

**METTERNICH'S DIPLOMACY
TOWARDS THE ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES AND SERBIA
(1815–1848)***

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Abstract

In 1918, Romania's fate was closely linked to that of the Great Powers of the After an introductory part, showing Metternich's influence and vision in the establishment of the Holy Alliance, as well as the guidelines he followed in the Habsburg foreign policy, the article presents two historical sources related to the Austrian-Russian diplomacy unfolded in the Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia between 1815–1848.

The first testimony is a private letter, sent on July 26/August 6, 1844 from Constantinople, by Polish revolutionary Mihał Czajkowski to Romanian revolutionary Ion Ghica, comparing the situation in the Romanian Principalities and Serbia, and describing at large the Habsburg Empire's insincere real politics, as well as the Tsarist Empire's aggressive expansionism towards the three Danubian Principalities.

The second primary source is a press article, published in *Satellit*, the Transylvanian Saxon newspaper from Braşov, on July 3, 1848, disclosing *Metternich's Personal Relation to Russia*. The huge amounts of bribe money, received by the Austrian chancellor from the tsars Alexander and Nicholas between 1815 and 1848, apparently offered the key for understanding the Austrian-Russian policy in Serbia, Croatia, and the Romanian Principalities, down to the Mouths of the Danube.

Keywords: Metternich, Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, Austrian-Russian diplomacy, 1815–1848.

Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich-Winneberg zu Beilstein (1773–1859) was one of the most important Habsburg statesmen and European diplomats of his age. He was minister of Foreign Affairs (1809–1848) and chancellor of the Austrian Empire (since 1821), actually running the Austrian state

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during the last years of Emperor Francis II (1804–1835) and during the reign of Emperor Ferdinand I (1835–1848).

At the Vienna Congress of 1814–1815, he was the main negotiator and grey eminence of the historical event, together with the chiefs of the French and Russian diplomacy, influential Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754–1838) and crafty Karl Robert von Nesselrode (1780–1862).

As a matter of fact, Metternich, Talleyrand, and Nesselrode were the founders and champions of the Holy Alliance that settled imperial Europe's ultraconservative and antireform politics for over three decades (1815–1848).

In foreign affairs, the aim of the Metternich regime – until its collapse determined by the outburst of the revolution in March 1848 – was the defense of the “inter-monarchic solidarity” established by the Holy Alliance. This meant the preservation of imperial centralism and European *status-quo*, eventually the widening of Austria and Russia's spheres of influence and territorial acquisitions.

During the whole period until the mid-nineteenth century, Austria's attitude towards Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia coincided with Metternich's interest regarding the three Danubian Principalities. In fact, all Austrian foreign policy was shaped by and identified itself with Metternich himself, while Emperors Francis and Ferdinand, not to mention the Council of Ministers, played rather decorative roles on this level.

But then, outside its state borders, the Habsburg Empire never took steps on its own, unless it was accompanied and often guided by the Tsarist Empire. The latter was represented by Nesselrode, who stood behind his masters, Tsars Alexander I (1801–1825) and Nicholas I (1825–1855).

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The similarities between the Romanian Lands and Serbia, as well as the stake in Austria and Russia's game represented by Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, are reflected by a private letter, sent on July 26/August 6, 1844 to Romanian revolutionary Ion Ghica by Mihał Czajkowski, representative of Prince Adam Czartoryski's Polish emigration in Constantinople.¹

As regarded Wallachia and Moldavia, Czajkowski pointed out the seriousness of joining one imperial party or another, choosing Turkey while rejecting Austria and Russia: “The notabilities of the [Romanian] Principalities have to understand and prove palpably that they understand that, by relying on the Porte and supporting the Porte, they work for the country's prosperity and, by

¹ Constantinople, July 26/ August 6, 1844. Mihał Czajkowski to Ion Ghica, in French. In: C. Bodea, *Lupta românilor pentru unitatea națională, 1834–1849*, Bucharest, 1967, doc. 30, pp. 257–258. English translation in: E. Cosma, *Habsburg Consular Agencies and the 1848 Revolutions in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia*, English transl. from Romanian by M. Ganea, Cluj-Napoca–Gatineau, 2016, pp. 282–285.

surrendering themselves to Russia or Austria, they work to enslave themselves and to cause disaster for the future.”²

Serbia was invoked in order to serve as an example for Wallachia and Moldavia. The Romanian Principalities were summoned to take a stand on Turkey's side: “Their example has to be Serbia, [as well as] Vučić and Petroniević's policy, so favorable to the interests both of the Porte and Serbia. It is true that the two statesmen are victims of the Autocrat's [the Tsar's] arbitrariness and revenge, but they placed their country's prosperity above all.”³

The mentioned Serbian politicians were Thomas Vučić, the princely voivode (der fürstliche Woiwode), and his right-hand man, Avram Petroniević, chief of the voivode's chancellery and director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Principality of Serbia. Both belonged to the oligarchic group of the so-called “Constitutionalists” (Ustavobranitelji or “Defenders of the Constitution”), who manipulated the Serbian ruler Aleksandar Karađorđević (1842–1858), son of Karađorđe and opponent of authoritarian Miloš Obrenović (1815–1839). The state of inner affairs in Serbia, with Vučić and Petroniević conducting Karađorđević, was minutely described in a report composed by the end of 1845, addressed to Prince Metternich by the Habsburg consul in Belgrade, Ferdinand Mayerhofer von Grünbühl.⁴

In Mihał Czajkowski's letter sent to Ion Ghica in 1844, the Polish revolutionary eulogized the Serbian politicians' pro-Turkish, anti-Russian, and anti-Austrian attitude: “Let us look at Serbia that blesses Vučić and Petroniević's names, and let us follow the example of the two, who, though persecuted, still persist in their policy, as they know it is for Serbia's progress. The despotic revenge of the Russian emperor and the coward denunciation of Austria do not scare them; they remain faithful to the Sublime Porte, to their duty, to their country's prosperity. And let us hope that they will be successful, even if abandoned by those who should help them.”⁵

² E. Cosma, *Habsburg Consular Agencies...*, pp. 282–283. Originally: *Les notables des Principautés doivent comprendre et le prouver par une démonstration palpable, qu'ils comprennent qu'en s'appuyant sur la Porte, et appuyant la Porte, ils travaillent pour le bien-être de leur pays et qu'au contraire, se livrant à la Russie ou à l'Autriche, ils ne travaillent qu'à leur esclavage et aux infortunes de leur avenir.*

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 282–283. Originally: *La Serbie doit être servir d'exemple; la politique de Voutchitch et Petronievitch, si favorable aux intérêts de la Porte, a été aussi favorable pour les intérêts de la Serbie, c'est vrai que les deux hommes d'État sont victimes de l'arbitraire et de la vengeance de l'Autocrate, mais ils ont placé bien haut la prospérité de leur patrie.*

⁴ Vienna, December 5, 1845. The Austrian consul in Serbia, lieutenant-colonel Ferdinand Mayerhofer von Grünbühl, to the chancellor of the House, Court and State, Prince von Metternich, about the state of affairs in Serbia. *Ibidem*, p. 281.

⁵ Constantinople, July 26/August 6, 1844. Mihał Czajkowski to Ion Ghica, in French. In: E. Cosma, *Habsburg Consular Agencies*, pp. 282–283. Originally: *Qu'on regard cette Serbie qui bénit les noms de Voutchitch et Petronievitch et qu'on imite l'exemple de ces deux hommes qui, persécutés, persistent dans leur politique, parce qu'ils savent que c'est le bien de la Serbie. La*

Czajkowski compared the situation in Serbia with that in the Romanian Lands, stressing the Russian-Austrian ambitions in order to undermine Ottoman authority in these territories. While the Tsarists acted undisguised against the suzerain power, the Habsburgs appealed to hypocrite methods. “The same situation is lurking today for Wallachia. Prince Bibescu, just like Prince Mihail [Sturdza], pushed by Russia, is making efforts to remove the constitutional freedom of the country [countries] and replace it with arbitrariness.”⁶

Gheorghe Bibescu (1843–1848) was the ruling prince in the Principality of Wallachia, while Mihail Sturdza (1834–1849) was the ruling prince of the Moldavian Principality. Both ruled the Romanian Principalities during a difficult period. The overwhelming Tsarist Protectorate (1829–1848) had imposed to the countries both a severe Russian control in every respect of their inner political life, and plenty of restrictions.

The document continued, denouncing the insincere strategy and real politics conducted by Austria in all three Romanian Lands. “Austria claims to be the Porte’s friend. It sent to Transylvania General Kauer, precisely the general who was famous for his anti-Russian feelings, who was in Semlin at the moment of the Serbian revolution in 1842, encouraging and helping the revolutionaries.”⁷

Czajkowski referred to the moment when Mihailo Obrenović’s reign was overthrown by the previously mentioned heroes, who had formed the opposition that was favorable to the return of the Karađorđević dynasty. In 1842, Aleksandar Karađorđević was elected ruling prince of Serbia.

Hereinafter, the revolutionary Pole stated: “Austria sends Mr. Mayerhofer, this ordinary man, once upon a time a spy for Mr. de Metternich, today consul in Belgrade. It sends him to Bucharest, and stirs agitation in Moldo-Wallachia. It will probably pretend to be anti-Russian, and tell the same to the Porte and to Europe and you, to win your trust, to have more freedom and more approval for its undertaking... As soon as it puts you in motion, it will turn its back on you, like it did on Serbia, it will attack you together with Russia, like it did on Serbia. It will declare you unruly revolutionaries; it will declare the Porte’s weakness and frailty.”⁸

despotique vengeance de l'Empereur de Russie, la lâche dénonciation de l'Autriche ne les a pas effrayés, ils restent fidèles à la Sublime Porte, à leur devoir, au bien-être de leur patrie et il faut espérer que quoique abandonés par ceux qui devraient les appuyer, ils triompheront.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 282–283. Originally: *Aujourd'hui la même phase s'annonce pour la Valachie. Le prince Bibesco, comme le prince Michel, poussé par la Russie, cherche à léser la liberté constitutionnelle du pays et à mettre en place l'arbitraire.*

⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 282–284. Originally: *L'Autriche se disant amie de la Porte, envoie le général Kauer en Transylvanie, ce même général qui est connu par ses sentiments anti-russes en apparence, le général qui était à Semlin au moment de la révolution serbe de 1842, qui a encouragé et aidé les révolutionnaires.*

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 282–284. Originally: *L'Autriche envoie M. Mayerhoffer, cet homme simple, jadis espion de M. de Metternich, aujourd'hui consul à Belgrade; elle l'envoie à Bucarest, elle agit en*

Even the short description of the Austrian consul in Belgrade, Ferdinand Mayerhofer von Grünbühl (1798–1869), was realistic, expressing the general truth valid before 1848 as regards the Habsburg representatives in the Ottoman Empire, Romanian Principalities, and Serbia, who were considered to be Chancellor Metternich's spies.

However, an exclusively negative image of Mayerhofer von Grünbühl, as suggested by the Polish representative's description, is far from reflecting the historical truth. From the Serbian point of view, Mayerhofer played a pretty positive role that was propitious to the development and growth of the country. Mayerhofer von Grünbühl turned out to be well informed in Serbian matters and very supportive as regards Serbian autonomy. Indeed, the long-term Habsburg consul in Belgrade (1843–1849), Colonel Mayerhofer, was a strong ally of the Principality of Serbia, and especially of the Serbians, during their war against the Hungarians in 1848–1849. He actually took over the military command of the country, after the death of voivode Šuplikać (in December 1848), leading the victorious battles of Pančevo (2 January 1849) and Vršac (21 January 1849). At the end of the revolution, on 18 December 1849, Emperor Francis Joseph appointed him as provisional land chief (*provisorischer Landeschef*) or *načelnik* of the newly created province of Serbian Vojvodina and Temesan Banat, with the offices in the city of Timișoara. General Major Mayerhofer held this position until 16 August 1851, when he was replaced with Fieldmarshal Coronini.⁹

Returning to Mihał Czajkowski's letter, it stressed and synthesized the similarity of Russia and Austria's goals towards Serbia and the Romanian Principalities. Both empires' goals were expansionist, only their actions were different. While the Tsarists' behavior was more direct and aggressive, the Austrians mastered the use of disguised methods.

The Polish revolutionary noticed, in particular, the Habsburgs' duplicity, their chameleonic ability to dissimulate, to mislead, and to hide their real intentions through deceiving appearances. Under the mask of taking distance to the tsarist offensive, on the one hand, and of friendship towards "Europe's sick man," the Sultan's Empire, on the other hand, the Austrian Empire was ready at any moment to change attitude, helping Russia to disintegrate not only Turkey, but also the Romanian Lands.

Moldo-Valachie, elle se montrera probablement anti-russe, elle le dira ainsi à la Porte, à l'Europe et à vous pour gagner plus de confiance, pour avoir plus de liberté, plus d'approbation à son action... Et une fois lorsqu'elle vous poussera au mouvement, elle vous tournera le dos, comme à la Serbie, et elle tombera sur vous avec la Russie, comme est tombée avec la Serbie. Elle vous décrira comme révolutionnaires incorrigibles, elle décrira la faiblesse et la débonnairété de la Porte.

⁹ About Ferdinand Mayerhofer von Grünbühl's consular, military and political activity in Serbia, see E. Cosma, *Austrian Consular Representative Offices in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia (1782–1848)*, English transl. from Romanian by M. Ganea, Cluj-Napoca–Gatineau, 2016, pp. 201–202. Eadem, *Habsburg Consular Agencies...*, pp. 265–331.

For Czajkowski warned the Romanians: “This strategy meant to [lead to] the Ottoman Empire’s disaggregation, to the annulment of your national existence is Russia and Austria’s purpose. While facing Serbia’s resistance, they managed to have an impact in Moldo-Wallachia. Austria needs Bosnians, Albanians, to keep the civilized peoples contained, as, unfortunately, the old Croatian pandurs became civilized and are no longer raw material to oppress the Italians etc. etc. So, they want these provinces, they want Turkey’s disaggregation. Russia wants Constantinople, etc. etc.”¹⁰

In conclusion, the empires of the Habsburgs and of the Tsarists acted differently, but complementarily, sustaining each other, as they were united by the solidarity of their mutual unscrupulous goal: “Both act today in consonance, and they do not care about the future, or about any potential conflict between them. They know that once the theft committed, the robbery accomplished is the closest bond between thieves and robbers.”¹¹

The best proof of the national and territorial “theft committed” and “robbery accomplished” was precisely Mihał Czajkowski’s own country, torn apart by the Great Powers: “Poland is [witness] in front of them, to certify the truth of this axiom that defines their policy.”¹² Of course, as diplomacy never openly exposes its real intentions, such was the case with the mutual Austrian-Russian interests in the three Danubian Principalities, too.

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So far, we have noticed the hidden motivation and relation between Russia and Austria, regarding their policies in the Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia.

Let us specify that Chancellor Metternich himself was the connecting and cohesive element, but who stayed away from the eyes of the public opinion for thirty-three years (1815–1848). It was only after the outbreak of the 1848 revolution, which swept away from Vienna and Austria both Chancellor Metternich and his regime, when *Satellit des Siebenbürger Wochenblatts*, a Saxon

¹⁰ Constantinople, July 26/August 6, 1844. Mihał Czajkowski to Ion Ghica, in French. In: E. Cosma, *Habsburg Consular Agencies...*, pp. 283–284. Originally: *Cette tactique mène au démembrement de l’Empire Ottoman, à l’anéantissement de vos existences nationales, c’est le but de la Russie et de l’Autriche; elles ont éprouvé de la résistance en Serbie, elles se rejettent sur la Moldo-Valachie. L’Autriche a besoin des Bosniaques, des Albanais pour tenir en brides les populations civilisées, car malheureusement ses antiques pandoures de la Croatie se sont civilisés et ne présentent plus assez de matière brutale pour opprimer les Italiens, etc. etc. Elle veut donc avoir ces provinces, elle veut le démembrement de la Turquie. La Russie veut Constantinople, etc. etc.*

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 283–284. Originally: *Toutes les deux travaillent donc aujourd’hui de concert, elles s’inquiètent peu de l’avenir, d’une lutte possible entre elles; ils savent que le vol commis, le brigandage consommé est le meilleur lien entre les voleurs et les brigands.*

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 283–284. Originally: *La Pologne est devant eux pour attester la vérité de cet axiome défini de leur politique.*

newspaper from the Transylvanian town of Braşov, edited by Johann Gött, published an anonymous article on *Metternichs Privatverhältnis zu Rußland* [Metternich's Personal Relation with Russia], disclosing unknown details of a squalid story.¹³

Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that, in 1833, a meeting had taken place in Münchengrätz, between the Russian and the Austrian emperors. As the Transylvanian Saxon historian Friedrich Teutsch narrated, “inspired by the Holy Alliance’s romantic memories,” the young tsar allegedly knelt down in front of the Austrian emperor, and solemnly took an oath to stand by him “with advice and action” at any time. Four years later, in 1837, Tsar Nicholas renewed his promise made to Emperor Ferdinand during the Polish maneuvers in Wosnosensk.¹⁴

However, a long time before this, when old Tsar Alexander was getting ready to return from the Vienna Congress of 1815, he proposed to Prince Metternich to initiate, apart from the exchange of couriers between the two Cabinets, also “a friendly private, not political, correspondence between the two of them and, in order to cover the expenses thereof, the prince was asked to receive 50,000 ducats per year.”¹⁵

Metternich told Emperor Ferdinand about the proposal, who literally advised him to accept it. The emperor considered that Metternich’s correspondence with the tsar “would rather serve than damage the friendly relation between our Cabinets, because I consider you to be an honest man; therefore, accept the proposal!”¹⁶

Direct relations were thus initiated in 1815 between Metternich and Tsar Alexander, a situation that lasted ten years, until the latter’s death. After Tsar Nicholas’s access to the throne in 1825, the Austrian-Russian relations got frozen for a while.

At a certain moment, Metternich received a letter from the new tsar, who excused himself explaining that he had just learned about the relationship previously initiated. The anonymous Saxon article revealed Nicholas’s initiative to renew the former connection: “His deep wish was that the Austrian prince should show him the same devotion, and he asked him to resume the correspondence. In order to cover the expenses with this correspondence, Metternich was asked to

¹³ *Zum Privatverhältnis Metternichs zu Rußland*, in *Satellit*, Braşov, no. 53, July 3, 1848, in German.

¹⁴ Friedrich Teutsch, *Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk*, vol. III, 1816–1868, Sibiu, 1910, p. 265.

¹⁵ *Zum Privatverhältnis Metternichs zu Rußland*, in *Satellit*, Braşov, no. 53, July, 3, 1848. Originally: *eine freundschaftliche, nicht politische Privatkorrespondenz zwischen ihnen beiden in Gang zu setzen, zu deren Kostbedeckung der Fürst jährlich 50.000 Dukaten annehmen möge.*

¹⁶ *Ibidem.* Originally: *bei der freundlichen Beziehung unserer Kabinette könnte eine solche Korrelation eher nützlich als schädlich sein, denn ich halte Sie für einen ehrlichen Mann. Nehmen Sie also den Antrag an!*

receive 75,000 ducats! Metternich received this amount by March 12 the same year.”¹⁷ Thus ended the article, published on July 3, 1848.

The judgment passed on the situation was, however, extremely harsh, as Metternich’s betrayal was considered to be not only the key to the Austrian-Russian policy towards the Romanian Lands and Serbia, but also the cause of the disaster in Austria’s Eastern policy and of its financial collapse: “The amount of money [of 75,000 ducats, received by Metternich] is the key to Austrian-Russian policy regarding the Danubian [Romanian] Principalities, Serbia and Croatia, the Turkish war and peace agreement, and especially the Mouths of the Danube.”¹⁸

Reference is made here to the Russian-Turkish war of 1828, concluded with the peace treaty of Adrianople in 1829. They inaugurated the period of the Tsarist Protectorate in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, unfolded between the years 1829 and 1848. It covered two decades of severe Russian interference in the inner and outer affairs of the three Danubian Principalities, in spite of the fact that they were officially autonomous and nominally under Ottoman suzerainty. Therefore, the concept describing a “Russian protectorate” in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia is clearly too soft. Even so, the Romanian and Serbian historiographies still prefer to avoid any mention suggesting the tsarist influence, and to use politically neutral, but national and social formulas, such as: “the period of the rules of the [Organic] Regulations” (*perioada domniilor regulamentare*) in the Romanian Principalities, or “the Constitutionalist period” in the Principality of Serbia.¹⁹

The article in the newspaper *Satellit* ended in a Jacobin manner, putting all the blame on the treacherous Austrian chancellor: “What Metternich received for each of his betrayals, as a reward for his sin, can be estimated rather than computed; it may mean a regular percentage of each state loan, and a regular percentage of an infinite series of acts of public money embezzlement, which together with the incurable [...]”²⁰ finally caused in all regions of the world that financial need that threatens to stifle Austria, after its political influence in the Orient has been entirely destroyed due to a high treason that harmed the monarchy more than the Turks, Gustav Adolph, and Napoleon taken together.”²¹

¹⁷ *Ibidem*. Originally: *Es sei sein innigster Wunsch, daß der Fürst jene Anhänglichkeit auch auf ihn übertrage, und ersuche ihn um Fortsetzung jener Korrespondenz, zu deren Deckung Metternich 75.000 Dukaten genehmigen möge. Diesen Sold bezog Metternich bis zum 12. März l.J.*

¹⁸ *Ibidem*. Originally: *Er [dieser Sold von 75.000 Dukaten] liefert den Schlüssel zur österreichisch-russischen Politik in Bezug auf die Donaufürstenthümer, Serbien und Kroatien, den türkischen Krieg und Friedensschluß, vorzüglich aber auf die Donaumündungen.*

¹⁹ About the Austrian consular offices in the three Danubian Principalities during the Russian influence (1782/1809–1829) and protectorate (1829–1849), see: E. Cosma, *Austrian Consular Representative Offices...*, pp. 141–230.

²⁰ Unreadable word in the original printing.

²¹ *Zum Privatverhältnis Metternichs zu Rußland*, in *Satellit*, Braşov, no. 53, July 3, 1848. Originally: *Was Metternich für jeden einzelnen Hochverrath als Sündenlohn bekommen, ist aber eher zu vermuthen, als zu berechnen; er mag wohl nicht geringer gewesen sein, als die systematische Prozentuation bei jedem Staatslehen und jene endlose Reihe von Unterschlagungen öffentlicher*

The respective article, with no author mentioned, did not quote the source of the considerations on Metternich's personal relation with Russia. The associated amounts of money were so huge for that time, that any further reliable information on this issue would have been of great interest. Unfortunately, we have not discovered other historical testimonies, documents or, at least, press articles related to the story of the two tsars who bribed Metternich for more than thirty years (between 1815 and 1848). The unbelievable, shocking high stakes counted: 50,000 ducats (gold coins) for ten years (1815–1825), and 75,000 ducats for another fifteen years (no later than 1833 until the beginning of 1848), totalizing $500,000+1,125,000=1,625,000$ ducats!

As a matter of fact, he who ran the fates of Imperial Austria during four decades was accused of high treason in 1848. Confronted with the revolution, he had to take flight in exile. Then he returned home and survived the political events of the Austrian neo-absolutism for another decade, until 1859.

Afterwards, Metternich's name was never completely rehabilitated. He still remains a disputed historical character, as shown by the numerous but contradictory biographies, which were devoted to him, along the time, by Woodward (1923), von Srbik (3 vols., 1925–1954), Corti (2 vols., 1948–1949), de Bertier de Sauvigny (1962), May (1963), Palmer (1972), Berglar (1973), Musulin (1975), Hartau (1977), Fink (1993), Sked (2008), and many others.²²

Gelder, die nebst der heillosen [...] in allen Weltgegenden endlich jene Finanznoth herbeiführte, die Österreich zu erdrücken droht, nachdem dessen politischer Einfluß im Orient vollkommen vernichtet ist, durch einen Hochverrath, der größeres Uebel über die Monarchie gebracht, als die Türken, Gustav Adolph und Napoleon zusammengenommen.

²² E. L. Woodward, *Three Studies in European Conservatism. Metternich – Guizot – The Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1923; H. von Srbik, *Metternich – Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, 3 vols., Munich, 1925–1954; E. C. Conte Corti, *Metternich und die Frauen*. Nach meist bisher unveröff. Dokumenten, 2 vols., Vienna-Zurich, 1948–1949; G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, *Metternich and His Times*, London, 1962; A. J. May, *The Age of Metternich 1814–1848*, New York, 1963; A. Palmer, *Metternich: Councillor of Europe*, London, 1972; P. Berglar, *Metternich. "Kutscher Europas – Arzt der Revolutionen,"* Zurich-Frankfurt am Main, 1973; S. Musulin, *Vienna in the Age of Metternich*, London, 1975; F. Hartau, *Clemens Fürst von Metternich*, Hamburg, 1977; H. Fink, *Metternich. Staatsmann, Spieler, Kavalier. Eine Biographie*, Berlin, 1993; A. Sked, *Metternich and Austria: An Evaluation*, Basingstoke, 2008.