

## VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS (II)

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### VI

In late December 1909, Venizelos had got to Athens and met the leadership of the Military League. He was invited only to “give advice”; nevertheless he already felt strong enough to dictate the main points of his policy. The first goal to be achieved was that the King’s interference in foreign policy be halted. If the Sovereign did not consent, he would be dethroned and replaced by a “young member” of his family. The succeeding King should be supervised by a “committee” of experienced statesmen”– if the “wrong” steps that King George I had taken were to be avoided in the future.<sup>1</sup>

King George’s “wrong steps” were his contacts with the Austrian Emperor. And such a friendship made a serious impact on domestic policy as well. In point of fact, no sooner had Venizelos reached Athens than he pointed out again the top priority of Greece, viz. Macedonia. Crete, accordingly, was to be brushed aside for the moment.<sup>2</sup> It was clear, in other words, that a war against the Porte was already in sight. But who was to undertake the re-organization of the Greek Army? It was a crucial matter – dealing not only with warfare but with foreign policy as well.

Colonel N. Zormpas, nominal head of the Military League, preferred a French military mission. Yet the point was that there had been such a mission in Greece during the years 1884–1887.<sup>3</sup> The results of its work had been all but deplorable. The 1897 Greco-Turkish war stood as proof. As a result, Crown Prince Constantine wished German officers to come to Greece to instruct and train their Greek colleagues. King George agreed and talked accordingly to the Kaiser Wilhelm II.<sup>4</sup> Still, Zormpas was steadfast in his opinion; for if German officers were invited into Greece, Constantine’s prestige would be restored and enhanced. He, therefore, took advantage of Constantine having fled abroad after the Goudi coup and, without informing the King, he carried the discussions with the French through to a successful conclusion.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> N. Zormpas, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, pp. 84–85; cf. P. K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 131.

<sup>2</sup> I. Ēliakēs, *Ho Venizelos kai hē politikē*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> EVP, 1/30/18: Emoluments of the first French Military Mission in Greece.

<sup>4</sup> N. Zormpas, *Apomnēmoneumata*, p. 139.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140.

On the other hand, upon his arrival in Greece Venizelos had reached a decision: Either the French or the Italians were to organize the Greek Army, and either the Americans or the British the Greek Navy.<sup>6</sup> In any case, neither German nor Austrian officers were to be permitted to come to Greece.

But in order to have Greece's Armed Forces trained by oversight of the Entente Powers, he needed to get a handle on Greek politics. It was the King who paved the way. Little wonder at that, since the British minister at Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, was manipulating George I for Venizelos' sake.<sup>7</sup> Sir Francis had by then more power in Athens than the Greek Prime Minister himself.<sup>8</sup> The King, therefore, was afraid of losing his throne following a general unrest, if Venizelos turned the Military League against him and the British discontinued the protection of his House.<sup>9</sup> In short, both the Crown and the League were coerced into bending to Venizelos' personality and programme.

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Since the King was prompted to grant Venizelos the leadership of Greek politics, a sense of urgency prevailed. At the outset, the League was persuaded by Venizelos himself that a radical amendment – in a most liberal way to the current Greek Constitution (in force since 1864) should be its crowning achievement.<sup>10</sup> The corollary was that not just a “conventional Parliament” should be summoned but a Revisionist one instead (with twice the number of deputies)<sup>11</sup>. Such a Parliament, nonetheless, would be only a Revisionist one, a Boule, and by no means a Constitutive Assembly. In other words, the abolition of the kingship would be out of the question;<sup>12</sup> George I was assured of his throne; and the way back to “normality” was paved by the self-dissolution of the Military League in mid-March 1910.<sup>13</sup>

Such a gracious act should be reciprocated by the King. And so it was. On August 8, 1910, a general election took place throughout Greece. Venizelos was entered as an independent candidate and absentee; yet he gained a seat in the Revisionist Parliament. The “Old Political Parties”, nonetheless, i.e. the ones that were the adversaries of the Military League and of himself, won the day.<sup>14</sup> Thus it was that Kōnstantinos Esslin<sup>15</sup> was elected, on September 27, President (= Speaker)

<sup>6</sup> I. Metaxas, *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 32 (entry of October 22, 1910).

<sup>7</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados*, III, pp. 86, 110.

<sup>8</sup> According to the chargé d'affaires of Austro-Hungary at Athens. (P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 230.)

<sup>9</sup> I. Ēliakēs, *Ho Venizelos kai hē politikē*, p. 84; Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–1912”, p. 93; P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 127.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, pp. 35–36.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Kairoi*, March 18, 1910, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados*, III, p. 106.

<sup>15</sup> Of Bavarian stock. His German name was Konstantin von Hoesslin.

of the Parliament. Esslin thought that the root problem of Greece was the “liberal spirit running through the 1864 constitution”.<sup>16</sup> He distrusted, therefore, Venizelos and, of course, was opposed to the radical changes scheduled by him and his obsequious military followers. In doing so, he signed his own death warrant. For Venizelos never forgave him: Esslin was to die in jail in January 1920.<sup>17</sup>

Be that as it may, a political deadlock had been reached – and the King’s personal intervention then was more necessary than ever. George I had been taught his lesson – and acted accordingly. In line with the Greek political practices – especially with the *Dedēlōmenē* principle, in force since 1875<sup>18</sup> – he was required to entrust the leader of the strongest party with the premiership. Still, the Sovereign – on the grounds that no “group” in the Parliament had achieved a clear majority<sup>19</sup>, opened talks with every available political leader in the country, and quite unexpectedly stated, on October 2, that the only politician fit to be charged with the formation of a government was Venizelos.<sup>20</sup> It was actually represented to him that Venizelos was “the one person in Greece capable of forming a cabinet without fomenting a civil war”.<sup>21</sup> It was clear, however, that the Sovereign only pretended to be convinced by such arguments.<sup>22</sup> Yet he could not do otherwise: he was browbeaten into trusting Venizelos “to the bitter end”.<sup>23</sup>

But Venizelos was not yet the leader of a political party, and it was more than questionable whether he was qualified to be the Prime Minister of Greece. In point of fact, when elected to the Revisionist Parliament he was still in office in Crete, viz. Ottoman territory. His being summoned to Athens by the Military League had led to his popularity in Crete reaching “its modest peak”.<sup>24</sup> For he had gained a small and unstable majority in the Cretan Assembly<sup>25</sup> and, subsequently, became, on May 4, 1910, the Chairman of the Executive Committee – quasi-Prime Minister of Crete.<sup>26</sup> This office had hitherto been held by Manousos Koundouros, his chief

<sup>16</sup> N. Zormpas, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 66 (note 45). As for the Constitution of 1864 see mainly Ch. Seignobos, *Histoire politique de l’Europe contemporaine. Évolution des partis et des formes politiques, 1844–1896* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1903), p. 624: *La constitution de 1864 établit la liberté de la presse et abolit le Sénat. Tout le pouvoir parlementaire fut concentré dans la Boulé [= Parlement] élue au suffrage universel, portée à 192 membres et quatre ans de durée.*

<sup>17</sup> Theodoros Vellianitēs, entry “Kōnstantinos Eslin” in *Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia* (= The Great Greek Encyclopaedia), vol. XI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1929), p. 637.

<sup>18</sup> Alexandros Svōlos, *Hē syntagmatikē Historia tēs Hellados. Ta hellēnika syntagmata, 1822–1955* (= The Constitutional History of Greece. The Constitutions of Greece, 1822–1955), Athens: Stochastēs, 1972, pp. 43–44.

<sup>19</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 108.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Memoirs of ... Prince Christopher of Greece*, p. 113.

<sup>22</sup> I. Metaxas, *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, pp. 30–31 (entry of October 21, 1910); cf. Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados*, III, p. 110.

<sup>23</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 114.

<sup>24</sup> A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 39.

<sup>25</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–1912”, p. 95.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*; Lilē Makrakē, *Eleutherios Venizelos...*, p. 441; S.I. Stephanou (ed.), *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena* (= Eleutherios Venizelos’ Texts), vol. I (Athens, 1981), p. 170.

antagonist.<sup>27</sup> Of course Venizelos, after he had informed of his election in Greece, rushed to Canea, on August 30, to resign; and with exceeding dexterity, he avoided the danger of making statements on his further political views. Upon boarding a ship back to Greece, he talked excitedly, and accordingly cried his eyes out.<sup>28</sup> It was obvious that he had adopted a strategy of complete – yet tearful – silence.

Still how might he be regarded as a subject of the King of the Hellenes, since he was involved so deeply in Cretan politics? For involvement in Cretan politics implied Ottoman citizenship. It is noteworthy that five other Cretans, i.e. Sultan's subjects, namely M. Koundouros, Antōnios Michelidakēs, Geōrgios Papamastorakēs, Antōnios Katzourakēs and Charalampos Pōlogiōrgēs, had put themselves up for candidacy in Greek constituencies; and were elected as well to the Revisionist Parliament.<sup>29</sup> The latter, nonetheless, had their election invalidated.<sup>30</sup> Such an annulment was presented to Venizelos as it were on a plate; because almost all of them were his political antagonists in Crete.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, the Body stood by the legality of Venizelos' election in absentia.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, it was a complex situation that emerged. Paradoxical as it may appear, the Ottoman Porte was not disposed to raise objections at the election of Cretans in the Parliament of Greece. Nonetheless, given that the Porte considered "Cretan" citizenship to be identical with Ottoman citizenship,<sup>33</sup> only two wholly logical conditions were laid down: Cretans elected to Greek constituencies had to break off all political ties with their native island and never go back to it.<sup>34</sup> Venizelos fulfilled both conditions promptly. As a result, his premiership was regarded by the Porte as a "domestic affair of Greece",<sup>35</sup> hence there was no room for Ottoman interference especially in it.<sup>36</sup> Had not the Parliament, on the other hand, annulled the election of the five, a diplomatic incident would likely have been produced and, as a result, the election of all six Cretans (including Venizelos) would have been cancelled.

<sup>27</sup> Manousos Koundouros, *Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis. Historika gegonota, 1890–1923.* (= Historical and Diplomatic Disclosures. Historical Events). Edited by Charikleia G. Dēmakopoulou and Eleutherios Skiadas (Athens: ELIA, 1997<sup>2</sup>), pp. 198–199.

<sup>28</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados*, III, p. 107.

<sup>29</sup> S. Kunalrp, *The Final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 830: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, August 6, p. 429.

<sup>30</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–1912", p. 97.

<sup>31</sup> S. Kunalrp, *The Final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 830: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, August 6, p. 430.

<sup>32</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics...", p. 97.

<sup>33</sup> S. Kunalrp, *The Final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 979: Rifaat Pasha to Halil Bey, Constantinople, June 14, 1911, p. 499.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 430: Rifaat Pasha to the Ottoman Embassies in Paris, London, Saint Petersburg, Rome, Vienna and Berlin, Constantinople, March 15, p. 477.

<sup>35</sup> In all probability, the Porte's attitude with regard to Venizelos' Greek premiership was dictated by the Protective Powers of Crete, i.e. the Entente Powers. (P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 167.)

<sup>36</sup> S. Kunalrp, *The Final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 851: Rifaat Pasha to the Ottoman Imperial Embassies, Constantinople, October 19, 1911, p. 442.

Effectively, it was the leaders of the “Old Political Parties”, namely G. Theotokēs and Dēmētrios Rhallēs, who had pushed Venizelos’ foes in Crete to submit their candidacy to Greek constituencies in 1910. They hoped that international complications would arise because of their Ottoman nationality and so Venizelos’ rush for power would be halted.<sup>37</sup> Strangely enough, it was the contrary that was occurred: though Theotokēs and Rhallēs controlled the Parliament, the election of Venizelos was validated, whilst those of the five other “Cretans” were annulled.

Was Venizelos a Greek citizen in 1910? True, his father was; and thanks to the law No. 391 of 1856<sup>38</sup> the son of a Greek citizen was considered to be a Greek citizen, too. Nonetheless, every Greek citizen had to register with his home Town Council, actually reside there and only after two years<sup>39</sup> had passed without the committing of criminal act, could he take the oath of “the Greek Citizenship” before the relevant administrative authority (the prefect as a rule).<sup>40</sup>

Venizelos was born to a Greek citizen, but he had not been registered with a town council in Greece. As a result, the Ottoman authorities in Crete did not regard him as Greek – and they were right. Had he not been backed overtly by the King and covertly by the British, he would not have been elected a member of the Greek Parliament and become the Greek Prime Minister.

## VII

Venizelos was sworn into office on October 6, 1910, and on the same day he appointed his cabinet. He further took a wise step, when he earmarked the Army and Navy ministries for himself. For in that way was he able to keep under control the leadership of the Military League and its radical-minded members as well. The King, on the other hand, managed to have the portfolio of Foreign Affairs given to Iōannēs Gryparēs, a career diplomat.<sup>41</sup> The Sovereign trusted Gryparēs, and hoped that that diplomat would frustrate any Venizelos’ attempt at wholly encroaching on foreign policy. Venizelos reciprocated by appointing Emmanouēl Repoulēs as Minister of Internal Affairs. The latter was a publicist of Albanian descent, associated with the influential daily paper *Hestia*; ruthless by nature, “fluent in all languages except foreign ones” and blindly devoted to Venizelos.<sup>42</sup> Whenever Venizelos was

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 830: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, August 6, p. 430.

<sup>38</sup> Art. 14. (*Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados*, I, No. 75 [November 15, 1856], p. 400.)

<sup>39</sup> For Greeks who had foreign citizenship – as Venizelos had.

<sup>40</sup> Art. 15. (*Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados*, I, No. 75 [November 15, 1856], p. 400.) The observance of this formality was compulsory. (AYE, 1898, A/11/1, Athōs Rōmanos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, to G.A. Argyropoulos, Greek minister at Bucharest, No. 11831, Athens, December 7, 1899.)

<sup>41</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 111.

<sup>42</sup> P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 173; Demetra Vaka, *In the Heart of German Intrigue* (Boston-New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), p. 273.

in power, Repoulēs ruled Greece's domestic affairs with a rod of iron up to his death in 1924. Lampros Koromēlas' nomination to the ministry of Finance was due to his American connections. He had been the Greek minister at Washington, D.C. since 1908 and had strong ties with rich Americans of Greek origin.<sup>43</sup> In 1911 he was to marry Anna Ewing Cockrell, a member of a powerful Missouri family,<sup>44</sup> and in 1912 he was appointed by Venizelos Minister of Foreign Affairs. An avowed enemy of the Slavic peoples, he was to play a crucial role in the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. It was the Minister of Justice, Nikolaos Dēmētrakopoulos, who was the only one among these 'rising stars' of Greek politics who did not depend upon Venizelos or the King or a foreign Power. He was justly regarded as a brilliant juriconsult, and Venizelos urged him to reform the Greek law system.<sup>45</sup> Yet he soon fell out with the Prime Minister and was to pass away unexpectedly in 1921.<sup>46</sup>

On October 7, Venizelos delivered a speech to the Parliament – the first one in his capacity as Prime Minister. He declared that the work of Greece's reconstruction on which he was going to embark "could not take place from one day to the next"; for the fulfillment of such a task would require a long period of domestic and international tranquility. As a result, Greece would be "an element of peace in the [Near] East".<sup>47</sup>

It was an obvious attempt to veil his intentions. Few, if any, believed him. Thus the Parliament became unmanageable and, accordingly, Venizelos dissolved it on October 12.<sup>48</sup> No objection was raised on the side of the King,<sup>49</sup> for most likely Venizelos had been given *carte blanche*. The Sovereign, in other words, had agreed in advance to have the Parliament dissolved, if Venizelos so wished.<sup>50</sup> The elections for a new Revisionist Parliament, the second to date, were held on November 28, 1910. Both G. Theotokēs and D. Rhallēs suspected the compliance of the King with Venizelos, denounced the "chicanery" and refused, accordingly,

<sup>43</sup> Theodōros Vellianitēs, entry "Lampros Koromēlas" in *Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia*, vol. XIV (Athens: Pirsos, 1930), p. 916.

<sup>44</sup> F.R. Bridge, *Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle* (Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), doc. 446, Athens, May 18, 1912 (No. 196), pp. 480–481; Percy F. Martin, *Greece of the Twentieth Century* (London-Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), p. 54.

<sup>45</sup> Geōrgios Ventērēs, *Hē Hellas tou 1910–1920*, vol. I (Athens: Pirsos, 1931), p. 77; cf. P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 173.

<sup>46</sup> Geōrgios D. Dēmakopoulos, "Tina peri tou N. P. Dēmētrakopoulou kai tou nomothetikou tou ergou" (= On the Life and Legislative Work of N. P. Dēmētrakopoulos), *Anakoinōseis hēmeridos (17 Martiou 2008) gia tēn epeteio tou thanatou tou Eleutheriou Venizelou* (= Proceedings of the Congress [March 17, 2008] on the Anniversary of Eleutherios Venizelos' Death), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2008, pp. 43–64.

<sup>47</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 189.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>49</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 114.

<sup>50</sup> É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, IV, p. 50; A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 43.

to stand in the elections.<sup>51</sup> In doing this they presented their enemy with an unassailable weapon. For now he had a solid political party at his disposal, namely the Liberal one, christened by the publicist Geōrgios Pōp,<sup>52</sup> owner and editor of the paper *Athēnai* – the only person [in Greece] entitled to interpret his [= Venizelos'] ideas".<sup>53</sup>

Though "liberal" the Venizelist party was a monolithic one. "It often denied freedom to its opponents and always to its adherents" – as a prominent founding member of it stated.<sup>54</sup> The term "party discipline" became, in fact, the slogan of Venizelos and his followers in the November elections.<sup>55</sup> The Liberal Party's local branches were soon being set up throughout Greece.<sup>56</sup> And last but not least, Venizelos had not resigned from office: the elections were to take place with him controlling the state machinery.<sup>57</sup> Under such conditions, the non-participation in the elections of Rhallēs and Theotokēs, i.e. the leaders who were in a position to organize political groups effectively, doomed to failure any candidate who did not belong to Venizelos' Liberals.

Significantly enough, the Prime Minister's first electoral speech was delivered in Larissa, Thessaly – a border city by then. Though he heralded *urbi et orbi* the peaceful purposes of his administration, he declared that the Greek Armed Forces were to be rapidly re-organized under the supervision of foreign experts.<sup>58</sup> So it was done, after he had won the elections. He amended the current Constitution, by which foreigners had been forbidden to become either civil servants or Army or Naval officers in Greece,<sup>59</sup> and stated that by means of "ad hoc laws" foreign specialists would be summoned to the aid of the country.<sup>60</sup> What is more, he added an eighth ministry, that of Agriculture, Trade and Industry,<sup>61</sup> the portfolio of which was given to Emmanouēl Benakēs, his sponsor.

<sup>51</sup> A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 43.

<sup>52</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 203.

<sup>53</sup> S. Kunalp, *The final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 879: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, December 31, 1910, p. 453.

<sup>54</sup> Kōnstantinos G. Zavitzianos, *Hai anamnēseis tou ek tēs historikēs diafōnias Vasileōs Kōnstantinou kai Eleutheriou Venizelou opōs tēn ezēse, 1914–1922* (=Kōnstantinos Zavitzianos' Memoirs from the Historical Disagreement between King Constantine and Eleutherios Venizelos as he witnessed it, 1914–1922), vol. I, Athens, 1946, p. 74.

<sup>55</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–1912", p. 99.

<sup>56</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 225ff.; A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 43.

<sup>57</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 171.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 208.

<sup>59</sup> Art. 3 of the 1864 Constitution.

<sup>60</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 276.

<sup>61</sup> Renamed as the "Ministry of National Economy" in July 1911. (Christine Agriantoni, "Venizelos and Economic Policy", in Paschalis Kitromilidis, *Eleftherios Venizelos. The trials of Statesmanship...*, p. 288.

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E. Benakēs was a key-figure in Venizelos' ascendancy. He had no business interests in Greece. Still, he was a fabulously wealthy member of the Greek colony in Alexandria, Egypt, and had supported Venizelos financially even before he became Prime Minister.<sup>62</sup> During the 1910s, moreover, Benakēs became the cardinal figure in Venizelos' taking charge of Greece. For not only did he give, throughout the decade, generous financial support to the Venizelists, but his sumptuous house, in the centre of Athens, near Syntagma Square, was rapidly transformed into the focus of the alliance between merchants and Venizelos' associates.<sup>63</sup> Benakēs furthermore was intimate with the Kyrou family, the owners of the daily paper *Hestia*. This newspaper was regarded as the mouthpiece of the Royal Court;<sup>64</sup> it had, moreover, played an important role in Venizelos' rise to power in the early 1910s<sup>65</sup>; and it was to play a key part in Greece's National Divide set up in 1914<sup>66</sup> – and in Venizelos' fall from power as well in the early 1930s.<sup>67</sup>

E. Benakēs was a case in point of the “golden cockroaches”,<sup>68</sup> that socially dominated the Greek colonies in countries under British rule. Those “golden cockroaches” felt ashamed of being associated with “such a miserable country” as Greece; as a result they had adopted a way of life modelled on those of the British and French.<sup>69</sup> To cap it all, they were the main sponsors and promoters of the struggle against the Exarchists in Macedonia.<sup>70</sup>

As Benakēs' story in the World War One years was to prove, he was capable of being disliked even by his friends and relatives;<sup>71</sup> albeit Venizelos proved to be an exception to the rule.<sup>72</sup> His appointment to the newborn Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and Industry meant that the economic life of Greece was being subjugated to foreign control. In retrospect, Venizelos' victory in the general elections of

<sup>62</sup> A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 39.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>64</sup> S. Kunalp, *The final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 879: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, December 31, 1910, p. 453.

<sup>65</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–1912”, pp. 95–96.

<sup>66</sup> Demetra Vaka, *In the Heart of German Intrigue*, pp. 77–80.

<sup>67</sup> EVP, I/50/101: Achilleus Kyrou, manager of the newspaper *Hestia*, to Venizelos, Athens, December 10, 1930.

<sup>68</sup> *Chrysokantharoi* in Greek.

<sup>69</sup> *Hē Penēlopē Delta kai ho kosmos tēs* (= Penelope Delta and her World), Athens: Benaki Museum, 2006, pp. 12–13.

<sup>70</sup> F.R. Bridge, *Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle*, doc. 17, Monastir, No. 5/pol., February 15, 1897, p. 55; doc. 24, Athen, No. 91B, December 23, 1897, p. 65.

<sup>71</sup> EVP, I/31/4, letter of Zoē Stephanou-Dragoumē to Angelikē Phikiōrē, Alexandria April 14/27, 1911; *Hē Penēlopē Delta kai ho kosmos tēs*, p. 10. (Penelope Delta was the daughter of E. Benakēs.)

<sup>72</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics...”, p. 100.

November 28, 1910, is rightly identified as the victory of Diaspora businessmen over Greece's native Civil and Army bureaucracy.<sup>73</sup> Venizelos' supremacy was now unchallenged.<sup>74</sup>

### VIII

The reform of the Constitution was completed on June 1, 1911;<sup>75</sup> a remarkable output of legislative work was produced as well.<sup>76</sup> Still both the constitutional amendment and legislative reforms largely benefited from steps taken by previous administrations.<sup>77</sup> Some of Venizelos' reforms, moreover, were never put into effect.<sup>78</sup> However, the point is that he did not decide upon Greece's crucial problems, namely her language and her rural issues. *Katharevousa*, i.e. the artificially classicizing variety of Modern Greek, was to remain the official language up to the mid-1970s; whilst the land reform, required especially in Thessaly, was implemented no earlier than the early 1920s.<sup>79</sup> His only actual reform was that applying to Paris and London for Army and Naval officers to be dispatched in order to reform the Greek Armed Forces. It was in January 1911, that the French mission arrived; it was under the command of general Joseph-Paul Eydoux. The British, who were to supervise the Navy, reached Athens later – in May of the same year; they were led by rear-admiral Lionel Grand Tufnell.<sup>80</sup>

Eydoux and his associates had not much to do; for the foundations of the Army re-organization had already been laid by Crown Prince Constantine – backed as he was by G. Theotokēs.<sup>81</sup> The crux of the matter was the Navy: Tufnell was a “retired and undistinguished” officer.<sup>82</sup> What was he supposed to do in Greece? As a matter of fact, the armoured cruiser “Geōrgios Averoff” had been purchased in Italy by the Greek government as early as 1909 and reached Greek waters in May, 1911.<sup>83</sup> It was thanks to this man-of-war that the Ottoman Fleet had been defeated in the Balkan War – yet Tufnell had not been involved in the purchase of the “Averoff”. What was he, therefore, supposed to do in Greece?

<sup>73</sup> A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 44.

<sup>74</sup> Thanos Veremis and Helen Gardikas Katsiadakis, “Protagonist in Politics, 1912–1920” in Paschalis Kitromilidis, *Eleftherios Venizelos. The trials of Statesmanship...*, p. 115.

<sup>75</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 276.

<sup>76</sup> EVP, I/31/7–22: Venizelos' notes on the reforms to be put into effect.

<sup>77</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics...”, p. 104.

<sup>78</sup> A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 45.

<sup>79</sup> Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics...”, p. 107.

<sup>80</sup> Zisis Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 28.

<sup>81</sup> G. Ventērēs, *Hē Hellas tou 1910–1920*, I, p. 79.

<sup>82</sup> A. Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, p. 45.

<sup>83</sup> Commodore K. Paizēs-Paradelēs, *Ta ploia tou Hellēnikou Polemiku Nautiku...*, p. 1.

The answer to such a question is simple: the French and British missions were summoned to Greece for political reasons and not for those of warfare.<sup>84</sup> For Greece had to side with the Entente Powers, Britain, France, and Russia.<sup>85</sup> As aforementioned, thanks to the amendment of art. 3 of the 1864 Constitution, French and British officers now had posts of responsibility in the apparatus of the Greek State<sup>86</sup>. Tufnell, first of all, was promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral in command of the Naval Forces and Establishments of Greece<sup>87</sup> in the beginning; and Inspector-General of the Greek Navy later.<sup>88</sup> The French, on the other hand, had to wait a little longer, because Prince Constantine and his party, regardless of the Goudi coup and its aftermath, had always hold of the rank-and-file of the Army. As a result, French officers did not take actual command of Greek troops until the end of the Balkan Wars.<sup>89</sup>

Tufnell, fortunately, was mild-tempered; so Greek seamen liked him and tried to even emulate him. For they saw in Tufnell a typical officer of the prestigious [British] Royal Navy.<sup>90</sup> Under such conditions, Tufnell's major achievement was the disciplining of the Greek crews. Discipline, in fact, was somewhat lax among them after the 1909 Salamis battle.<sup>91</sup> King George I, moreover, did not want the "Averoff", by far the most important ship of the Greek Navy, to be commanded by Iōannēs Damianos, an officer associated with the Military League and considered to be inimical to his authority.<sup>92</sup> Thus Tufnell took advantage of an accident suffered by the "G. Averoff" in June 1911 to have Damianos placed *en disponibilité* and replaced by Captain Sophocles Dousmanēs.<sup>93</sup> By the same token, King George openly favoured Paulos Kountouriōtēs, another Captain of the Greek Navy whom the sovereign considered to be loyal to his Crown; and his favour was upheld when he recommended him to Venizelos as Chief of the General Staff of the Navy.<sup>94</sup> Venizelos acquiesced, and Kountouriōtēs from then on was to play a key role in the Balkan War -and Greek politics as well.

<sup>84</sup> I. Metaxas, *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 32 (entry of October 22, 1910).

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39 (entry of October 29, 1910).

<sup>86</sup> Law No. 3775, *Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados*, I, No. 101 (May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1911), pp. 399–400.

<sup>87</sup> Z. Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy*..., p. 29.

<sup>88</sup> Admiral S.I. Dousmanēs, *To hēmerologion tou kyvernētou tou "G. Averoff" kata tous polemous 1912–1913* (= The Diary of the Captain of the "G.Averoff" during the Wars of [the Years] 1912–1913), Athens: Pyrsos, 1940, p. 15.

<sup>89</sup> *Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados*, I, No. 186 (June 9, 1914), p. 986: Royal Decree regarding the Cavalry Officer Descoins.

<sup>90</sup> Rear Admiral Epameinōndas P. Kavvadias, *Ho Nautikos Polemos tou 1940 opōs ton ezēsa. Anamnēseis, 2 Martiou 1935–25 Martiou 1943* (= The Naval War of 1940 as I witnessed it. Memoirs, March 2, 1935–March 25, 1943), Athens: Pyrsos, 1950, pp. 19–20.

<sup>91</sup> Z. Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy*..., p. 34.

<sup>92</sup> Though he did not take part in the Goudi coup. (P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 106.)

<sup>93</sup> Z. Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy*..., pp. 33–34.

<sup>94</sup> EVP, I/32/5, King George I to Eleutherios Venizelos (letter), Corfu, April 8, 1912.

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In truth, the British had no illusions as to whether their aid in re-organizing the Greek Navy would contribute to a Greco-Turkish war in the future.<sup>95</sup> Still, Russia's willingness to help the Greek Navy to redress the balance of the Ottoman navy (if the British did not do so) worked in favour of Tufnell's team coming to Greece.<sup>96</sup> And last but not least, Greece was subsidized with French money in order to accomplish her re-armament.<sup>97</sup>

Of course Venizelos was aware of the political motives of the decision to summon French and British officers. As for the Navy, in late 1910 the Greek government was given clear warning by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, not to rely for the Navy's re-organization on expertise from Germany.<sup>98</sup> Not surprisingly, since 1898–1901 Russia's repeated attempts to persuade Germany to sign a secret agreement on spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire, recognizing Russian ambitions in the Bosphorus, were silently turned down by the Germans.<sup>99</sup> Still Sazonov's warning had no effect on the Army. Accordingly, Venizelos recalled Crown Prince Constantine and entrusted the Army to him and his German-trained associates (such as I. Metaxas).<sup>100</sup> He was dexterous enough to display this act as a vital step for the sake of Greek national unity.<sup>101</sup> Be that as it may, it was Constantine's and his military 'wing' that waged the Balkan War on the Ottomans.

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The work of the Second Revisionist Parliament was over in December 1911, and accordingly general elections took place on March 11, 1912. The result was a fresh triumph for Venizelos: he was to dominate Greek politics unchallenged up to 1915.<sup>102</sup> In the meantime, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was put into effect. As foretold, Italy declared war on the Porte in 1911 and in 1912 Italian troops captured Rhodes, a major island of the Dodecanese group, hitherto under Turkish rule. Venizelos knew that war was imminent. A couple of weeks after the 1912 elections he met on Mt. Pelion, Thessaly, James D. Bouchier, the Balkan correspondent of the London *Times*. Bouchier was acting as an intermediary

<sup>95</sup> Z. Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy...*, p. 28.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*; Michel Garin, *Les Grecs de Paris pendant la Première Guerre mondiale* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2010), pp. 8–9.

<sup>98</sup> Z. Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy...*, p. 27.

<sup>99</sup> Christopher Andrew and Oleg Cordievsky, *KGB. The Inside Story* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 29

<sup>100</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, pp. 132–133.

<sup>101</sup> S.I. Stephanou, *Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena*, I, p. 283ff.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337.

between the Sofia and Athens governments, for the attainment of a rapprochement. The Pelion talks were the last stage of Bouchier's endeavours. In point of fact, the Greco-Bulgarian understanding had been canvassed since early 1910,<sup>103</sup> and Venizelos had harped on about the benefits of this very entente long before he became Prime Minister of Greece. Bulgaria was regarded as the pivotal Power in the Balkan alliance against the Porte; but due to the 1904–1908 bloody antagonism in Macedonia, the former was not prompt to conclude an alliance with Greece. Still, a Greco-Bulgarian formal alliance was concluded on May 16, 1912; any commitment on how the spoils of a successful outcome of a future war would be shared was avoided therein.<sup>104</sup> This alliance was heralded as the “first diplomatic triumph” of Venizelos.<sup>105</sup> In fact, it was the product of semi-official British pressure on the Bulgarian government. Whatever the facts of the matter, the war was now *ante portas*.

### CHAPTER THREE THE WARS

An indirect consequence of the 1912 elections was that the Christians of Crete considered that the time was ripe for the union<sup>106</sup> of their island with Greece. As mentioned, they saw in Venizelos a supporter of Ottoman rule over Crete. Now they discovered in him an all-powerful Prime Minister of Greece. They knew him to be the irreconcilable foe of Prince George and, further, of the Greek Royal House. They now saw King George I backing Venizelos' “chicaneries”. Of course they were not able to grasp the enormity of the diplomatic manoeuvres that produced Venizelos' seizing the reins of Greek politics. They perceived, nonetheless, that the socio-political climber who claimed Cretan ancestry was now the strongman of Greece. If so, why should the formal accomplishment of *enosis* be delayed? After all, Venizelos, before he left Crete for good, proclaimed the island to be nothing more than an “annex of Greece”.<sup>107</sup>

Shortly after the general elections of March 11, 1912, therefore, the Cretan Assembly required of Iōannēs Tsirimōkos, the new Speaker of the Greek Parliament, that Christian Cretans – elected according to “Cretan custom” be

<sup>103</sup> Th. Veremis and Helen Gardikas Katsiadakis, “Protagonist in Politics, 1912–1920”, p. 143.

<sup>104</sup> The text of the Alliance: Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Polemikē Ekthesis (= Ministry of War. General Staff of the Army. Account of the War), *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912–1913* (= The Greek Army in the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars), vol. I. Annex (Athens: National Printing House, 1932), doc. 2, pp. 3–4.

<sup>105</sup> Steph. I. Stephanou, *Eleutherios Venizelos...*, pp. 53–55.

<sup>106</sup> *Enosis* in Greek.

<sup>107</sup> *Vasileion tēs Hellados. Parartēma tēs Ephēmeridos tēs Kyvernēseōs en Krētē* (= Kingdom of Greece. Cretan Annex of the Official Gazette), I, No. 30 (May 31, 1910), pp. 121–127.

accepted as regular members of the sovereign legislature of Greece.<sup>108</sup> Venizelos refused point-blank.<sup>109</sup> He argued of the Cretan deputies taking part in the working of the Greek Parliament that it would be a rebellion against the “established order”, both international and domestic; and explained accordingly that such an act would be met violently, viz. “by guns”<sup>110</sup>.

In retrospect, such an attitude is justified by Venizelos’ alleged fear of diplomatic complications; for the Porte was said to be ready to declare war on Greece if this occurred. But this is simply not true. Of course the Ottoman Government did not wish the Cretan deputies to be recognized as members of the Greek Parliament.<sup>111</sup> Still the possibility of war was far off; for nothing in the Ottoman documents has revealed so far the Porte rushing to a foreseeable and catastrophic combat. It is clear, on the other hand, that Britain was against the formal accomplishment of Cretan annexation by Greece.<sup>112</sup> This is why British men-of-war blockaded the island and arrested several deputies trying to reach Athens.<sup>113</sup> By the same token, Venizelos did not want his ‘fellow-patriots’ in the Greek Parliament. They were sixty nine,<sup>114</sup> “too many” in his mind, and chiefly “manipulated” by Antōnios Michelidakēs, one of his political opponents in Crete;<sup>115</sup> they could, therefore, wipe out the Venizelists’ parliamentary majority. (For the Liberals, viz. the Venizelists had won, in the 1912 elections, 150 seats out of the Greek Parliament’s 181.<sup>116</sup>) That was why on May 19, when the Cretan deputies, who had managed to arrive in Athens, tried to enter the Parliament on Stadiou Street,<sup>117</sup> Venizelos drew up the whole garrison of the capital, i.e. 2,000 troops “with fixed bayonets”.<sup>118</sup> The result was that a string of skirmishes broke out in downtown Athens. Cavalry units charged the Cretan deputies. The populace

<sup>108</sup> Sinan Kunalalp [ed.], *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899–1913* [Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2009], doc. 1140: Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Athens, to Assim Bey, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1912, p. 575; doc. 1146: the same to the same, Athens, March 23, 1912, p. 578.

<sup>109</sup> *Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs* (= Official Hansard of the Greek Parliament), sitting of May 19, 1912, p. 6.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> S. Kunalalp, *The Final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 1148: Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Assim Bey, Vienna, March 26, 1912, p. 579.

<sup>112</sup> Daily paper *Kairoi* (= Times [Athens]), January 24, 1912, p. 3.

<sup>113</sup> Daily paper *Patris* (= Fatherland [Athens]), April 16, p. 5.

<sup>114</sup> S. Kunalalp, *The final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 1148: Ghalib Kemaly Bey to Assim Bey, Athens, March 23, 1912, p. 578.

<sup>115</sup> *Patris*, February 8, 1912, p. 5; with regard to A. Michelidakēs, eloquent is Venizelos’ letter to a friend of his, dated on June 4, 1907 (AEV, I/27/2).

<sup>116</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828–1964* (= Political History of Modern Greece, 1828–1964), vol. III (Athens: Papyros, 1966), p. 140.

<sup>117</sup> Today the Museum of the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece.

<sup>118</sup> S. Kunalalp, *The final Stage of the Cretan Question...*, doc. 1155: Moukhtar Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Assim Bey, Athens, June 1, 1912, p. 582.

supported the latter. The Athens Gendarmerie threatened to “decapitate” anyone trying to interfere with the working of Parliament “without the right to do so” and so on.<sup>119</sup>

It was Venizelos who put an end to these colourful scenes. Realizing that such a confrontations were hazardous to him and his Liberal party, he declared that he could not make stand in such a delicate matter. Upon the advice, therefore, of Nikolaos Dēmētrakopoulos, his minister of Justice, he suggested that the opening of the Legislature should be postponed until October, 1912. So it was; and the episode was over.<sup>120</sup> Venizelos, nonetheless, grasped the opportunity to get rid of his Justice minister. He accused him, by means of the pro-government newspapers, of having given advice contrary to the Greek Constitution.<sup>121</sup> Bewilderedly Dēmētrakopoulos saw no option but to resign, as he saw the Prime Minister adopting his idea yet, almost simultaneously, accusing him of not being in conformity with the Constitution.<sup>122</sup> He was immediately replaced by Kōnstantinos Raktivan. The latter was born in Manchester to Demetrius Raktivand, a wealthy merchant of Greek origin,<sup>123</sup> and he had strong ties with the opulent Greek merchants abroad. After the Balkan Wars, he was to emerge as an expert in Macedonia’s colonization and administration by Greece.

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Not only was Venizelos now the strongman of Greece but moreover her parliamentary dictator. The functioning of her Parliament was discontinued; the King was docile and Dēmētrakopoulos ousted. There was only one more step to be taken: to have an individual of his choice as head of the Navy. In fact, the Crown Prince was appointed Inspector-General of the Greek Army, i.e. Generalissimo. The Greek troops, nonetheless, were discredited because of the 1897 débâcle. Unlike the Army, the Greek Navy enjoyed a great deal of prestige. But who was to command the Greek men-of-war against those of the Ottoman Porte?

The quasi ‘natural’ head of the Greek Navy was Prince George, who had ruled Crete in his capacity as the Powers’ High Commissioner. He was an excellent

<sup>119</sup> *Patris*, May 18, p. 5 and May 19, p. 1; *Kairoi*, May 19, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>120</sup> *Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs*, sitting of May 19, 1912, p. 6; *Patris*, May 20, p. 4.

<sup>121</sup> *Patris*, May 19, 1912, p. 1; *Kairoi*, May 19, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>122</sup> EVP, I/32/9, Venizelos to Dēmētrakopoulos (letter), Athens, May 18, 1912; Geōrgios D. Dēmakopoulos, “Tina peri tou N. P. Dēmētrakopoulou kai tou nomothetikou tou ergou” (= On the Life and Legislative Work of N. P. Dēmētrakopoulos), *Anakoinōseis hēmeridos (17 Martiou 2008) gia tēn epeteio tou thanatou tou Eleutheriou Venizelou* (= Proceedings of the Congress [March 17, 2008] on the anniversary of Eleutherios Venizelos’ Death), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2008, p. 58; Geōrgios Ventērēs, *Hē Hellas tou 1910–1920* (Greece of [the years] 1910–1920), vol. I (Athens: Pyrsos, 1931), p. 95.

<sup>123</sup> [Anonymous] entry “Raktivan, Kōnstantinos” in *Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia* (= The Great Greek Encyclopedia), vol. XXI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1933), p. 38.

seaman, a rear-admiral, and before being appointed to Crete he had laid the foundations of a successful re-organization of the Greek Navy. But Venizelos vetoed his appointment, because he had feuded bitterly with Prince George in Crete. Thus the choice fell upon Captain Paulos Kountouriōtēs, the Chief of the Navy's General Staff.<sup>124</sup> He was to be the Head of the Greek Fleet in the coming war – his flagship being the “Averoff”. The King did not object; for he considered Kountouriōtēs to be loyal to the Royal House. Thinking so and acting accordingly, George I was mistaken; but it was Constantine, his son and successor, who paid dearly for Kountouriōtēs' rise.

## I

It was the Russians that in February, 1912 fomented the Macedonia problem: As for the European part of the Ottoman Empire, what lessons were the Great Powers to draw from the Italo-Turkish war?<sup>125</sup> Undoubtedly there was “something” going on in the Balkans. And this ‘something’ came into being merely a couple of weeks after the “Macedonian issue” had been stirred up by the government of St. Petersburg. For on February 29 the Bulgaro-Serbian Alliance Treaty was signed.<sup>126</sup> It was a bilateral act, thanks to which the partition of Macedonia between the two Slavic nations of the Balkans was assured. Given, nevertheless, that Macedonia was already the inchoate apple of discord between them, the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II, was proclaimed, in a secret protocol annexed to the Treaty, *arbiter summus*.<sup>127</sup> It was clear, therefore, that Slavs, headed by the Russian Tsar, were to overrun Macedonia and reach the Mediterranean seashore.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, the British (namely James Bouchier) obliged the Bulgarians to accept Greece, too, in the Alliance. The Sofia government agreed halfheartedly: not only was the Greek Army discredited (unlike that of Bulgaria) but, as aforesaid, memories of the 1904–1908 conflict between Patriarchists and Exarchists were still alive. There was only one trump card in favour of Greece: her fleet – and chiefly the Italian-built, armoured cruiser “G. Averoff”. For, in the framework of the Ottoman mobilization plan the garrisons in Europe (in Macedonia, Epirus and Albania) were to be reinforced by troops from Asia Minor; and transport ships were supposed to carry these troops.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>124</sup> Admiral S.I. Dousmanēs, *To hēmerologion tou kyvernētou tou “G. Averoff” kata tous polemous 1912–1913* (= The Diary of the Captain of the “G. Averoff” during the Wars of [the Years] 1912–1913), Athens: Pyrsos, 1940, p. 33.

<sup>125</sup> Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, tome V (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), pp. 68–69.

<sup>126</sup> The text: *ibid.*, pp. 69–70.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>129</sup> N. Th. Kladas, entry “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos” (= The First Balkan War) in *Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia*, vol. VI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1928), p. 549.

It was a “perfect plan”<sup>130</sup> but only on paper:<sup>131</sup> the rule of the Ottoman men-of-war on the Aegean Sea was presupposed for such a plan to be put into effect. If, on the other hand, the Greek Navy interrupted the Ottoman sea communications, a major step towards the Christian Allies’ victory would be taken.

Not only was Bulgaria the pivotal nation in the Balkan Alliance (or League, as it was termed in retrospect) vis-à-vis the Porte but she was now emerging as the Great peripheral Power. Her population had been constantly increasing during the last decades of the nineteenth century – and her prosperity alike.<sup>132</sup> She had concluded bilateral alliance treaties with Serbia and with Greece – plus an “oral” one with Montenegro.<sup>133</sup> A formal joint Treaty of the four Christian Balkan nations was never concluded; for it was needless: so huge was the prestige of the Bulgarian Army, thanks to its victory in Slivnitsa over the Serbs in 1885. As aforesaid, the Greek Army was discredited, the Serbian army also (on account of the Slivnitsa battle) – and Montenegro’s army was simply too small. The corollary is that the Bulgarian Army was ranked among the best of Europe; and Bulgaria, when independence was declared in 1908, *ipso facto* occupied the most powerful position in South-Eastern Europe.

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On September 22, 1912, a military convention between Greece and Bulgaria was concluded in Sofia.<sup>134</sup> During that same month the Greek Army was mobilized.<sup>135</sup> The Porte, nonetheless, up till the last moment hoped that a new Greco-Turkish war was by no means unavoidable and, subsequently, tried to lure Greece away from the Balkan League.<sup>136</sup> If truth be told, neither King George nor the Crown Prince were delighted at the prospect of a war against Turkey. Still Venizelos was adamant and briefed the Sovereign as follows: “Your Majesty! The war or your crown!”<sup>137</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Polemikē Ekthesis (= Ministry of War. General Staff of the Army. Account of the War), *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912–1913* (= The Greek Army in the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars), vol. I. *Parartēma* (= Annex), Athens: National Printing House, 1932, doc. 3: Dēmētrios Panas, Greek minister at Sofia, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Sofia, August 14, 1912, p.4.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> H. Charles Wood, *The Danger Zone of Europe. Changes and Problems in the Near East* (London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 284.

<sup>133</sup> N. Th. Kladas, “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos”, p. 547.

<sup>134</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 11, pp. 11–12.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 42, pp. 23–24; doc. 43, pp. 24–25.

<sup>136</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou (= General Staff of the Army. Department of Military History), *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912–1913* (= The Greek Army in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913), vol. I (Athens: History Department of the Army, 1988), p. 32.

<sup>137</sup> É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours...*, V, p. 76.

As might be imagined, King George preferred his throne and on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire. She was the last to do so; for Montenegro had declared war as early as September 25<sup>138</sup> and Bulgaria and Serbia on October 4.<sup>139</sup> The Bulgarian Army was exceedingly strong: it numbered 300,000.<sup>140</sup> The Serbians had 220,000 in arms<sup>141</sup>, Montenegro only 35,000,<sup>142</sup> whereas Greece numbered 89,300 in Thessaly<sup>143</sup> and 10,500 in Epirus.<sup>144</sup> It is noteworthy, however, that the Greek Army swelled to 100,000 as soon as hostilities began<sup>145</sup> and doubled in number shortly after that, thanks to Greek-Americans who rushed to her aid as volunteers.<sup>146</sup> Crown Prince Constantine was appointed Generalissimo of the Greek Thessaly Army, i.e. the one that was to confront Ottoman forces in Southern Macedonia. He was assisted by a team of brilliant officers namely: lieutenant colonel Victor Dousmanēs and captains Xenophon Stratēgos, Iōannēs Metaxas, and Kōnstantinos Pallēs. They formed the General Staff of the Greek Army and together planned the to be successful campaign. The three captains had been trained in Germany<sup>147</sup> (typical *Kriegsakademiker*<sup>148</sup>). On the other hand, the nominal Chief of Staff, Major-General Panagiotēs Danklēs, of remote Albanian stock,<sup>149</sup> was an associate of Venizelos<sup>150</sup> and the favourite with the French Military Mission, as

<sup>138</sup> Viz. on October 8, 1912 (New Style). *Ibid.* p. 76.

<sup>139</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, pp. 32–34.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 211a: Colonel Napoleōn Sotilēs to the Ministry of War, Larissa, October 6, 1912, p. 98.

<sup>144</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 25.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*; Sir Basil Thomson, *The Allied Secret Service in Greece*. Translated into Greek by Kōstas Barbēs (Athens: Logothetēs [no date given]), p. 39.

<sup>146</sup> X. Stratēgos, *Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912* (= The 1912 Greco-Turkish War), Athens: “Hellēnikē”, 1932, pp. 45, 48.

<sup>147</sup> As far as the officers of the General Staff of the Greek Army, their ideology and their connection with Crown Prince Constantine are concerned, see mainly *Gnōmateusis tou eisēgētou tou A' Diarkous Stratodikeiou Styl. A. Kolokytha kata tou teōs Genikou Hellēnikou Epiteleiou Dousmanē V., Metaxa Iōan., Stratēgou X. kai Hexadakyλου Athanasiou* (= Report of Stylianos Kolokythas, reporter of the First Permanent Court Martial, against the former Greek General Staff [namely] V. Dousmanēs, I. Metaxas, X. Stratēgos and Athanasios Hexadakylos), Athens: National Printing House, 1919, pp. 3–5.

<sup>148</sup> Iasōn A. Dēmētriadēs, *Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou kai hē strophē pros Thessalonikēn* (= The Sarantaporon maneuver and the move to Salonika), Athens, 1948, p. 44.

<sup>149</sup> Panagiōtēs Danklēs, *Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou* (= Memoirs-Documents-Correspondence-his Archives). Edited by X. Leukoparidēs, vol. I (Athens: Vagiōnakēs, 1965), pp. 1–2; cf. vol. II (Athens: Vagiōnakēs, 1965), p. 15.

<sup>150</sup> Victor Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata. Historikai selides tas hopoias ezēsa* (= Memoirs. Pages of History that I have witnessed), Athens: Petros Dēmētrakos, 1946, p. 93; Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 153.

well.<sup>151</sup> As a matter of fact, it was general Eydoux himself who insisted on his appointment;<sup>152</sup> for he had voted down the Krupp gun over the Schneider.<sup>153</sup> Danklēs' contribution to the operations was nil;<sup>154</sup> but under the aegis of King George I,<sup>155</sup> he was forever trying to “detect” what was going on among the “Germans” of Constantine’s entourage.

Notwithstanding, 300,000 Ottomans were expected to fight in the case of war in the Balkans.<sup>156</sup> The bulk of them were to confront the Bulgarians in Thrace and about 25,000 of them the Greek Thessaly Army.<sup>157</sup> Yet at the beginning of the hostilities only 15,000 Ottoman troops were ranged along the Greco-Turkish frontier in Macedonia.<sup>158</sup> The Greek General Staff, moreover, had organized a good espionage network in Ottoman territory,<sup>159</sup> and most of the Christian privates of the Ottoman Army were expected to desert after war had been declared.<sup>160</sup> The apostasy of those Christians would actually prove to be crucial for the defeat of the Ottoman troops – but only in Epirus and in 1913. With reference to 1912 Macedonia, the key person was an Ottoman general of Albanian descent, namely Hasan Tahsin Pasha.

## II

When hostilities began, the objective of the Greek General Staff was to destroy the enemy troops covering the frontier in Macedonia, and move northward along the valley of the Vardar (Axios) river to strike the Ottomans fighting the Serbs. The point, in other words, was to capture Monastir (Bitola) advancing from the South.<sup>161</sup> Nonetheless, the Sarantaporon and Demir Kapı (Iron Gate) gorges, in the very region bordering on Greece, were heavily fortified. Would the Greek Army be able to pass through these gorges?

<sup>151</sup> I.A. Dēmētriadēs, *Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou...*, p. 41.

<sup>152</sup> P. Danklēs, *Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou*, II, pp. 1–2.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 290–292.

<sup>154</sup> I. Metaxas. *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio* (= I. Metaxas’ diary), vol. II. Edited by Chr. Christidēs (Athens: Govostēs [no date given]), pp. 132 (entry of October 12, 1912) and 174 (entry of October 23, 1912); V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, pp. 88–91.

<sup>155</sup> V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 53.

<sup>156</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., *Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 5: D. Panas to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Sofia, August 14, 1912, p. 5.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 203: Information Bulletin signed by Captain Athanasios Hexadakylos, p. 92.

<sup>158</sup> Stylianos Gonatas, *Apomnēmoneumata, 1897–1957* (=Memoirs, 1897–1957), Athens, 1958, p. 39.

<sup>159</sup> I.A. Dēmētriadēs, *Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou...*, p. 58.

<sup>160</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., *Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 195a: General Order (signed by Crown Prince Constantine, Larissa, October 3, 1912), pp. 88–89.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 21: Constantine to the Ministry of War (cable), Berea, October 18, 1912, p. 14.

Big surprises were in store; for on the night of October 9/10, after the initial engagements, the Ottoman troops abandoned their positions in Sarantaporon and subsequently Demir Kapı.<sup>162</sup> A couple of days later a bridge over the Bistritsa (Aliakmon) River was found intact.<sup>163</sup> As a result, a unit of Greek Cavalry crossed the river and reached Kozanē. It was a well fortified city, commanding important communication routes. The Greek cavalrymen, nonetheless, seized it on October 11<sup>th</sup> without meeting any opposition.<sup>164</sup>

Now the Greek Army was able to advance northward, namely to Monastir. Still Hasan Tahsin Pasha lured by means of his troops' retreat – the Greeks towards Salonika. And when the Crown Prince Constantine was unsure whether he should try to capture Monastir or Salonika, Venizelos himself, in his capacity as War Minister, suggested to him (ordered him) that he march against Salonika.<sup>165</sup>

The point is that when hostilities began Ali Riza Pasha and not Hasan Tahsin was the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman troops deployed against the Greeks on the Macedonian front.<sup>166</sup> He was renowned for his bellicosity and expertise in warfare.<sup>167</sup> Yet he was replaced when the hostilities began by Hasan Tahsin Pasha.<sup>168</sup>

The latter had begun his career as a guard in the provinces. Afterwards he was commissioned in the Ottoman Army and promoted to the rank of general. His rapid promotion, nonetheless, was due mainly to his political connections.<sup>169</sup> At the beginning of the First Balkan War, he was the Commander of the VIII Army Corps, with its headquarters in Damascus, Syria. But given that this very Army Corps came under the military authority of Salonika, Hasan Tahsin Pasha was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman troops at the Bistritsa River. At last an “extraordinary” VIII Army Corps was created there, having headquarters in Kozanē and, literally, by means of legerdemain, he assumed the command.<sup>170</sup> Without any doubt, such a conjuring trick was performed through political chicanery;

<sup>162</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, pp. 44–59.

<sup>163</sup> X. Stratēgos, *Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912*, p. 60; Spyros Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913* (= The 1912–1913 Wars), Athens: Birēs, 1958, p. 117.

<sup>164</sup> X. Stratēgos, *Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912*, p. 62.

<sup>165</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., *Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 415: Venizelos to Constantine (cable), Athens, October 12, 1912, p. 169.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 210: Information Bulletin, Larissa, October 4<sup>th</sup>, 1912, p. 97.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 209: Information Bulletin, Kazaklar, October 4<sup>th</sup>, 1912, p. 95.

<sup>168</sup> Ali Riza Pasha, in fact, fought only against the Serbs.

<sup>169</sup> Vasileios Nikoitsios and Vasilēs Gounarēs, *Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē. Hē hellēnotourkikē anametrēsē tou 1912 mesa apo tis anamnēseis tou Stratēgou Hasan Tahsin Pasa* (= From Sarantaporon to Salonika. The 1912 Greco-Turkish Conflict through the Memoirs of General Hasan Tahsin Pasha), Salonika, 2002, p. 10.

<sup>170</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 28.

and Mehmet Kâmil Pasha, appointed Grand Vizier on October 16, 1912<sup>171</sup> and noted for his British connections,<sup>172</sup> most likely had something to do with it.<sup>173</sup>

Whatever the facts of the matter, Hasan Tahsin Pasha was an “old and experienced Army officer”.<sup>174</sup> Yet, after the first engagements with the Greek troops, he “lost every hope of gaining the war”<sup>175</sup> and hastened to retreat to Salonika.

A plausible explanation of such a stance is that he was bribed,<sup>176</sup> but this is only an assumption. Other factors that probably determined his attitude were his Greek wife and his admiration of Greek learning.<sup>177</sup> The crux, nevertheless, was that he had a large property on the outskirts of Salonika<sup>178</sup> and dreaded that city being captured by the Bulgarians.<sup>179</sup> For the members and followers of the Internal Macedonian Organization (IMRO), usually identified with the Centralists, headed by Yane Sandanski,<sup>180</sup> were fighting as irregulars of the Bulgarian Army in 1912.<sup>181</sup>

Those irregulars had put forward anti-plutocratic slogans – and Hasan Tahsin Pasha was terrified. For the prelude to the 1903 Ilinden Uprising was the bomb attacks which took place in Salonika in the spring of that same year. These attacks were performed by the “Boatmen”, i.e. the IMRO’s anarchist branch, and aimed at provoking the intervention of the Great Powers in favour of the autochthonous Slavic populations of Macedonia.<sup>182</sup> This goal was somehow achieved thanks to the 1903 Mürzsteg agreement between the two Emperors, Franz-Joseph of Austro-Hungary and Nicholas II of Russia. Most of the 1903 bomb attacks’ protagonists, nevertheless, met a cruel end.<sup>183</sup> But in the long term more important was the fact that the “Boatmen” were considered to be Bulgarians;<sup>184</sup> and the large majority of

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 439.

<sup>172</sup> Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II: *Reform, Revolution and Republic. The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 294.

<sup>173</sup> V. Nikoltsios and V. Gounarēs, *Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē*, pp. 19–20. It is noteworthy that Mehmet Kâmil Pasha was forced to resign at gunpoint on January 23, 1913. (S.J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire...*, II, p. 295.)

<sup>174</sup> X. Stratēgos, *Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912*, p. 13.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> Herbert Adam Gibbons, *Venizelos* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), p. 118.

<sup>177</sup> Christos K. Christodoulou, “Hoi treis taphes tou Hasan Tahsin Pasa” (= The Three Burials of Hasan Tahsin Pasha), daily *Makedonia* (= Macedonia [Salonika]), October 27, 2007. (<http://www.makthes.gr/news/arts/8072/> [retrieved on July 15, 2011].)

<sup>178</sup> V. Nikoltsios and V. Gounarēs, *Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē*, p. 10.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>180</sup> Hermenegild Wagner, *With the victorious Bulgarians* (London: Constable and Co., 1913), p. 250.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 251, 254–255.

<sup>182</sup> Giannēs Megas, *Hoi Varkarēdes tēs Thessalonikēs. Hē anarchikē voulgarikē homada kai hoi vomvistikes energeies tou 1903* [= The Salonika Boatmen. The Bulgarian Anarchist Group and the 1903 Bomb Attacks], Athens: Trochalia, 1994, p. 47ff.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159ff.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172ff. *passim*.

Salonika's population in the early twentieth century, i.e. Jews and Moslems, were panicked by those "Bulgarians".

In fact, Salonika was by then an "international city".<sup>185</sup> According to the estimations of Salonika's first Greek prefect, Pericles Argyropoulos,<sup>186</sup> in October 1912 there dwelled merely 19,000 Greeks<sup>187</sup>. The great majority of the population were Jews (90,000 out of 160,000)<sup>188</sup>, with the Moslems as the second largest religious group (about 44,000).<sup>189</sup> That is why that though Sandanski's irregulars were the first to enter Salonika before the Bulgarian and the Greek armies<sup>190</sup>, Hasan Tahsin Pasha managed to have the city surrendered to the Greeks.<sup>191</sup> For the latter had the reputation of being lenient towards the non-Christians.<sup>192</sup>

What is more, the Pasha made the advance of the Greek Army easier. For after the Ottomans failed to halt the Greeks in Yenice-i Vardar on October 19–20<sup>193</sup>, the Moslems' sacred city in Macedonia<sup>194</sup>, Hasan Tahsin Pasha abandoned the defence line on the Vardar (Axios) River<sup>195</sup>, and actually disbanded his troops on the very outskirts of Salonika.<sup>196</sup> Thus, although the capital of Macedonia was heavily fortified by the Porte, it was surrendered to the Greeks without opposition.<sup>197</sup> It is noteworthy, moreover, that the agreement on Salonika's surrender, albeit concluded and signed on October 27,<sup>198</sup> it was dated on October 26.<sup>199</sup> In this way

<sup>185</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 554: Constantine to the War Ministry (cable), Berea, October 18, 1912, p. 209.

<sup>186</sup> Pericles A. Argyropoulos, *Apomnēmoneumata* (= Memoirs), Athens, 1970, p. 100.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.

<sup>191</sup> The protocol of surrender: Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 765, p. 168.

<sup>192</sup> Pierre Loti, *Turquie agonisante* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1913), p. 70; cf. Réna Molho, «Thessalonique après 1912. Propagandes étrangères et communauté juive», *La France et la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre. Actes du colloque tenu en novembre 1989 à Thessalonique* (Θεσσαλονίκη, 1992), p. 54

<sup>193</sup> S. Gonatas, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, pp. 40–41; Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 82ff.

<sup>194</sup> S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, p. 215.

<sup>195</sup> S. Gonatas, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 41; S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, p. 251. Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 681: Hasan Tahsin Pasha to the Ottoman Headquarters in Salonika Topsis, October 21<sup>st</sup>, 1912, p. 244 (intercepted cable); doc. 693: Constantine to the IV Division, Kircalar, October 23, 1912, p. 248.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 702: Koromēlas to Constantine (cable), Athens, October 23, 1912, p. 250.

<sup>197</sup> S. Gonatas, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 42; V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, pp. 59–60.

<sup>198</sup> P. Argyropoulos, *Apomnēmoneumata*, p. 96; V. Nikoltsios and V. Gounarēs, *Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē...*, p. 39.

<sup>199</sup> V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 57.

the Greeks were given an unassailable argument against the Bulgarians<sup>200</sup>; for units of the Bulgarian regular Army had reached Salonika almost simultaneously with the Greek ones.<sup>201</sup>

So the move of the Greek troops to Monastir did not take place; and it was Salonika, a non-Greek city in 1912, that fell to the Greeks instead. Of course, to assume that Hasan Tahsin Pasha, bribed or not, hatched by himself the entire ‘plot’ that culminated in Salonika being captured by the Greeks, is all but an absurdity. It is well-known that many individuals were involved in Salonika’s capture by the Greek Army and not by the Bulgarians. The first among them was L. Koromēlas, to whom Venizelos had given the Foreign Affairs portfolio in August, 1912.<sup>202</sup> As previously stated, Venizelos’ new Foreign Minister had moneyed connections abroad. The result was that he had been the first to bring to Crown Prince Constantine’s attention the shift that it was necessary to make with regard to the Greek Army’s move. On October 12, in fact, at exactly 03.35 p.m., he cabled to Constantine that he (i.e. Constantine) had to enter Salonika “at the soonest possible”.<sup>203</sup> A couple of hours later it was Venizelos himself who actually ordered the Generalissimo to have Salonika seized, for “outstanding political reasons”.<sup>204</sup> The interference of the Foreign Minister in military matters was quite unorthodox,<sup>205</sup> still not only did Venizelos not dissuade his Foreign Minister from doing so, but he took his lead.

Three days later, on October 15, Koromēlas suddenly changed his tune, and urged the Generalissimo to hasten his troops’ advance to Monastir. For it was crucial for that city to fall to the Greeks and not to the Serbs or the Bulgarians.<sup>206</sup> A week and a half later, nonetheless, a further change of heart occurred; for he sent Constantine the following message: “... The Ambassador [of a Great Power in Berlin] implores you to enter Salonika the sooner the better. That way most likely the Great Powers will agree to Salonika being annexed by Greece”.<sup>207</sup> The Ambassador in question was France’s Jules Cambon.<sup>208</sup> It was clear that L. Koromēlas was pirouetting to music other than his own, i.e. from abroad; and Venizelos to the music being played by his Foreign Minister.

<sup>200</sup> Cf. P. Argyropoulos, *Apomnēmoneumata*, p. 100.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97–98.

<sup>202</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 129.

<sup>203</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., *Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 416, p. 170.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 415, p. 169.

<sup>205</sup> S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, p. 136.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 194.

<sup>207</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., *Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 728, p. 257.

<sup>208</sup> P. Argyropoulos, *Apomnēmoneumata*, p. 101.

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One should be reminded of the fact that Constantine was ‘lured’ to Salonika by Hasan Tahsin Pasha. Kozanē had fallen to the Greeks on October 11; and the Greek Generalissimo knew well that Southern Macedonia’s Ottoman troops were being marshalled in Berea, the famous age-old town about 75 kilometres westward from Salonika.<sup>209</sup> The mind of Constantine was clear-cut: he would advance to Berea in order “to combat the enemy”<sup>210</sup> – and try, by the same token, to destroy the Ottoman troops that would eventually retreat to Monastir.<sup>211</sup> That was his operational plan on October 15.

Still new – happy – surprises were in store for the Greek Army. On the morning of October 16, the Crown Prince was informed that Hasan Tahsin Pasha’s troops had evacuated Berea and were retreating eastward, viz. to Salonika.<sup>212</sup> Constantine and his Staff entered Berea that same day.<sup>213</sup> In the meantime, Greek troops captured other important towns in south-western Macedonia without meeting any resistance,<sup>214</sup> but a Greek Division that attempted to advance northward – actually to Monastir<sup>215</sup> – halted abruptly and “without explication” on October 20<sup>216</sup> – though it had beaten the Ottoman troops that it had met.<sup>217</sup> A couple of days later having interrupted its push to Monastir,<sup>218</sup> this Division suffered a severe defeat.<sup>219</sup> It was clear that whilst the way to Salonika was open the one to Monastir was closed.

Yet Constantine was oscillating. As early as the 16<sup>th</sup> of October, he had stated that the Greek Army was to move eastward, i.e. to Salonika.<sup>220</sup> But the day after, at 3.00 p.m., the “whole of the... Army” was sent northward from Berea.<sup>221</sup> that meant Constantine was likely to march to Monastir. In point of fact, a couple of

<sup>209</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 474: Constantine to the V Division, Kozanē October 14, 1912, p. 187.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 480: Operational Order, October 15, 1912, p. 189.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 75.

<sup>213</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 519: Constantine to the Ministry of War, Berea, October 16, 1912, p. 198.

<sup>214</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 75.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76–79.

<sup>218</sup> S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, p. 275.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143ff.

<sup>220</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 524, p. 200.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 543: Constantine to the VII Division, Berea, October 17, 1912, p. 205.

hours later Constantine entered Niaousa<sup>222</sup>, another town located to the north of Berea. The Ottomans had evacuated Niaousa during the night of October 16/17<sup>223</sup>; Constantine and his Staff encamped in the railway station.<sup>224</sup> The distance between Berea/Niaousa and Salonika or Monastir being almost the same, Venizelos was unsure of the Generalissimo's intentions. He feared that the Greek Army might advance to Monastir; this is why on October 17, he sent Constantine a telegram which read as follows: "According to intelligence furnished by foreign diplomats, it is likely that agitation and massacres will soon take place in Salonika... I have assured [the foreign diplomats] that our Army will reach [Salonika] in time, in order to avert agitation and massacres".<sup>225</sup> It was the IMRO 'peril' that was termed "agitation" and "massacres" by "foreign diplomats". Both Moslems and Jews were terribly scared; for not only were Sandaski's komitadjis approaching Salonika, but some of them had bypassed it and had already reached the Berea and Niaousa region.<sup>226</sup>

Constantine was at last convinced and, accordingly, on October 18 announced to Venizelos his decision to capture Salonika during "the next three or four days".<sup>227</sup> The political pressure exerted on him was unbearable.<sup>228</sup> As aforementioned, Salonika fell to Constantine on October 27. It is discernible that without Hasan Tahsin Pasha's 'conscious passivity' that city would be seized by the Greeks much later – or never.

The Pasha could not live in Macedonia any longer; for Turks, Macedonians and Bulgarians alike saw in him a hated foe. As a matter of fact, the opinion was widespread that Macedonia had been "sold out" by Ottoman officialdom.<sup>229</sup> So he fled to Paris in 1913 and afterward to Lausanne, Switzerland, where he passed away, aged 73, in 1918.<sup>230</sup> His son, Kenan Mesare (1889–1965), was naturalized as Greek and spent his life in Greece. What is more, he became the semi-official painter of the Greek Army.<sup>231</sup>

<sup>222</sup> Today Naousa.

<sup>223</sup> S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, p. 149.

<sup>224</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 81.

<sup>225</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 553, p. 209.

<sup>226</sup> S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, pp. 154–155.

<sup>227</sup> Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, *Parartēma*, doc. 554, p. 209.

<sup>228</sup> Cf. S. Gonatas, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 40.

<sup>229</sup> S. Melas, *Hoi polemoi tou 1912–1913*, p. 204.

<sup>230</sup> Chr. K. Christodoulou, "Hoi Treis Taphes tou Hasan Tahsin Pasa".

<sup>231</sup> Paraskeuē Katimertzē, "Kenan Mesare", daily *Ta Nea* (= The News [Athens]), February 14, 2003. ([http://www.greeklanguage.gr/greekLang/modern\\_greek/tools/corpora/nea/content.html?t=2,1471](http://www.greeklanguage.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/corpora/nea/content.html?t=2,1471). [Retrieved on July 15, 2011].)

## III

As foreseen, the march of the Greek Army to Monastir never took place, though it was not until November 5 that the Serbs seized it.<sup>232</sup> Janina, nonetheless, i.e. Epirus' capital, remained a very important Ottoman stronghold in Europe – and it was there that the Ottomans held out against the Greeks.<sup>233</sup> In fact, the Greek troops in Epirus, only 10,500 strong, were unable even to menace Janina.<sup>234</sup> On January 17, 1913, nonetheless, after reinforcements had arrived from Macedonia,<sup>235</sup> the Janina fortress was besieged; but after a four days assault the attack failed.<sup>236</sup> On January 10, 1913, Crown Prince, Constantine arrived in Epirus,<sup>237</sup> and assumed the direct leadership of the Epirus Army.<sup>238</sup> On February 20, Janina was attacked anew.<sup>239</sup> Greek arms were now crowned with success; for a Christian officer of the Ottoman Army, namely Nikolaki Effendi, a captain of Engineers, following the intervention of the local Metropolitan, Gervasius, delivered sketches of the fortifications to the Greek General Staff.<sup>240</sup> As a result, the Ottoman troops in Janina surrendered on February 21, 1913.<sup>241</sup>

The fall of Janina to Constantine had an enormous impact on Greece. Epirus is justly considered to be “the cradle of the Hellenes”, and Janina meant a lot to the entire Greek People.<sup>242</sup> The operations were pressed forward, therefore: on March 3, Argyrokastron (Gjirokastër) was captured by the Greek Army<sup>243</sup> and two days later Tepelenë.<sup>244</sup> (Korytsa [Korçë] had fallen as early as December 7, 1912, to Greek troops advancing from Western Macedonia.<sup>245</sup> The Greek Army was all set to enter

<sup>232</sup> N. Th. Kladas, “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos”, p. 559.

<sup>233</sup> EVP, I/32/108, Crown Prince Constantine to the Ministry of War, Flōrina (Lerin), November 24, 1912 (cable); Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous*, I, pp. 207, 211.

<sup>234</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous tou 1912–1913*, vol. II, Athens: Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, 1991, pp. 65–69, 91–103.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, p.126.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, p.142.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, p.146.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, p.148.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203ff.

<sup>240</sup> Athan. D. Tsekouras, *Apo tou 98ou hypsōmatos* (= From the 98<sup>th</sup> Hill), Athens: The Epirotic Society, 1979, pp. 201–221.

<sup>241</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous...*, II, p. 224.

<sup>242</sup> É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 91 : *Car l'Épire est comme le berceau de l'Hellénisme... Elle tient plus que Constantinople même au cœur de tous les Grecs.*

<sup>243</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous...*, II, p. 249.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>245</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous...*, I, p. 187.

Valona (Vlorë); yet Venizelos, on March 2<sup>nd</sup>, had ordered (again in his capacity as Minister of War, but unlike his previous orders with reference to Salonika) the march to Valona to be halted.<sup>246</sup>

It was Dēmētrios Gounarēs who was the only one that dared to ask him, in May 1914, in Parliament, the reason for his having hastened the Greek Army to Salonika yet halted its march to Valona.<sup>247</sup> Gounarēs was to be shot, in November 1922, by Venizelists with the connivance of Venizelos himself.<sup>248</sup> The latter, nonetheless, had no option in 1914 but to answer however indirectly, but still clearly enough: it was Britain that was to blame.<sup>249</sup>

In this Venizelos was right. Not only had the British kept a watchful eye on the situation in Epirus and Albania, but at the beginning of May 1913, Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and a “British Admiral” arrived in Athens, after “having visited” the “Channel and the island of Corfu”.<sup>250</sup> Asquith and Churchill claimed that their stay in the Greek capital did not have a “political flavour”; for they were in Greece “only on holiday”, they explained. Of course, nobody believed them.<sup>251</sup> As a matter of fact, they were in Greece in order to have talks with the “Greek leaders”, chiefly Venizelos,<sup>252</sup> on the matter of Epirus and Southern Albania.

Before the British leaders visited Corfu and Athens, King George I was assassinated in Salonika. Constantine was now the new King and his son George<sup>253</sup>, the new Crown Prince. After Venizelos halted the march of the Greek troops to Valona, Crown Prince George, commanded by his father, did a “round of inspection” in the Northern part of Epirus and in southern Albania.<sup>254</sup> The new King was anxious to have the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts, where the majority of the population was Christian Orthodox, annexed by Greece. Still Venizelos was adamant in his refusal. On May 17, moreover, the Peace Treaty between the Balkan League, namely Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire was signed in London. In article 3 of this Treaty, the Sultan entrusted the Emperors of Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia, the Kings of Britain and Italy and the President of the French Republic with the task of “organizing” and “delimiting” an autonomous (actually independent) Albania. Had

<sup>246</sup> V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 115; Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, *Ho Eleutherios Venizelos kai to Voreioēpeirōtiko zētēma* (= Eleutherios Venizelos and the Question of Northern Epirus), Athens: Liberal Club, 1992, pp. 18–19.

<sup>247</sup> *Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs*, sitting of May 12, 1914, p. 1585.

<sup>248</sup> PKP, I/1/1, Venizelos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Paris, November 3/16, 1922 (cable, top secret).

<sup>249</sup> *Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs*, p. 1592ff.

<sup>250</sup> *Kairoi*, May 6, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>251</sup> Grēgorios Xenopoulos, “Askouith kai Sia” (=Asquith and Co), *Kairoi*, May 7, 1913, p.1.

<sup>252</sup> *Kairoi*, May 6, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>253</sup> The future King George II of the Hellenes.

<sup>254</sup> *Kairoi*, May 11, 1913, p. 1.

not the Greek government, i.e. Venizelos, agreed, Greece would no longer be supported by the British, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey explained to the Greek minister, Iōannēs Gennadios, in London.<sup>255</sup>

By “British support” it was inferred that Greece would be backed by Britain as far as the issue of the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea was concerned. For article 5 of the London Treaty made provision for “the care” of these islands to be entrusted to the six Great Powers then pertaining (as was done with regard to Albania).<sup>256</sup> The northern most islands in question had already been seized by the Greek Fleet under P. Kountouriōtēs (who was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral at the outbreak of the war<sup>257</sup>). It was clear, therefore, that Venizelos had opted for Greece to expand eastward. He therefore abandoned the southern slice of Albania. His decision, nonetheless, was pregnant with consequence; for it contained in embryo the 1919–1922 Greek campaign in Asia Minor.

Thus Venizelos completed the change of direction of Greek irredentism – fuelled, moreover, by himself. Salonika instead of Monastir was to be annexed by Greece; and the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea instead of the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts. Constantine, the new King, and his political allies such as D. Gounarēs, did not agree.<sup>258</sup> But Venizelos, eager to have British support, gave up the island of Saseno to newborn Albania.<sup>259</sup> Saseno is located at the mouth of the Valona gulf and was nominally annexed to Greece in 1864: for this little but highly strategic island<sup>260</sup> was regarded as part of the Ionian Islands. True, Saseno was never occupied by Greek troops or ruled by any Greek authorities. Yet its being given up to Albania engendered a bitter conflict between Venizelos and Gounarēs that culminated in the National Divide of the Greeks; and Gounarēs’ execution in 1922.

#### IV

On March 5, 1913, King George I of the Hellenes was assassinated in Salonika. The sovereign had settled there on October 29, 1912, i.e. shortly after the

<sup>255</sup> Gennadios’ dispatch to the Foreign Ministry, London, May 17, 1913 in: Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous...*, vol. III (Athens: History Department of the Army, 1992), p. 347.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> S.I. Dousmanēs, *To hēmerologion tou kyvernētou tou “G. Averoff”...*, p. 47.

<sup>258</sup> P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung* (Athens: Zacharopoulos, 1992<sup>2</sup>), pp. 271–274; Sinan Kunalalp [ed.], *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Aegean Islands Issue, 1912–1914* [Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011], doc. 514: Djevad Bey, Ottoman minister at Belgrade, to Saïd Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, Nish, September 10, 1914, p. 306.

<sup>259</sup> Law No. 271, *Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados* (= Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece), I, No. 151 (June 7, 1914), p. 801.

<sup>260</sup> Valona (actually its gulf) was considered to be “the key of the Adriatic Sea”. (S. Kunalalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 22: Naby Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, to Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome, December 8, 1912, p. 42. )

city had fallen to his son, Constantine; for he wished to make sure that it would be annexed to Greece. As foretold, the Macedonian irregulars of the Bulgarian Army had entered Salonika before the Greek troops did; and units of the Bulgarian regular – Army had reached Salonika simultaneously with the Greeks. From late October on, nevertheless, the city was run by Greek military authorities; yet the Bulgarians had their own and, in practice, did not recognize Greek rule.<sup>261</sup>

On December 5, 1912, the Tsar of the Bulgarians, Ferdinand, paid a visit to Salonika. He wished a Greek-Bulgarian condominium to be established. King George “welcomed” him, but made it clear that such a joint rule was out of question.<sup>262</sup> About three months later King George was murdered.

The assassin was Alexandros Schoinas (or Schinas), a 52 year old Greek, a former schoolteacher, and a native of Macedonia.<sup>263</sup> He was said to be anarchist or insane; but he was neither.<sup>264</sup> He was merely the “armed hand” of a vast plot against the King – a plot wherein even the Greek Salonika authorities were involved.<sup>265</sup> After this criminal act, Schoinas was arrested by the Greek police and tortured. He declared at length that he was willing to unveil the “mystery of the King’s death” to the latter’s Consort Olga. In fact, Olga paid him a visit and heard his confession. She was accordingly terrified and conveyed the secret only to their son Nicholas, by then, military commander of Salonika.<sup>266</sup> Schoinas, after he had talked to Olga, was murdered as well by being defenestrated by his guards.<sup>267</sup> Last but not least, the dossier on the King’s death was destroyed by fire in 1915.<sup>268</sup> There were members of the Royal House who suspected Venizelos of being the *éminence grise* behind the plot that culminated in the killing of the Sovereign<sup>269</sup>. Still nothing has been proven so far.

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The death of King George I was ill omened; for it acted like a catalyst – as the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, in 1914 would do but on a larger scale. The problem now was Serbia’s relationship with Albania. Serbia coveted the Albanian littoral; but Albanian independence was proclaimed in Valona as early as November, 1912. If the Great Powers were to recognize

<sup>261</sup> EVP, I/32/108, Prince Nicholas of Greece, Military Commander of Salonika, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Salonika, November 27, 1912 (cable).

<sup>262</sup> Iōan. E. Iōannidēs, *Kōnstantinos IB’* (= Constantine XII), Athens: Govostēs [no date given], pp. 284–285.

<sup>263</sup> P.K. Enepekides, *Gloria und Spaltung*, p. 237.

<sup>264</sup> P.A. Argyropoulos, *Apomnēmoneumata*, p. 120.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>269</sup> *Memoirs of H.R.H. Prince Christopher of Greece* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938), p. 118.

Albanian independence (which was most likely) Serbia would not have outlet to the sea. Anxious to have such an exit, the Serbian government concluded a secret agreement with the Greeks: Albania would be shared between the two Parties by means of “influence zones”.<sup>270</sup> Yet this agreement was never put into practice. Macedonians, on the other hand, obviously the IMRO associates, dispatched a memorandum to the Six Great Powers, calling for an autonomous (in fact independent) Macedonian State.<sup>271</sup> But this demand (fashioned on the Albanian precedent) also went unheeded.

In short, Serbia was now denying Macedonia proper, i.e. the Üsküp (Skopje) and Monastir regions, the right to be Bulgarian – as had been tacitly agreed before the outbreak of the war against the Porte.<sup>272</sup> The Bulgarian government accepted, therefore, that the dispute should be submitted to the Russian Emperor.<sup>273</sup> But by then the main characters of the drama had changed their minds. First of all, James Bouchier, the famous correspondent of the London *Times* in the Balkans, argued against the arbitration of Nicholas II.<sup>274</sup> Tsar Ferdinand of the Bulgarians subsequently, reminiscent of his Habsburg connections (for he was of Hungarian stock) strongly opposed Russian intervention in the “Macedonian issue”;<sup>275</sup> for the Vienna cabinet disapproved of such a ‘conciliatory’ intervention of the Russian Tsar.<sup>276</sup> What is more, Ferdinand overtly approved of the Bulgarian military leadership’s stance; for he had established a “political party of the Crown” reliant on Bulgarized Macedonians.<sup>277</sup> So he supported the upper echelons of the Bulgarian Army, the bulk of whom was of Macedonian descent, and allowed them to prepare for a general onslaught on the Serbs and the Greeks.<sup>278</sup> For the revival of the Serbo-Bulgarian feud implied also a Greco-Bulgarian one, since the Sofia government was now almost bound to dispute Greek rule over Salonika.

Paradoxical as it may appear, Venizelos was the main champion of Russian arbitration in the Balkan mess that spring of 1913. In fact, when Prince Nicholas of Greece paid a visit to St Petersburg in order to explain to the Tsar the Greek views on the Macedonian issue,<sup>279</sup> it was released to the Greek Press that the Russian Emperor had authorized Venizelos to “inform the Balkans of his own [imperial]

<sup>270</sup> É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 70.

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 122.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122; Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous...*, III, p. 81.

<sup>274</sup> *Daily Nea Hēmera Tergestēs* (= The Trieste New Day [published nevertheless in Athens]), May 31, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>275</sup> *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, June 2, 1913, p. 7.

<sup>276</sup> *Kairoi*, June 6, 1913, p. 3 and June 8, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>277</sup> Victor Kuhne, *Les Bulgares peints par eux-mêmes* (Paris-Lausanne: Payot, 1917), pp. 247, 251–252.

<sup>278</sup> Ernest Daudet, *Ferdinand I<sup>er</sup>, tsar de Bulgarie* (Paris-Neuchatel: Attinger frères [no date given]), p. 209; É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 123.

<sup>279</sup> *Kairoi*, June 7, 1913, p. 1.

wishes”.<sup>280</sup> Though such news was somewhat exaggerated, it did contain a kernel of truth. For, according to what had been announced by then, Nicholas II was backed up by the German Emperor;<sup>281</sup> and King Constantine of the Hellenes, who was related to the Kaiser through family ties, had wholeheartedly endorsed the prospect of Russian arbitration in the Balkans. Venizelos, on the other hand, was at that time all out to curry favour with King Constantine: thus no disagreement was in sight between them.<sup>282</sup> By the same token Venizelos aspired to have the Kaiser’s sympathy as well.<sup>283</sup>

The British perceived early on Venizelos’ shifting his ground and managed to have a Greco-Serbian Protocol signed in Athens in April 1913.<sup>284</sup> It stipulated that Greece and Serbia would have a “common frontier”. The “common frontier” implied Monastir’s annexation by Serbia and Salonika’s by Greece. The *éminence grise* behind the new, anti-Bulgarian constellation, was Crawford Price, the deputy Balkan correspondent of the London *Times*. He convinced Prince Nicholas, commander, as aforementioned, of the Salonika defences, to engineer a surreptitious anti-Bulgarian policy;<sup>285</sup> and such a policy was fuelled by the April Protocol signed by Koromēlas himself. The Alliance Treaty proper was to be concluded on May 19.<sup>286</sup>

Of course Venizelos, making use of a smokescreen, implored the British government to act as an “independent arbitrator” as far as the Tsar’s intervention in the Balkan turmoil was concerned.<sup>287</sup> But the reaction to his demand was foreseeable: the British minister at Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, explained to him that Britain was not disposed to “act” in the Balkans alongside Russia.<sup>288</sup> Venizelos then made it clear that he was to pay a visit to St Petersburg – at the Tsar’s invitation.<sup>289</sup>

## V

Venizelos was thus speaking the truth once more. For at the eleventh hour, a compromise was reached between the members of the – victorious yet moribund – Balkan League.<sup>290</sup> The Prime Ministers of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece agreed to be

<sup>280</sup> *Kairoi*, June 6, 1913, p. 3.

<sup>281</sup> *Kairoi*, June 10, 1913, p. 3; *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, June 17, 1913, p. 7.

<sup>282</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 309; cf. V Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 118.

<sup>283</sup> Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 111.

<sup>284</sup> Hypourgeion epi tōn Exōterikōn (=Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Diplōmatika engrapha, 1913–1917* (= Diplomatic Papers, 1913–1917), Athens: National Publishing House, 1920<sup>2</sup>, pp. 37–39.

<sup>285</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, pp. 208–209.

<sup>286</sup> Hypourgeion epi tōn Exōterikōn, *Diplōmatika engrapha, 1913–1917*, pp. 37–39.

<sup>287</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 213.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>290</sup> I. Metaxas. *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, pp. 219 (entry of June 5, 1913) and 231 (entry of June 14, 1913).

in the Russian capital on June 25, 1913, and have their disagreement submitted to Emperor Nicholas II.<sup>291</sup> What is more, the Tsar was not to be the only *arbiter*. In fact, he would act in the name of the German Emperor as well – and both Monarchs would “represent the whole of Europe”.<sup>292</sup> And last but not least, the Bulgarians had finally agreed for Salonika being annexed into Greece.<sup>293</sup>

In short, the war had seemingly been averted. In those self same days, however, a Greek verbal note was published in some Athens newspapers: it was slanted so insultingly against the Bulgarians that war was now a certainty.<sup>294</sup> Nonetheless, it was a “phoney” one, because Venizelos knew nothing about it. He blamed, instead, L. Koromēlas, his Foreign Minister, and asked the King to dismiss him.<sup>295</sup> Yet nothing happened. Not only did Koromēlas keep the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, but he was promoted to acting Prime Minister on August 8.<sup>296</sup> True, he resigned ten days later<sup>297</sup> – only because he had been offered the opportunity of becoming the Greek minister at Rome.<sup>298</sup>

In mid-June 1913, however, it was too late for any kind of reaction: furious with the Greeks thanks to the “phoney” verbal note, the Bulgarian military leadership ordered a general and immediate offensive against the Greeks first, and the Serbs afterwards, in Macedonia. The sporadic hostilities broke out during the night of 16/ 17 June;<sup>299</sup> still the outbreak of the war proper did not occur until the 19,<sup>300</sup> whilst the King and Venizelos announced it only on June 21,<sup>301</sup> for they had hoped that it would be avoided.

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This war is termed the Second Balkan War<sup>302</sup>. The Bulgarian Army was ravaged by cholera<sup>303</sup> for – unlike the Greeks<sup>304</sup> – it lacked an efficient medical

<sup>291</sup> *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, June 3, 1913, p. 7 and June 19, 1913, p. 1; *Kairoi*, June 12, 1913, p. 3; É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 122.

<sup>292</sup> *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, June 18, 1913, p. 9.

<sup>293</sup> *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, May 16, 1913, p. 1; Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 210.

<sup>294</sup> *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, June 19, 1913, pp. 3, 4; June 20, p. 7.

<sup>295</sup> EVP, I/33/85, Venizelos to King Constantine (cable), Athens [June 1913].

<sup>296</sup> Alcibiades Provatas, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados apo 1821 mechri 1980. Nomothetika kai ektelestika Sōmata* (= Political History of Modern Greece from 1821 to 1980. Legislative and Executive Bodies), Athens, 1980, p. 393.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>298</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 110.

<sup>299</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, III, p. 73ff.

<sup>300</sup> I. Metaxas. *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 222 (entry of June 18, 1913).

<sup>301</sup> *Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseos tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados*, I, No. 121 (June 21, 1913), p. 395.

<sup>302</sup> In fact, it was the “Second Stage” of the Balkan War. (S. Kunalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 210: Tevfik Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in London, to Saïd Halim Pasha, Ottoman Prime Minister, London, November 5, 1913, p. 146.

corps.<sup>305</sup> The Greek Army, on the other hand, was galvanized by the victories of the war against the Ottomans and the stance and tactics of its Generalissimo – who was now a most popular King: the German *Aufmarsch* principle<sup>306</sup> was carried into effect with spectacular success. The Bulgarians, moreover, had to fight simultaneously the Serbs, the Ottomans and the Romanians as well. For them it was a war on several fronts; so the armistice was concluded – to their detriment – on July 18.<sup>307</sup> Still, unlike in the combat against the Ottomans, the Greek Army suffered many casualties.<sup>308</sup> Iōannēs Metaxas, who jointly with Victor Dousmanēs, the new Chief of the Army General Staff<sup>309</sup>, had planned the whole campaign at least with regard to the Greek side,<sup>310</sup> was instilled by a something approaching fear of Bulgarian dexterity in warfare.<sup>311</sup> Thus he was to stand in dread of conducting a renewal of war against them – and this feeling cast long shadow over the History of the Balkan Peninsula in general and Greece in particular.

It was the Russian government that intervened to stop the hostilities and summoned again the political leadership of the belligerents to St Petersburg. For Russia was “equally benevolent towards everyone of them”.<sup>312</sup> Upon the advice of Koromēlas, nonetheless, King Constantine turned down the Russian *démarche*<sup>313</sup>, and a conference was called in Bucharest instead. It was there that the Peace Treaty was signed on July 28, 1913. The borderline between Romania and Bulgaria was adjusted in favour of the former, Serbia annexed the Macedonian regions of Üsküp and Monastir, whilst the Greco-Bulgarian frontier was fixed along the Mesta (Nestos) River in Macedonia.<sup>314</sup> Bulgaria lost Eastern Thrace to the Porte, but held

<sup>303</sup> *Kairoi*, June 4, 1913, p. 1 and June 14.

<sup>304</sup> *I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, pp. 219 (entry of June 7, 1913), 223 (entries of July 7 and 11, 1913).

<sup>305</sup> *Nea Hēmera Tergestēs*, June 8, 1913, p. 7.

<sup>306</sup> I.A. Dēmētriadēs, *Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou...*, p. 51.

<sup>307</sup> Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, III, p. 283ff.

<sup>308</sup> 15, 054 in the First Balkan War and 21, 894 in the Second one. See Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, I, p. 289; II, p. 355; III, p. 462. And also *I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 222 (entry of June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1913).

<sup>309</sup> V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 116; Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 215; P. Danklēs, *Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou*, vol. II pp. 51–52.

<sup>310</sup> V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 117; Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 215; *I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, pp. 222 (entry of June 28, 1913), 223 (entry of June 30, 1913) and 224 (entry of July 21, 1913)

<sup>311</sup> *I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 224 (entry of July 21, 1913).

<sup>312</sup> ...*La Russie également bienveillante pour tous*. (É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 125.)

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 125–128.

<sup>314</sup> The text of the Treaty: Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, *Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous...*, III, pp. 426–431.

on to the Western part of it with the port of Dedeğaç (today Alexandroupolis). True, the Bulgarian government wanted Kavalla, too; for Kavalla was as an outlet to the sea far more important than Dedeğaç. But Venizelos was adamant: he had taught a lesson by Koromēlas, whose dismissal, though vociferously sought, was still pending. Venizelos, therefore, was by no means prepared to be accused of being pro-Bulgarian. In this wise he was laconic: To Bulgaria should be ceded either Dedeğaç or nothing.<sup>315</sup> Greece was at last awarded Kavalla, thanks to the intervention of the Kaiser.<sup>316</sup> So, Bulgaria lost most of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece, whilst Serbia had no sea outlet. Here is to be found the embryo of World War One – and its aftermath as well.

## VI

The task of the Generalissimo Constantine and his General Staff in carrying on the war against the Ottomans and the Bulgarians was crucial. Regardless of the role played by Hasan Tahsin Pasha in Salonika and Nikolaki Effendi in Janina, this was the first time after the independence of Greece that the (regular) Greek Army proved able to conquer dreaded foes such as the Ottomans and the Bulgarians. The crux of the matter, however, was that King Constantine and his Staff had been trained in Germany. Obversely, the work accomplished by the French Military Mission under General Eydoux was said to lack organizational effectiveness.<sup>317</sup> Be that as it may, Constantine after the Bucharest Treaty was signed paid a visit to Berlin and Paris. In the capital of Germany he was invested, on August 26, the insignia of a German Army Field Marshal.<sup>318</sup> It was an honorific act: King Edward VII of Britain, for instance, was a German Field Marshal as well, whilst the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austro-Hungary was a British one.<sup>319</sup> Constantine thanked the German Emperor and explained that the Greek victories in the Balkan Wars were due to the “vigour” of the Greek troops and also to the “warfare principles” that “he and his officers” had been taught in Berlin.<sup>320</sup> He was right – and, furthermore, it was an all but private conversation between the two Sovereigns.<sup>321</sup>

Constantine’s “statement”, however, was echoed in the international Press; and accordingly a wave of protests swept Paris. The King of the Hellenes failed to

<sup>315</sup> Dimitris Michalopoulos, *Attitudes parallèles: Éleuthérios Vénisélou et Take Ionescu dans la Grande Guerre* (Athens: Institut de recherches sur Éleuthérios Vénisélou et son époque, 2008<sup>3</sup>), p. 18.

<sup>316</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 224.

<sup>317</sup> V. Dousmanēs, *Apomnēmoneumata...*, p. 43; *I Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 173 (entry of October 12, 1912).

<sup>318</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 232.

<sup>319</sup> *The Sunday Morning Herald* (Sydney), October 17 1903, p. 1.

<sup>320</sup> É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 138.

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid.*

grasp the reason for such indignation. He hastened to the French capital and thanked Raymond Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, for the assistance that Greece had been given by France “from her Independence [i.e. the 1821 Revolution] to the glorious victories of the Balkan Wars”.<sup>322</sup> Nevertheless, the tumult continued; and now Constantine was dubbed “the brother-in-law of the Kaiser”.<sup>323</sup>

Venizelos, on the other hand, got the message at once and grasped his chance: Greece must side with the Entente Cordiale Powers, namely France and Britain. He therefore explained to the King that Greece was actually in desperate need of French aid and support and, as a result, the “misunderstanding” should be “cleared up”.<sup>324</sup> So it was done: from late 1913 onwards, the French seized control of the Greek Army.<sup>325</sup> No Greek officers were to be German-trained any longer. Venizelos, already awarded the cordon de la Légion d’Honneur<sup>326</sup>, was the “man of France” in Greece<sup>327</sup> – indeed of the Entente Cordiale.

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Meantime, the war against the Ottoman Empire was continuing (at least in theory). True, the Peace Treaty was signed in London on May 17, 1913, but though termed “definitive”<sup>328</sup> it was only a preliminary one: for Macedonia and the island of Crete were handed over to the four Christian Balkan Sovereigns, whilst Albania and the islands of the Aegean Sea were “entrusted”, as previously stated, to the Six Great Powers.<sup>329</sup> The Six were to deliberate upon the Islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea,<sup>330</sup> of which the southern portion, namely the Dodecanese, had been seized by the Italians and the northern group captured, as aforementioned, by the Greeks.

The Greek men-of-war, in fact, had managed to bottle up the Ottoman Fleet in the Dardanelles throughout 1912 and 1913: Not only were the Ottoman garrisons in Europe not reinforced, but large islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea, such as Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios, were occupied by Greek naval troops as well. The British had guaranteed that these islands would be annexed to Greece and so the Greek Army evacuated the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts. Still, the Porte objected to Greek rule over these islands on the grounds that it was the Great

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>324</sup> EVP, I/33/103, Venizelos to the King (report [no date given]).

<sup>325</sup> N.Th. Kladas, entry “[Hellēnikos] Stratos” (= [The Greek] Army) in *Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia* (= The Great Greek Encyclopaedia), vol. X (Athens: Pirsos, 1934), p. 280.

<sup>326</sup> EVP, I/33/30–51: Congratulatory telegrams to Venizelos.

<sup>327</sup> *On comptait sur Venizelos*. (É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 140.)

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*

Powers, chiefly Britain,<sup>331</sup> that wished them to be annexed to Greece; such a “wish” nonetheless did not chime in with the thinking of the Ottoman Government.<sup>332</sup>

In point of fact, the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea do “besiege” Asia Minor.<sup>333</sup> The Porte, therefore, was not ready to give them up.<sup>334</sup> Still, on November 1, 1913, the Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Porte and Greece was signed in Athens. The war was formally over, diplomatic relations resumed; but the question of the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea remained unresolved. The Porte was now threatening Greece with a fresh war. Venizelos, moreover, was blamed: because of his diplomatic and political “ineptness”, Greece was left alone face to face with a dreaded foe. Constantine, who was triumphantly touring the European capitals, hastily returned to Athens. But it was now clear that if Greece lost her naval supremacy in the Aegean, hitherto assured by the cruiser “G. Averoff”, her rule over the islands would be over. Yet Venizelos did not want the Greek Fleet to be reinforced by heavy warships (dreadnoughts); for as he frankly explained, the British government was against such a step being taken by the Greeks.<sup>335</sup> Of course he was overtly backed by Admiral Lionel Grand Tufnell, head of the British Naval Mission in Greece.<sup>336</sup> Therefore, upon the advice of his old friend, Emile Joseph Dillon, the noted British publicist, and due mediation, he decided to submit to the Porte the suggestion that Ottoman suzerainty over the islands in question namely Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios<sup>337</sup> be preserved. In the framework of a regime analogous to that of Crete’s from 1899 to 1912, the Turkish flag would fly “somewhere, with a small garrison” to defend it. Dillon offered to inform the Ottoman government of Venizelos’ proposal.<sup>338</sup> The suggestion, on the other hand, that Greece’s problems with Turkey be resolved following a Russian military intervention in the Balkans, was flatly turned down by Venizelos.<sup>339</sup> The memories of the 1913 Koromēlas affair were still vivid in his mind.

In May 1914, however, a fresh war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was *ante portas*.<sup>340</sup> But Greece was now in a position far worse than the one she had been in 1912. The Porte would now have to combat only Greece; and her Navy

<sup>331</sup> S. Kunalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 256: Naby Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Rome, January 14, 1914, p. 200; the same to the same, Rome, February 10, 1914, pp. 232–233; Moukhtar Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Saïd Halim Pasha, Berlin, January 11, 1914, p. 236

<sup>332</sup> S. Kunalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 256: Munif Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at St Petersburg, to Saïd Halim Pasha, St Petersburg, December 31, 1913, pp. 178–179.

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>334</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 228.

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236; I. Metaxas, *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, p. 229ff.

<sup>336</sup> I. Metaxas, *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, pp. 229, 231.

<sup>337</sup> Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, pp. 237–238.

<sup>338</sup> I. Metaxas, *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio*, II, pp. 235–236; S. Kunalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 471: Ghalib Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Athens, July 13, 1914, p. 288; the same to the same, Athens, July 14, 1914, p. 289.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>340</sup> É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 157.

was to be strengthened by two dreadnoughts that she had ordered from British shipyards.<sup>341</sup> These dreadnoughts were due for completion in the summer of 1914.<sup>342</sup> The Ottoman Navy moreover was now being reorganized by a British Mission led by Rear Admiral Sir Arthur H. Limpus.<sup>343</sup> Greece hastily purchased two American warships built in 1907, namely the “Idaho” and “Mississippi”.<sup>344</sup> It was clear, nonetheless, that should a new Greco-Turkish war break out, the Greek Navy would be inferior to that of Turkey.<sup>345</sup> Thus Venizelos decided to take a huge risk: he agreed to meet the Grand Vizier, Saïd Halim Pasha, in Brussels, late in August, 1914.<sup>346</sup> He was to have “conciliatory talks” with him. It was a foregone conclusion that the Ottoman suzerainty on Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios would be accepted by the Greek government.<sup>347</sup>

Venizelos was in Trieste when the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, took place in Sarajevo.<sup>348</sup> He was astute enough to grasp that the issue was clouded. He therefore cancelled the meeting with the Grand Vizier and returned to Greece, via Brindisi.<sup>349</sup> Thanks to the mediation of the Romanian Government and mainly to Take Ionescu, Venizelos’ friend, one more attempt of Greco-Turkish entente in the matter of the islands of the Aegean Sea took place in Bucharest in August. But nothing was achieved.<sup>350</sup> For World War One had already broken out.

<sup>341</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911–1918*, vol. II (London: Odhams Press [no date given]), p. 436.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>343</sup> S.J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire...*, II, p. 308.

<sup>344</sup> Rear Admiral Epameinōndas P. Kavvadias, *Ho Nautikos Polemos tou 1940 opōs ton ezēsa. Anamnēseis, 2 Martiou 1935–25 Martiou 1943* (= The Naval War of 1940 as I witnessed it. Memoirs, March 2, 1935, March 25, 1943), Athens: Pyrsos, 1950, p. 24.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>346</sup> S. Kunalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 473: Ghalib Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Athens, July 14, 1914, p. 289; the same to the same, Athens, July 20, 1914, p. 291.

<sup>347</sup> M. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce...*, V, p. 158.

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*; Sp. V. Markezinēs, *Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados...*, III, p. 226; S. Kunalp, *The Aegean Islands Issue...*, doc. 486: Ghalib Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Athens, July 29, 1914, p. 486.

<sup>350</sup> Constantin Iordan, *Venizelos și români* (Bucharest: Omonia, 2010<sup>2</sup>), p. 115ff.