal of federative military action,

... the plans, hopes and demands to reorganize the Confederation on constitutional lines,

... the tendencies for an exclusion of Austria from the Confederation.

In short: The German Confederation from the point of view of Austria’s European interests could no longer be regarded as a “Greater Austria”—something the Confederation certainly never was or wanted to be.¹²⁶

The middle states of the South were the most vehement in their opposition to the dictation of Austria and Prussia in the area of domestic security (*Innere Sicherheit des Bundes*) in the German Confederation but they were also very firm on issues concerning the representation of the German Confederation in external affairs as well. The best example for the period is the controversy over Belgium

¹²⁵ HHStA Preussen 146, Metternich to Clam Martinitz 21 November 1831 (translation WDG).

¹²⁶ Cf. Wolf D. Gruner, “Die Habsburger Monarchie in Europa 1789–1860 – Großmacht und multinationale Gemeinschaft auf Abruf.” In: *Studia Germanica Napocensia* 1/2009, p. 35–129, p. 77ff.

and Luxemburg when the German great powers—also representing the member states of the Confederation—at the London Conference acted according to their own power political interests, neglecting the interests of the Confederation as a whole.¹²⁷ The Diet of the German Confederation advised the Austrian and Prussian delegates to the London Conference on Belgium “to take care the Confederation did not by any of its measures on the Luxembourg Question infringe the Rights of the House of Nassau or those of the Confederation.”¹²⁸ The Diet of the German Confederation forced a revision of the treaty and the Duchy of Limburg, as a compensation for West-Luxemburg (Province of Arlon), became a member of the Confederation.¹²⁹

When in 1832 Austria and Prussia decided to take action against the new press act passed in Baden, which in their eyes was incompatible with federative law, they had to expect resistance from the constitutional states of the South to federal measures. Reports from Baden indicated that the Grand Duke and the Chambers, supported by the public opinion, would not yield to the pressure of a federal decree. And the British envoy to the Confederation reported in a private letter to Palmerston that there was an anti-Confederation sentiment in Baden. He considered this to be due to the influence of Rotteck, Welcker and other Baden and Bavarian liberals. They also had an influence on the liberal representatives in the Electorate of Hesse. “The spirit which prevails in Cassel is very unsatisfactory—it has a decidedly revolutionary tendency and springs from the intrigues of this party [i.e. the Liberals] which has been at work in Baden and Bavaria and has such extensive ramifications in many parts of Germany. At Cassel it has gained immense root, and it is not confined to the populace or the lower classes and wealthy burghers [...] The introduction of

¹²⁷ BAB-DB BT I/31 Negotiations London Conference. Protocols. Protocols of the Diet on Belgium and Luxembourg – BAB-DB B.T. I/263 Unterakt Londoner Vertrag v. 19.4.1839 – BAB-DB BT I/258 list of deliberations of the Federation on Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands 1830–1843 – BAB-DB BT I/260 Luxembourg.

¹²⁸ NA PRO F.O. 30/35 No. 113 Cartwright – Palmerston, Frankfurt 24 August 1831 – BAB-DB Separate Prot. XVI. Sitzung v. 11 August 1831 §1 – cf. also: Philipp Anton Guido von Meyer / Heinrich Zöpfl (Eds.), *Corpus Iuris Confederationis Germanicae oder Staatsakten für Geschichte und Öffentliches Recht des Deutschen Bundes* (hereinafter CJCG), 3 vols. Frankfurt: Verlag von H. L. Brönnner 31858-1869 (Reprint Aalen: Scientia Verlag 1978), vol. 2, p. 363–381: Transfer of parts of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to the newly founded Kingdom of Belgium and inclusion of the Duchy of Limburg into the German Confederation (CXLVII Bundesbeschlüsse über die Abtretung eines Theils des Großherzogthums Luxemburg an das neugegründete Königreich Belgien und die Einverleibung des neugebildeten Herzogthums Limburg in den Deutschen Bund, vom 18. August 1836 Separate Protocol of 16th Session 11 May 1839, 6th Session § 86 mit Staatsverträgen Ziffer 1–3, and of 5 and 16 September 1839, XIX. Session § 273, including matriculation, p. 363–381).

¹²⁹ BAB-DB Sep. Prot. 16th Session 16 August 1836 and Sep. Prot. 16th Session 11 May 1839 – cf. also CJCG II, p. 363–381 –NA PRO F.O. 30/73 No. 42 Abercrombie – Palmerston Frankfurt 18.5.1839 – cf. also in more detail: Gruner, “Die belgisch-luxemburgische Frage” (note 5), pp. 357ff., pp. 388ff.

liberal institutions, the subversion of the actual system, and the dissolution of the Confederation are avowed as the marks at which they aim. The Grand Duke of Baden is held up as the model of the sovereign they want—and there is not a house at Cassel in which the discussions of similar questions does not form the principal occupation of the day.”¹³⁰

When Austria and Prussia in January of 1832 were convinced that the Baden Press Act on the “Polizey der Presse” (Baden Press Law)¹³¹ was violating the laws of the German Confederation, the liberal British envoy to Munich warned Palmerston in his report about the dangers for the constitutional states in Germany. Britain should protect the “Constitutional Liberties of the smaller states of Germany.” Britain should publicly support the liberal governments. From Erskine’s point of view “it would greatly promote the good will of those States of Germany toward England and to further the cause of Freedom well defined and guarded by wholesome Laws, against the encroachments of an arbitrary power which is making most daring and rapid approaches.”¹³²

Because of the influence of liberalism which reduced the sovereignty and power of the Princes “à zero,” Metternich stated that “Hereusement, la Confédération existe, et nous la mettre en mouvement.”¹³³ The German great powers, after the passing of the Baden Press Law, wanted to make an example at the federal level. The Federal Press Committee was asked to check if the Baden Press Law was in accordance with the laws of the Confederation. The report of the Danish envoy for Holstein to the Diet, Baron Pechlin, stated that the Press Law was incompatible with the laws of the Confederation.¹³⁴ Baden stated that its Press Law did not violate any federal laws whereas the German great powers recommended suspension.¹³⁵ Cartwright, the British envoy to Frankfurt, stated In a report to Palmerston: “As the party which brought the Grand Duke in collision with the Diet has immense influence in the Grand Duchy and is supported by publick opinion, it is hardly possible to suppose it will submit to the Decrees of the Diet without struggle. And if any explosion of popular feeling should unfortunately occur, it is to be apprehended it would extent to the Bavarian Rhine Province where the publick mind is ripe for any extremity.”¹³⁶

The possibility that excitement and unrest would spread from Baden to other parts of Southern Germany, especially to the Bavarian Rhine Province was a factor that had to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, Metternich was determined to employ

¹³⁰ NA PRO F.O. 30/37 No. 29 Cartwright – Palmerston Frankfurt 6 March 1832.

¹³¹ Gesetz über die Polizey der Presse (*Badisches Regierungsblatt* No. 2/ 12 January 1832).

¹³² NA PRO F.O. 9/64 (Bavaria) Erskine – Palmerston Munich 24 January 1832.

¹³³ Metternich – Apponyi 11 November 1831 (Richard Metternich-Winneburg (Ed.), *Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren*, vol. 5. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller 1882, p. 139f.

¹³⁴ BAB-DB BT I 336 Preßgesetz Baden – Ibid. Prot. 6th session 9 February 1832 § 38 – Ibid. 7th session 20 February 1832 § 55 (Baden Press Law included as an annex).

¹³⁵ Ibid., Prot. 25th session 12 July 1832 § 238.

¹³⁶ USL-BP GC/CA 533 private Cartwright – Palmerston Frankfurt 19 February 1832.

the Confederation as an instrument against the increasing influence of the Liberal party, a party which from his point of view had been successful in reducing the power of constitutional sovereigns to insignificance. At the same time Metternich intended to strengthen the authority of Austria and Prussia in the Confederation. On 3 May 1832, a federal committee declared the new Baden press law to be incompatible to the laws of the Confederation and recommended its immediate suspension. The constitutional states were not willing to accept this view. Would the Confederation be able to force the suspension of the press law?

The situation, however, changed completely as a result of the Hambach festival. "As the case now stands," the British envoy to Frankfurt reported on 2 June 1832: It "is argued [at the Diet] that an example has been given to the rest of Germany which must find imitation. A popular meeting has been held in open day under the Symbol of Revolution, unimpeded by the legitimate government of the country, and must bear its fruits. One circumstance has been brought to light by these occurrences — the close connection between the French and German propaganda has been ascertained fully to exist."¹³⁷ Two days later he reported on border violations in the Palatinate by French soldiers and commented: "If French Soldiers can cross the frontier in one instance, they may in another, and the members of the Diet are therefore apprehensive that, should the excitement now prevailing in the Bavarian Province lead to any excess or a partial rising of the population, the whole country may be immediately overrun with military from the French garrisons along the frontier to aid and abet in fomenting insurrection."¹³⁸

Fear of revolution and a possible French invasion led the constitutional states of South Germany to agree to cooperate with the German great powers and to approve to measures of the Diet (Six Articles), although they had previously expressed firm opposition to federative actions which had been planned in the field of federal domestic security. Milbanke's assumption in mid-June 1832, that the Austrian president of the Diet "may come back with his pockets stuffed with propositions; but unless he brings at the same time the determination and the power of cramming them down the throats of the governments themselves at the point of the bayonet, he might just as well, or better, remain where he is"¹³⁹ turned out to be wrong. The constitutional states were asking for amendments only!¹⁴⁰ Bavaria argued that the provisions of the Final Act were sufficient and proposed a new phrase for article 4 of the Six Acts.¹⁴¹

Nevertheless British and French diplomats and politicians—not just for ideological reasons—took a firm stand against the measures decided by the Diet.

¹³⁷ NA PRO F.O. 30/38 No. 54 Cartwright – Palmerston Frankfurt 2 June 1832.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, Cartwright – Palmerston Frankfurt 4 June 1832.

¹³⁹ USL-BP GC/BE/46/3 Milbanke-Lamb (Vienna) Frankfurt 16 June 1832 (copy).

¹⁴⁰ BAB-DB Prot. Diet 22nd Session 28 June 1832 (Resolution Six Articles) – *Ibid.* 42nd session 8 November 1832 § 485.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 42nd Session 8 November 1832, § 485, p. 245f.

They were convinced that the revolutionary atmosphere in Southwestern Germany was not to be solved with authoritarian methods. On the contrary, the British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, for example, was of the opinion that a stabilization of the German Confederation could be achieved through evolutionary development. In a private letter to the British ambassador to Vienna, Frederick Lamb, he expressed the following position: “No doubt there are many who want Revolution and they should be opposed but the more people are opposed, the less likely they are to succeed. *Divide et Impera*, should be the maxims of governments in these times. Separate by reasonable concessions the moderate from the exaggerated; content the former by fair concessions and get them to assist in resisting the insatiable demands of the latter. This is the only way to govern nowadays but then it must be resorted to betimes and not to be put off till too late, as it was by King William in Belgium, by Charles X on the Thursday of July.”¹⁴²

After the Hambach Festival Lord Erskine reported from Munich, that “Affaires in Germany are assuming *serious* aspects.” He feared that “thoughts were seriously entertained of employing *force*—it should be well considered what might be the consequences of such attempts.”¹⁴³ In his private letters to Palmerston between July and October Erskine suggested to defend the “enlightened institutions against Tyranny & blind Despotism.”¹⁴⁴ He also brought up the idea that the constitutional states should form a league under Bavarian lead,¹⁴⁵ but Palmerston preferred a “stout Resistance in the Diet of even Bavaria and Württemberg & Baden would of itself chalk the Designs of Austria.” From his point of view this “is the wisest System of Defence which the smaller States should adopt.”¹⁴⁶ In a speech to the House of Commons Palmerston stated that the liberal states in Germany were Britain’s natural allies: “I am prepared to admit that the independence of constitutional States, whether they are powerful, like France or the United States, or of less relative political importance, such as the minor States of Germany, never can be a matter of indifference to the British Parliament, or, I should hope, to the British public. Constitutional States I consider to be the natural allies of this country and whoever might be in office conducting the affairs of Great Britain, I am persuaded that no English Ministry will perform its duty if it be inattentive to the interests of such States.”¹⁴⁷ Palmerston referred to the Treaty of Vienna to which the great powers were a party. It is the opinion of a Minister of

¹⁴² USL-BP GC/BE 419 private Palmerston – Lamb 30 June 1832.

¹⁴³ Ibid., GC/ER 11 Erskine – Palmerston, private, Munich 25 June 1832.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., GC/ER 11—13, 17, 20, 189 (exchange between Erskine and Palmerston).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., GC/ER 11 Erskine – Palmerston 26 June 1832.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., Palmerston – Erskine private FO 3 August 1832 (GC/ER 189 copy).

¹⁴⁷ Viscount Palmerston in the House of Commons on 4 August 1832, col. 1045 (<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1832-08-02/debates/96a8120e-d656-4303-b8df-a99f860c1c6b/Germany-ProtocolOfTheDiet> (accessed 9 November 2020)).

this country “to pronounce a judgment one way or the other on the acts of independent Governments who have entered into these Resolutions.” It was his personal, private opinion, however, “that the Governments who have entered into these Resolutions, have over-estimated the dangers against which they were endeavouring to guard, and not framed with the greatest possible degree of discretion that measure which they propose to apply as a remedy to the danger.”¹⁴⁸ This phrase got attention in Vienna and in other German states. In a private letter to Palmerston Frederick Lamb wrote: “They have commented a good deal upon the phrase in your speech about the Constitutional States being our natural allies. I have represented it to Metternich as a parliamentary phrase.”¹⁴⁹ It was a diplomatic wording the British ambassador was using. Palmerston, however, was convinced that Britain had to intervene against the resolution of the Diet which violated the basic Law (“Bundesakte”) of the German Confederation. He therefore decided on British and French intervention into the affairs of the German Confederation.¹⁵⁰ He held that the Liberals in Germany were less likely to fall under the influence of French liberalism if such measures were carried out. King William and leading British diplomats, however, felt that intervention into the affairs of the Confederation would endanger the attainment of Britain’s global interests, especially in a phase marked by the emergence of disparate ideological camps in Europe.¹⁵¹ King William was convinced “that this country should not unnecessarily commit itself by an interference with Austria and Prussia and other states of the Germanic Confederation in support of the Liberal and revolutionary feelings, which has found its way into Germany.”¹⁵² He warned the Cabinet of the negative consequences of a common intervention of Britain and France in Germany.¹⁵³ The king also referred to the fact that as King of Hanover he had voted in favor of the Resolution of the Diet of 28 June 1832. therefore as King of England he cannot condemn the resolution of the Diet.¹⁵⁴ Frederick Lamb was also warning Palmerston. His opinion was based on the conviction that the “principle of movement and that of repose are at war openly or underhand throughout Europe.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. Col. 1046 – cf. also USL-BP GC/ER 13 Erskine – Palmerston, Munich private 11 August 1832.

¹⁴⁹ USL-BP GC/BE 53 Lamb – Palmerston, Baden 22 August 1832 private.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. the reports of Lord Granville from Paris (NA PRO F.O. 27/447) and the private exchange between Granville and Palmerston (USL-BP GC/GR 255–402 / 1381–1455) – AMAE Papiers Desages T. 20 (162), note pour le Roi, 15 Juillet 1832.

¹⁵¹ Cf. the correspondence of King William and Palmerston from June to September 1832: USL-BP GC/RC/ A 99 (June 18); RC/ A 119 (July 27); RC/A 127 (August 3); RC/A 129 (August 7); RC/A 140 (September 6) – Ibid. Palmerston – William IV RC/AA 31 (June 16); RC/AA 43 (August 5).

¹⁵² Ibid., William IV – Palmerston 18 June 1832 (RC/A 99).

¹⁵³ Ibid., William IV – Palmerston 20 June 1832.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., William IV – Palmerston 3 August 1832 (RC/A 127) – cf. also Gruner, Wolf D., “England, Hannover und der Deutsche Bund 1814-1837.” In: *England und Hannover – England and Hanover*. Ed. by Adolf M. Birke and Kurt Kluxen. Munich: K.G. Saur 1986, p. 81-126, pp. 119ff.

National prejudices and antipathies have given way before them, and people are much more liberals or the reverse than they are Frenchmen, Germans or Italians.”¹⁵⁵ Palmerston believed that the constitutional German states would promote the liberal cause and strengthen federal elements of the Confederation, would hand back the peacekeeping character to the Confederation and make it resilient against aggression and influences from the East and the West. From his point of view the states with constitutions rather than authoritarian states were peaceful and more open to free commerce.

His instruction to Vienna and Berlin against the resolution of the Diet—it was not sent to the German Diet in Frankfurt—was more moderate than primarily intended by Palmerston.¹⁵⁶ The British envoy to Frankfurt read the confidential diplomatic note to the President of the Diet who listened carefully but was not willing to discuss the issue. “He observed, however, that it would be easy to prove the necessity, as well as the legality of the course the Diet was pursuing, but that it was for His Government to undertake this office.”¹⁵⁷ The French envoy to Frankfurt saw France as a guarantor of the Final Act of Vienna. In a report to Paris he stated that the German Confederation was the result of European treaties and it was not at all a free and spontaneous association of states. For Austria and Prussia the option of a free association would be “le signal de renversement de l’équilibre que le Congrès de Vienne a prétendu rétablir.”¹⁵⁸ The British ambassador to Austria, Frederick Lamb, who had served as a diplomat in Vienna at the time of the Congress of Vienna, tried to convince Palmerston that it was an error to believe that there were British guarantees for the Confederation. “The fact is if I do not mistake that all the other Powers guaranteed the whole of the acts concluded at Vienna, that we resolutely refused to guarantee any of them. If there was any exception it was certainly not about Germany [...] Our doctrine about guarantees was the following—by becoming Parties to these acts we undertook not to infringe them ourselves but refused by guaranteeing them to secure them the infringement of others.”¹⁵⁹ King William IV took a similar view. He called Palmerston’s attention to Article 28 of the Treaty of Vienna “respecting the General interference in Time of Trouble. I shall as King of Hanover take the Part of Austria and Prussia at the Diet of Frankfort. But the Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia ought to recollect that Hanover and other Parts of Germany have Constitutions.”¹⁶⁰ King William disagreed instructions to Lord Erskine “to engage Bavaria to take the Lead

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., Lamb – Palmerston Vienna 12 September 1832 (GC/BE 54).

¹⁵⁶ NA PRO F.O. 7/233 No. 83 Palmerston – Lamb FO 7 September 1832 (concept) – Gruner, *Belgisch-Luxemburgische Frage* (note 5), p. 386 ff.

¹⁵⁷ NA PRO 30/39 No. 117 Cartwright – Palmerston Frankfurt 16 September 1832.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. Alleye – MAE Wiesbaden 4 August 1832 dechiff.

¹⁵⁹ USL-BP GC/BE 62 Lamb – Palmerston, private, Vienna 16 October 1832.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. GC/RC/A 10 William IV – Palmerston n.d. [August 5 1832] – cf. also Protocol of Cabinet of 5 August 1832 (GC/CAB 15).

in the Opposition to the Propositions introduced by Austria & Prussia at the Diet, and to give an Impulse to the Endeavour to produce a Schism between the Two Principal States of the German Confederation.” Britain should strengthen and unite the “Union rather than to create Disunion & to dissolve the Bond.”¹⁶¹

Austria and Prussia rejected the British and French interventions into the domestic affairs of the German Confederation.¹⁶² The diplomatic notes of Britain and France, despite the harsh rejection by the Diet, Austria and Prussia, had an impact, but Palmerston’s instruction did not fully materialize. One of the reasons were the king and his advisers. William IV—also King of Hanover—supported the actions of the German great powers and thus was part of the “all-considered zeal” of the Diet. The king referred to the German constitutional states—the Kingdom of Hanover had a constitution since 1831—which did not accept all the measures of the resolution of 28 June 1832. For its independence Hanover needed the Confederation and Austria and Prussia with their resources and power could guarantee the security of the German states. The British envoy to the Diet, Cartwright, in a private letter to Lord Minto, therefore stated that the anti-constitutional forces had become calmer and thus Palmerston’s Dispatch of 7 September had been effective.¹⁶³

Bavaria did not publish the decisions of the Diet for constitutional reasons,¹⁶⁴ despite the warnings of Maximilian Baron Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian Minister to the Diet, that a close and trustful cooperation at the Diet was necessary and not jealousy against the Confederation.¹⁶⁵ The Bavarian way to deal with the decisions of the Diet was not unusual. This had happened several times since 1819/20. Bavaria argued that these decisions of the Diet were incompatible with the Bavarian Constitution of 1818.

The British ambassador to Vienna, one of the leading experts on Germany, beyond the ideological beliefs of Palmerston, was a pragmatist and a realist. In a long letter he reacted to the diplomatic note to Austria and Prussia of 7 September 1832 concerning Germany: “Our real interest in Germany is, that it should be strong, united, monarchical and federal, under these conditions, incapable of aggression itself, and repelling it from the East and from the West, it becomes the key stone of the Peace of Europe. Let us look to the best means of fulfilling this great European and therefore English object, instead of gambling over suppression

¹⁶¹ Ibid., William IV – Palmerston 7 August 1832 (GC/RC/A 129).

¹⁶² Concerning the British-French cooperation on the resolution of the Diet cf. AMAE C.P. *Allemagne* 780.

¹⁶³ National Library of Scotland MSS Minto 12025: Cartwright – Minto private 17 October 1832.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. BHStAM Ges. BT 253 Lerchenfeld’s reports in September 1832 – vgl. also Gruner, “Die deutsche Politik Ludwigs I.” (note 97), p. 474ff.

¹⁶⁵ BHStAM Ges. BT 253. Lerchenfeld – Gise No. 51 Frankfurt 2 September 1832 – cf. also on the reaction of the Confederation to British and French Intervention and its consequences: Lerchenfeld – Gise No. 62 Frankfurt 27 November 1832.

of a few incendiary newspapers.”¹⁶⁶ Lamb also referred to the different political systems in Britain and Germany: “There is no doubt of the difference of our Systems, it would be equally weak and dangerous to deny this difference or keep it out of view. Hitherto they have gone on side by side in peace and good understanding—is it impossible to do so any longer? With whom is the fault? Where is the remedy? [...] The only principle upon which these two systems can exist together, is that of neither of them attempting to encroach upon the other. This principle Metternich adopted in words to its fullest extent. He applies it to France, to Belgium, to Switzerland, to Germany, to all that exists in Europe. Does He act up to its spirit? Do you on your side adopt it in theory, do you abide by it in practice? To the first of these latter questions I am not able to answer, but this I know that if you do not adopt the principle, you reject the only one which can maintain tranquility in Europe, and He who wishes the end wishes the means.”¹⁶⁷

4. Conclusions and Perspectives

What were the immediate, short term effects? What was the lasting impact of the July Revolution and its aftermath on Europe, on the United Netherlands, on Belgium and Luxembourg, on Italy, on Poland and on Germany?

Between 1830 and 1834 Palmerston and Metternich played an important role in European politics, mostly being antipodes having the same aim in mind but different means to get there. They had differing perceptions and visions on domestic and international crisis management. When the Revolution of July started Metternich had already been serving as Foreign Minister of Austria for more than twenty years, whereas Palmerston started his impressive career in the Foreign Office only in November 1830 and continued on as prime minister. Both men were politically and in their ideological approach shaped by their respective teachers at the Universities of Strasbourg, Mayence, and Edinburgh.

Metternich, being one of the architects of the Vienna system based on a multilateral order, was interested in keeping up the new Europe of 1815. The balance of powers was an important element in his political beliefs, shared by Gentz. He worked for keeping the “hydra of revolutions” at bay in order to ensure European peace. It was his interest to safeguard the great power status of Austria. It was his vision to develop the German Confederation into a safe power base for the Austrian monarchy and as an element of European security and stability. From this perspective and in the interest of Austria he had to keep in mind the Austrian Empire as a multiethnic empire. Therefore Metternich was against the introduction of regional parliaments and an all-Austrian parliament. When the German Diet was

¹⁶⁶ Lamb – Palmerston Vienna 12 September 1832 (USL-BP GC/BE 54).

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

discussing to fill article 13 of the Federal Act Austria and Prussia opted that the “Landstände” should be the old estates and spoke up against representative estates. After Hambach, Metternich, who was also an entrepreneur in Bohemia, explained his dislike of too many German Parliaments, especially those of the constitutional states. In his view the “astonishing prosperity of England since 1688” was due “to her Parliament but he [i.e. Metternich] doubts whether she would have flourished equally with 20 Parliaments, at Leeds, at Hull, at Oxford, at Birmingham and so forth. This, however, is the situation in Germany, and one immediate consequence of this is that the members of each of these Parliaments wish to become Members of one great Parliament and hence the idea of the unity of Germany gains strength.”¹⁶⁸

In the critical situation after the Hambach Festival, Frederick Lamb, the British ambassador to Vienna, several times in his private letters to Palmerston tried to explain the “Metternich System.” This system was defensive and Metternich did not “consider war as a remedy for the evils of the Times. His whole system is to condemn France to a state of peace and reduce the revolution to prey on itself.”¹⁶⁹ Metternich was not interested in territorial acquisitions in Italy. Not a “dream of them enters his head.” What are the differences between Metternich and you? “The whole difference between you lies in the choice of the measures wherewith to oppose revolutions. You say enter into transactions with it, redress grievances, conciliate the good, found your rule upon the happiness of the people. He says yield nothing to clamor, the good are the majority, they are content already and will be more so with what is doing for them, the bad can not be conciliated, let them not be encouraged from without, let them be overawed within, and all troubles will cease. *I have no doubt that his reasoning is wrong, and that a judicious application of both systems is required.*”¹⁷⁰ Lamb’s comments wonderfully show the intentions and differences of both statesmen.

When Palmerston entered the international scene the new king of the French was already recognized. Politically he moved from a Tory conviction to a Whig belief. For him it was important to support the rise of liberalism, to promote liberal institutions and to help smaller states to keep their freedom, liberty and independence. Besides his liberal beliefs and the experience of the reform debate in England¹⁷¹ he had a pragmatic stand towards the European Concert, European

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., Lamb – Palmerston private Vienna 6 June 1832 (GC/BE 42).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., Lamb – Palmerston private Vienna 2 June 1832 (GC/BE 41).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. (underlines are mine).

¹⁷¹ Cf. on the reform debate and the Reform Act: Michael Brock, *The Great Reform Act*. London: Hutchison Press 1973 – John Cannon, *Parliamentary Reform 1640–1832*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1973 – Eric J. Evans, *The Great Reform Act of 1832*. London: Methuen 1983 – Norman Gash, *Aristocracy and the People . Britain 1815–1865*. Cambridge: Harvard UP 1979 – John A. Phillips / Charles Wetherell , “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England.” In: *American Historical Review* 100/1995, p. 411–436.

crisis management and a conference system. British interests had priority. His liberal entente with France and the liberal quadruple alliance which from his point of view should also promote free trade failed.¹⁷² Since 1831 British economic, political and strategic interests had demanded that Belgium should be independent from Holland and open to British trade. In 1835 the aim of the mission of John Bowring had been to stabilize the political alliance of the Western liberal states beyond ideological commonalities through a customs federation to break up the prohibition system of the authoritarian powers.¹⁷³ These efforts failed since Palmerston was already considering to break up the Anglo-French alliance because of a clash of interests with France in the Mediterranean.

The outcome of the European war crises and the management of the European Concert between 1830 and 1839 did not bring about the expectations and results hoped for by Palmerston and Metternich, despite their cooperation in the Eastern Question. Thus the personal outcome for both statesmen was mixed.

4.1. Europe, the Revolution of July and its Aftermath

When the great powers of Europe recognized the new regime in France, the constitutional states of the German South followed their lead. This was also true for the German small states. For a considerable time there was fear of French aggression. France's ambition to retake the territories lost by the treaties of 1814–15 and its often publicly proclaimed demand for the natural frontiers for France diminished French hopes to make the constitutional states of Southern Germany her natural allies. Nevertheless, Southern Germany was to play an important role in France's German policy till 1870. Since 1830 the constitutional states of Southern Germany were looking in times of crisis for a strategy best suited to meet their own needs and interests, i.e. to secure their existence as sovereign, independent German and European body politics. Thus they were considering various projects to achieve these ends (a league of neutrality—armed neutrality—a special relationship of the constitutional states of the Confederation (*Sonderbund*)—and reform of the federal constitution by a cooperation of the Third Germany (*Drittes Deutschland*), thus becoming the third force in the German Confederation. The “Special League” failed militarily and politically. An economic “Special League” “The German Customs Union,” founded in 1834 was an important organization for the industrial Revolution in Germany. Austria—the presiding power of the Confederation—tried to counteract all tendencies for a special relationship of the constitutional states and their planned exclusion of Austria from the Confederation. Metternich succeeded in thwarting the Prussian–South-German plans.

¹⁷² There are no studies so far concerning the idea to supplement the liberal alliance by a free trade Customs Union of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. Cf. Gruner. *Die belgisch-luxemburgische Frage* (note), p. 388ff.

¹⁷³ Cf. Bowring – Palmerston Paris October 1835 (USL-BP GC/BO 46).

4.2. Austria and Her Federal Polity

For some time in 1830–31 Metternich was considering the dissolution of the German Confederation. During the debate over the Baden Press Law the French envoy to Frankfurt reported to Paris: “dass es für Wien und Berlin schwierig sein werde ‘d’atteindre complètement le but au quell elles visent’.”¹⁷⁴ The independence of the member states of the Confederation is one of the basic principles of the Federal Act. If Austria and Prussia ever tried to endanger the independence of the secondary states of the Confederation the Federation had the right “de réclamer le redressment d’une pareille violation de l’acte du Congrès de Vienne.”¹⁷⁵ Later in 1832 Metternich succeeded, however, for the time being, to reestablish Austrian influence over the Confederation due to disturbances and rallies such as Hambach. The six decrees of the Diet in June 1832 intended to strengthen Austria’s and Prussia’s position within the constitutional framework of the Confederation. The British and French interventions against the Six Articles were only partially successful. The Diet in Frankfurt rejected their claim to be guarantee powers of the Vienna Act of 1815.¹⁷⁶ The British and French actions, however, had an impact on how the German Confederation was dealing with the Six Acts. Lamb tried to convince Palmerston that it was an error “to suppose that Austria and Prussia can dictate to the Diet. I have seen this long and closely enough to be aware that there is a spirit of opposition to them in the German Govts. which can be only overcome by some imminent fear or danger. The Diet is not Austria and Prussia only.”¹⁷⁷ In the long run, however, Austrian hopes to make the Confederation and even Prussia the tool of her European power political interests failed. Between 1831 and 1833 the number of constitutional states in the Confederation grew. There were liberal constitutions in Saxony, Electoral Hesse and Hanover. On the contrary, Austrian federal policy—her behavior—often looked upon as selfishness, unreliability and arrogance, especially after 1851 became an essential determinant, despite South German partisanship for Austria in 1859 and 1866, for the breakup of the German Confederation in 1866 and maybe of the Habsburg monarchy as a body politic in Europe.

4.3. The Question of Luxembourg and Belgium

The German Confederation was touched directly by the questions of Belgium and Luxemburg. These were raised by the French Revolution of July, the Brussels uprising and French ambitions to annex Belgium and Luxemburg. For some years

¹⁷⁴ AMAE C.P. 779 (Allemagne): No. 193 Alleye – M.A.E. Frankfurt 18 February 1832 (dechiff.) – enclosed at No. 193 a Mémoire on Austrian Policy toward the German Confederation.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. NA PRO F.O. 7/233 (Austria) Palmerston – Lamb 7 September 1832 (draft) – BL Add. MSS 48444 Palmerston No. 83 Palmerston – Lamb FO 7 September 1832 – NA PRO F.O. 64/184 (Prussia) No. 3 Palmerston – Lord Minto FO 7 September 1832 (draft) – AMAE C.P. 780.

¹⁷⁷ Lamb – Palmerston Vienna 1 October 1832 (GC/BE 58 confidential).

the German Confederation was to play politically an important and active role in European politics in addition to the fact that since 1815 she had been a stabilizing element for the European system and for the maintenance of European peace. To a large extent this was a result of the influence and interest-orientated policy of firmness of the constitutional states of the German South. The management of the Luxembourg Question—the Grand Duchy being a member state of the German Confederation—showed that the Confederation was interested in avoiding military action but she was also interested in securing its federal fortress in Luxembourg. When the German great powers at the London Conference on Belgium were willing to disregard the interests of the German Confederation and to cede the Luxembourg province of Arlon, the Diet insisted on territorial compensation. Thus the Duchy of Limburg became a member of the German Confederation in 1839.¹⁷⁸

4.4. *The Long-Term Impact of 1830*

The reforms of the 1804–1812/14 period were not fulfilled in many fields. This was especially true for the social and economic reform in the late *Rheinbund* states. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, due to differing interests and priorities and to the resurgence of traditional influences, these reforms could not be enforced. These issues, however, were picked up again as a result of the July Revolution, especially the demand for more political participation in the running of the nation and in other fields such as economy, finances, society and state. Similar to Britain, in some of the constitutional states of Southern Germany there took place improvements and reforms (the new poor law; *Ansaessigmachung*, *Gewerbefreiheit*). Here, like in the following considerations, the July Revolution of 1830 was to function as a most important catalyst for European and also South German developments.

A politicization of the masses took place, partly transforming liberalism. A new mentality and consciousness developed. It could, for example, be seen in the calling of rallies and mass-meetings like Hambach. These meetings put nationalism and patriotism on a broader political basis previously unknown and could be activated on occasions like the Rhine-crisis of 1840.

The Revolution of July had a considerable impact on mentality and social psychology. The ruling elites of the constitutional states of Germany after the July Revolution were more prepared for improvement and reform within the existing

¹⁷⁸ Cf. on the details of the Luxembourg-Belgium Question and the reasons why the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, established in 1815, broke up: Gruner, *Die belgisch-luxemburgische Frage* (note 5), esp. pp. 301–316, 325–384 cf. also Idem., *Grossbritannien und die Julirevolution von 1830. Zwischen Legitimitätsprinzip und nationalem Interesse*. In: *Francia* 9/1982, p. 369–410, pp. 398ff. – Lademacher, Horst, *Die belgische Neutralität als Problem der europäischen Politik 1830–1914*. Bonn: Röhrscheid 1971 – Kossmann, *The Low Countries 1780–1940*. Oxford: Oxford UP 1978, pp. 151 ff.

socio-political system, i.e. they rather preferred an evolutionary development which would preserve their own social and political position than experience violence and revolution. This was true for the South German states despite the six acts of the Diet of 28 June 1832. They did not fight the Six Acts of the Diet. They did not publish them since they were considered not to be in line with their constitutions.

In the long run, 1830 provided the setting for the German constitutional states to proceed on the way of reform. There was hope that there would be a majority of the constitutional states in the German Confederation when, as an outcome of the impact of the July Revolution, constitutions were negotiated for the Electorate of Hesse (1831), the kingdom of Saxony (1831) and Hanover (1833). The year 1830 thus paved the way towards parliamentary rule—as the Baden example of 1860 should show. This process was interrupted by the Prussian solution of the German question in 1866-1871.

By that time the antagonists of the 1830s, Metternich and Palmerston, had already died.