

## THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ANTI-OTTOMAN WARFARE: THE CASE OF MOLDAVIA (1475–1477)

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In September 1476, the last Ottoman troops were retreating south of the Danube, chased by Moldavian and Hungarian units. Venice's envoy in Moldavia, Emmanuele Gerardo thought that Moldavia had come out rather well (i.e. cheap) from the clash with the Porte. This was relative. Plagues, destructions, famine and death had struck not only her army, but also the population. Most damage had been inflicted by the Basarab III Laiotă's Walachians, who had accompanied Mehmed II on his campaign. Stephen III the Great (*cel Mare*) of Moldavia had lost most of his loyal supporters in the battle of Valea Albă (July). Prior to it, he had been abandoned by approximately a third of the army. The regional anti-Ottoman picture became however brighter after the success, even if short-lived, of the Hungarian-Moldavian intervention in Walachia (October–November). By early 1477, the Ottoman reaction had turned these victories into history<sup>1</sup>.

The Ottomans eliminated the military positions gained, throughout the last year, by Hungary and Moldavia, along the Lower Danube, the Morava and the Sava. In particular, Stephen III was in a delicate situation. His foreign and domestic support was virtually ruined. He depended, more than before, on the financial and political support of the powers which had attracted him into the conflict with Mehmed II (1473–1474). Through her promises and, less, through subsidies

<sup>1</sup> E.g. *Actae et epistolae relationum Transylvaniae Hungariaeque cum Moldavia et Valachia* (=FRT, IV, VI), edited by Endre Veress, I, 1468–1540 (Budapest 1914), nos. 19–22, pp. 22–25; [Giovanni Maria Angiolello] Donado Da Lezze, *Historia Turchesca*, edited by I[oa]n. Ursu (Bucharest 1910), pp. 88–90; Ștefan Andreescu, 'L'action de Vlad Țepeș dans le sud-est de l'Europe en 1476', *RESEE*, XV (1977), 2, pp. 268–271; Naghi Pienaru, 'Un document otoman necunoscut din 1476' [Un unknown Ottoman Document of 1476], *RI*, XIII (2002), 1–2, pp. 229–241; Al. Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin. O coexistență medievală* [Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus. A Medieval Coexistence] (Cluj-Napoca 2006), pp. 102–103, 360–361, 445–446. A significant part of the documents related to Mehmed II's campaign of 1476 were edited in *Războieni. Cinci sute de ani de la împlinirea campaniei din 1476. Monografie și culegere de texte* [Războieni. 500 Years since the Completion of the Campaign of 1476: Monograph and Collection of Texts], general-editor Manole Neagoe (Bucharest 1976), still rather useful in spite of its peculiar aims and means.

(except when Süleyman Pasha's army was besieging Scutari), Venice had been instrumental. She was consequently the main target for Stephen's demands and pressures. His pressures were probably greater than in 1475–1476, when, following his victory of Vaslui and in view of Mehmed II's response, he had demanded his financial and monarchical rights from Rome and Venice. Still, after 1476, the next major Ottoman-Moldavian confrontation came only in 1484<sup>2</sup>.

### PERSUASION AND PROVIDENCE

In early May 1477, John Tzemplakon, Stephen III's envoy and *uncle (barba)*, had arrived in Venice. He presented his lord's message in front of the senate. Tzemplakon's speech was very well received by the senators (who then rushed off to find out the latest information on the difficult Venetian-Ottoman negotiations). The speech had been delivered by probably the most appropriate person to gain Venice's attention. Tzemplakon, previously captain in the service of the republic, was a close relative of Mary of Mangop, Stephen's wife, and of cardinal Bessarion († 1472), Venice's Greek crusader spearhead. In spring 1477, Venice too was in a difficult position. Though, at that time, no major fighting took place between her and the Porte, the war costed Venice in general 70% of her yearly budget, which amounted usually to 1.000.000 ducats<sup>3</sup>.

Tzemplakon had been sent to obtain Venice's support, whether all by herself or together with Rome. Stephen wanted money, for his war efforts, for a potential campaign in Crimea. He wanted to cover his losses. Tzemplakon underlined his investment in finances and blood in the cause of the cross. He reinforced Stephen's

<sup>2</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Roma*, cart. 79, fasc. 5, nn (14<sup>th</sup> of September 1475); cart. 81, fasc. 2, nn (17<sup>th</sup> of May 1476); Domenico Malipiero, *Annali veneti dall'anno 1457 al 1500 del Senatore Domenico Malipiero ordinati e abbreviati dal senatore Francesco Longo* (=ASI (1<sup>st</sup> series, VII, 1), edited by Agostino Sagredo (Florence 1843), pp. 99–100; Guglielmo Berchet, *La repubblica di Venezia e la Persia* (Turin), 1865, p. 101; *Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese 1446–1488*, editor Giovanni Soranzo (Venice 1915), p. 307; Tursun Bey, *La conquista di Constantinopoli*, editors Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Michele Bernardini, Luca Berardi (Milan 2007), pp. 209–210; Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571*, II, *The Fifteenth Century* (= MAPS, CXXVII) (Philadelphia 1978), pp. 314–322; Ferenc Szakály, 'Phases of Turko-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács. 1365–1526', *AOASH*, XXXIII (1979), pp. 88–94.

<sup>3</sup> ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 28, c. 13<sup>r-v</sup> (8<sup>th</sup> of May 1477); edited, for instance, in Nicolae Iorga, *Veneția în Marea Neagră. III. Originea legăturilor cu Ștefan cel Mare și mediul politic al dezvoltării lor* [Venice <'s Involvement> in the Black Sea <Area>], in *Idem, Studii asupra evului mediu românesc* [Studies on the Romanian Middle Ages], edited by Șerban Papacostea (Bucharest 1984), no. 47, pp. 289–291; see further C[onstantin]. Sathas, *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge*, V (Paris 1884), p. 211; Malipiero, pp. 111–112; N. Iorga, 'L'oncle d'Étienne le Grand', *BSHAR*, V–VIII (1916–1920), pp. 79–81; Dan Ioan Mureșan, 'La place de Girolamo Lando, patricien vénétien et titulaire du Patriarcat de Constantinople (1474–1497), dans la politique orientale del'Église de Rome', *AIRCROU*, VIII (2006), pp. 182–184.

crusader credibility and 'eligibility' for subsidies. If not, like Matthias Corvinus, like Venice too (obviously Tzampakon did not say this directly), Stephen was to find an arrangement, against his will and belief, with Mehmed II. In other words, he was to finalize the talks he had initiated with the sultan in the first months of 1477, after the death of Vlad III the Impaler (*Țepeș*), he had helped enthrone in Walachia. Hence, during her own negotiations with the Porte, Venice would have been deprived of at least one of her major cards: Stephen and the threat he posed, since 1473–1474, to the Ottoman Empire<sup>4</sup>.

The scenario was neither original, nor did it become obsolete. John Hunyadi, Skanderbeg or Matthias Corvinus had made use of it. Until the start of his 'Bohemian crusade', Matthias had been the most successful of all (1468). In relation to the *Christian* powers, Stephen III used the menaces in every decade of his remaining rule (e.g. 1479–1481, 1489–1490 or 1499–1502). The responses were not always positive. Still, these menaces were basically an important chapter of the 'late crusader rulers of engagement'. Venice tried everything to protect her colonial possessions and in particular Scutari, menaced once again in 1477 by the Ottoman armies. Christian and Muslims alike were usually just pawns in her game with the Porte. For her interests, the republic had sacrificed Skanderbeg during Mehmed II's Albanian campaign (1467). There can be little doubt that Stephen the Moldavian was well aware of Skanderbeg the Albanian's fate<sup>5</sup>.

Stephen had to act and provide an alternative, not only to the East, but namely to the West, to his potential abandonment by Venice and/ or Rome, after the events of 1476. Elegantly, his envoy had made clear to republic what she risked if Stephen was abandoned. He presented her one solution. She had to support Stephen, with money which he could use for various actions. In this respect, he preferred a campaign in Crimea. This campaign was cost-effective. It required only

<sup>4</sup> Stefano Magno, *Annali veneti e del mondo [1443–1478]* (ÖNB, *Codices*, Cod. 6215–6217), III, *Ad an-num 1477*, ff. 671<sup>r</sup>–674<sup>v</sup> (and also *Ad an-num 1478*, ff. 692<sup>r</sup>–693<sup>v</sup>); Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor* [Documents regarding the History of the Romanians], XV–1 *Acte și scrisori din arhivele orașelor ardelene Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu, 1358–1600* [Documents and Letters from the Archives of the Transylvanian Cities Bistrița (Bistritz), Brașov (Kronstadt), Sibiu (Hermannstadt), editor Nicolae Iorga (Bucharest 1911), nos. 171–176, pp. 76–79. Al. Simon, 'The Arms of the Cross: The Christian Politics of Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus', in *Between Worlds* (=MHG, NS, I, 1–4), I. *Stephen the Great, Matthias Corvinus and their Time*, edited by László Koszta, Ovidiu Mureșan, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca 2007); pp. 48–50.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Venezia*, cart. 354, fasc. 2, nn (18<sup>th</sup> of February 1468); O.J. Schimitt, 'Actes inédits concernant Venise, ses possessions albanaises et Skanderbeg (1464–1468)', *Turcica*, XXXI (1999), pp. 247–312; Iulian-Mihai Damian, 'La Depositeria della Crociata (1463–1490) e i sussidi dei pontifici romani a Mattia Corvino', *AICRU*, VIII (2006), pp. 135–152; Al. Simon, 'The Hungarian Means of the Relations between the Habsburgs and Moldavia at the End of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century', *AICRU*, VIII (2006), pp. 259–296; Idem, 'The Lion in Winter: John Hunyadi from Kossovopolje to Belgrade', in *Between Worlds*, II, *John Hunyadi and his Time*, edited by Ana Dumitran, Loránd Mádly, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca 2008), pp. 500–502.

10.000 men. Venice was not too fond of this perspective. An action of this (geo) political size would have required the consent of the Polish king, Casimir (Kazimierz) IV, whose envoy in Venice, Filippo Buonaccorsi Calimachus, worked against the crusade. Stephen III's plan also required support from the Tartars, still divided between khans Ahmed, Stephen's eastern shield in 1476, and Mengli Ghiray, who had taken Caffa, alongside the Ottomans in 1475<sup>6</sup>.

#### BETWEEN THE CRIMEAN AND THE BALKAN PLANS

10.000 soldiers could have hardly been moved in the direction of the Crimean Peninsula, even through the Precop pass, Tzemplakon had mentioned, without the Ottomans noticing that (this had worked only for the 300 men strong elite troop sent two years earlier by Stephen in support to Mangop). It could have seemed easier to stage a Balkan action, similar to those usually suggested and attempted by Venice. Stephen had constantly avoided accepting such plans, because of the potential domestic (the passing of the Tartars, as his and Venice's auxiliaries nonetheless, through Moldavia) and foreign (the breaches and overlaps in authority and in monarchical claims) problems a Balkan campaign could have caused. His attitude was however probably different in respect strictly to the political titles involved by such propositions<sup>7</sup>.

One of the most obvious Balkan propositions made by the republic to him was contained in the project presented in front of Sixtus IV and of the Sacred College by Venetian representative Paolo Mauroceno (in spring 1475). Drafted also under the influence of the victory of Vaslui, the project was rather realistic, due, for instance, to the military effectives involved. Stephen III, *voivode of Serbia and Moldavia* (with 5.000 men), kings Casimir and Matthias (each with 25.000) were to attack Mehmed II. Rome and Venice had to support the action by sea and in the West.

The campaign was to end on the Bosphorus. In 1477, the context did not favor such audacious plans. In 1476, Stephen III and Matthias had failed to close the

<sup>6</sup> ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 28, c. 13<sup>v</sup> (8<sup>th</sup> of May 1477); Ş. Papacostea, 'La guerre ajournée: les relations polono-moldave en 1478. Réflexions en marge d'un text de Filippo Buonaccorsi-Callimachus', *RRH*, XI (1972), 1, pp. 3-21; N. Pienaru, 'Proiectul scitic. Relațiile lui Ștefan cel Mare cu Hoarda Mare' [The Scythian Project: Stephen the Great's Relations to the Great Horde], *RI*, XXIV (2003), 5-6, pp. 121-136. See also Jan Władisław Woś, *Politica e religione nella Polonia tardo medioevale* (Trento 2000), pp. 48-50.

<sup>7</sup> *Venetia*, no. 34, p. 276; no. 38, p. 279; no. 42, p. 282; Geo Pistarino, 'La caduta di Caffa: diaspora in Oriente', in *Idem, Genovesi d'Oriente* (Genoa 1990), p. 518. For Venetian earlier plans: Enrico Cornet, *Le guerre dei Veneti nell'Asia, 1470-1474. Documenti cavati dall'Archivio ai Frari in Venezia* (Vienna 1856), no. 43, p. 44; no. 85, p. 106; no. 90, p. 112; [Jacopo Ammannati Piccolomini], *Diarium Concistoriale dell'cardinale Ammannati attribuito dal Muratori a Giacomo Gherardi da Volterra*, *RIS*, XXIII, 1904, 3, pp. 141-144;

'Moldavian trap' on Mehmed II. Their very short-lived Walachian success had only partially redeemed their 'crusader credit'<sup>8</sup>.

An anti-Ottoman action in the south could have seemed doomed in spring 1477. The obstacles in the south were less susceptible to be bridged by money and diplomacy than in the north-east. The planned Crimean campaign did thus not appear so far-fetched. A Moldavian success in the Crimea was also meant a Venetian victory. The re-conquest of Caffa would have brought the former Genoese metropolis into Venice's commercial sphere of influence. Nothing was done however. In November 1477, while the Ottomans were attacking Scutari, Stephen took out their positions in Walachia (as in 1473–1474). Previously, he had done little or nothing against the *Turk*. Until 1481–1482 and the outburst of the peculiar Genoese crusader enthuse-asm, Stephen's Crimean plan apparently vanished completely from the anti-Ottoman picture<sup>9</sup>.

In May 1477, the odds had seemed in favor of the plan. The costs (up to 80.000 ducats, including Stephen's share) involved by the 10.000 men were not high. The campaign, including preparations for it, in case, they had not already been made in order to reinforce Stephen's Venetian stand, was to last only half a year. Otherwise, the element of surprise would have been lost. The problem was who was going to block the Ottomans while most of Stephen's professional troops were in the Crimea. Matthias could have done that, but Tzamlakon doubted that he was to continue fighting the sultan. The other solution was Venice. She had to attract the Turk to *Albania*, returning Stephen his *Walachian* services. Other details remain unknown. Tzamlakon could not present all facts in front of a senate, where the *Turk* had his informants. He had said more than enough. It is therefore likely that some of his data was meant for the sultan's ears<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 2, nn [April–May 1475; misdated, under 1462, by Jovan Radonić in *Đurađ Kastriot Skenderbeg i Arbanija XV veku (istoriska iratha)* [George Castriot Skanderbeg and Albania in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century (Historical Sources)] (=Spomenik, XCV) (Belgrade 1942), no. 226, p. 128; re-edited in Al. Simon, Cristian Luca, 'Documentary Perspectives on Matthias Corvinus and Stephen the Great', *TR*, XVII (2008), 3, pp. 101–103; Simon, 'The Arms of the Cross', pp. 55–56.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Al. Simon, 'În jurul bătăliei de la Vaslui (1474–1475). Considerații asupra relațiilor dintre Regatul Ungariei, Moldova și Țara Românească' [Around the Battle of Vaslui (1474–1475). Thoughts on the Relations between the Kingdom of Hungary, Moldavia and Walachia], *SUBBH*, XLIX (2004), 2, pp. 9–10, 15. It should be added that the Venetian-Genoese hostility naturally surpassed even the strong adversity which had developed between Moldavian and Genoese Pontic structures and figures throughout the last century.

<sup>10</sup> See also Donald E. Pitcher, *A Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from the Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden 1972), pp. 92–97, 138–139. In East-Central Europe prices and wa-ges were up to four times smaller than in *Italia* (Fernand Braudel, Frank C. Spooner, 'Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, general editor Michael M. Postan, IV, *The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, edited by E.E. Rich, C.H. Wilson (Cambridge 1967), pp. 394–398; Gy. Rázsó,

### VENICE'S MOLDAVIAN DEBTS

Venice needed an anti-Ottoman success, at least (like in 1474–1475), in view of a more advantageous peace treaty with the sultan. However, she did not feel very capable of facing the Ottomans alone. Sultan Mehmed II prepared for a new Albanian campaign. He was not to strike again in weakened Moldavia. Venice could not rely on Matthias. Conflicts between Buda (Ofen) and Venice had intensified. The price for his support had gone up in respect to the 15,000 ducats of 1474. If Stephen left for Crimea, Venice basically stood alone in front of the Ottomans. Luring the sultan into Albania and retaining him there, while Stephen conquered the Crimea, was an unattractive perspective. Even if the Crimean plan thus looked unsustainable, Stephen had achieved something else. Venice was fully aware of the fact that she needed Moldavia<sup>11</sup>.

Stephen's 'absence' from the Danube front, whether because he was in the Crimea or because he had a truce with the sultan, meant for Venice that there was no one in East-Central Europe or in Asia Minor (Uzun Hassan's promises failed to impress) to relieve the Ottoman pressure off her. After Tzamlakon's speech, she immediately started pressuring the papacy. As usual, for Venetian politics namely, Rome too had to financially support her Moldavian *athlete*. However, although her senate had understood and reacted to the Moldavian message, Venice seemingly tried to avoid completely giving in to Stephen's demands. This best explains why he waited until November, before entering Walachia, in the decisive hour of the Ottoman Albanian campaign. He had waited to see how Venice's and Istanbul's positions towards him evolved<sup>12</sup>.

Stephen re fortified his fortresses, using all resources still available to him. Since 1474, the princely chancery had virtually ceased to issue charters. He could counterbalance the domestic situation only through foreign affairs. Peace and war seemed equally useful to him. The republic knew his limited choices. News of

'Military Reforms in the Fifteenth Century', in *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History*, edited by László Veszprémy, B.K. Király (New-York, 2002), pp. 70, 76).

<sup>11</sup> For an overview, see for instance: *I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia. Regesti* [edited by Ricardo Predelli], V, [Registri XIV–XVII] (Venice 1901), no. XVI–65, 73, pp. 213, 215; Malipiero, pp. 41, 43; Fabio Cusin, *Il confine orientale d'Italia nella politica europea del XIV e XV secolo*, II, (Milan 1937), pp. 151–153; Gy. Rázsó, 'Una strana alleanza. Alcuni pensieri sulla storia militare e politica dell'alleanza contro i turchi (1440–1464)', in *Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento*, edited by Vittore Branca (Florence 1973), pp. 95–101; O.J. Schmitt, *Das venezianische Albanien (1402–1479)* (Munich 2001), pp. 604–612.

<sup>12</sup> Iván Nagy, Albert B. Nyáry, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek. Mátyás király korából 1458–1490* [Souvenirs of the Hungarian Diplomacy: The Age of King Matthias. 1458–1490] (= *MHH*, IV, 1–4), II [1466–1480] (Budapest 1876), no. 245, p. 355; *Venezia*, no. 42, p. 282; [Jan Długosz], *Jan Długosii Senioris Canonici Cracoviensis Opera omnia*, editor Alexander Przewdziecki, XIV, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII* [II] (Krakow 1887), p. 665; J.E. Woods, *The Aqquymlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Minneapolis-Chicago 1976), pp. 127–137.

them reached Milan. Venice too had informed the duchy, (still) her ally. The astute Leonardo Botta, the Sforzas' man in Venice, for almost a decade, did not have to collect all the pieces of information in secret. Over the last years, Botta had authored at least 100 preserved reports only in regard to Moldavia. Botta had witnessed the 'invention' of Moldavian anti-Ottoman successes for Venice's benefit (1474). In March 1477, he witnessed Stephen's public discontent with Venice's policy. Botta quickly took notice of his threats and charges and informed Milan of them, in close connections to Istanbul as well, since decades<sup>13</sup>.

*Preterea dicta Signoria ha de presenti recevuto littere de Valachia per le quali secondo ho dal/ medesimo loco e advisata ch'el Valacho Steffano Vayvoda fe grana asay/ de questo Dominio, con dire che da esso non ha potuto havere subsidio, ne adiumento/ alcuno nelle fatiche sue, como con li era stato promesso. Et che per tuto mazo non sera/ facta provisione al facto suo, esso pigliara partito col Turco, della quale/ nova dicta Signoria ha preso qualche assomno, parendolli che quando el prenominato/ Valacho se acordasse col Turco, esso Turco potria sicuramente voltare li periferi soy/ in Albania et deinde in Dalmatia. Et per ho dicta Signoria ha spaciato cavallari et scripto/ littere al dicto Steffano Vayvoda molto amorevole et plene de offerte asay (13<sup>th</sup> of March 1477).*

The republic was accused of anti-Ottoman misconduct. She had pushed Stephen into the war and left him with no means of resisting Mehmed. Without her money he could not continue to fight the *Turk*. Venice quickly realized the peril. She wrote Stephen a letter *full of love and promises*. Four days later, she instructed her representatives in Rome to ask for at least 10.000 ducats for him. The stage was set for TzAMPLAKON's speech of May. He made no direct reference to Stephen's previous threats. In a polite and emphatic at times manner, he only capitalized on them. TzAMPLAKON presented Stephen's propositions. Botta did not even make the effort to record TzAMPLAKON's speech. Things were clear for him and his masters since March. In return, three days after TzAMPLAKON's speech, Botta recorded what appeared to be of greater value<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Venezia*, cart. 364, fasc. 3, nn (13<sup>th</sup> of March 1477); Enrico Basso, 'De Boucicaud à Francesco Sforza. Persistence et changements dans a politique orientale des seigneurs étrangers de Gênes au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle', in *Le partage du monde. Echanges et colonization dans la Méditerranée médiévale*, edited by Michel Balard, Alain Ducellier (Paris 1998), pp. 63–77; Marco Pistoressi, 'Venezia-Milano-Firenze 1475. La visita in Laguna di Sforza Maria Sforza e le manovre della diplomazia internazionale: aspetti politici e ritualità pubblica', *SV*, XLVI (2003), pp. 31–69; Al. Simon, 'Anti-Ottoman Warfare and Crusader Propaganda in 1474: New Evidences from the Archives of Milan', *RRH*, XLVI (2007), 1–4, pp. 25–39.

<sup>14</sup> ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 28, c. 1<sup>r</sup> (17<sup>th</sup>–18<sup>th</sup> of March, 10<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> of April 1477; part of the data was edited, for instance, in *Hurmuzaki*, VIII, 1376–1650 [editor Ioan Slavici?]) (Bucharest

### THE BOYS FROM CAFFA

Given his Venetian ‘negotiations’ and the lack of anti-Ottoman action on his behalf, Stephen seems to have reached a sort of truce with Mehmed II. The possibility is substantiated by the negotiations between Buda and Istanbul (January 1477–April 1478). The negotiations did not lead to a lasting Hungarian-Ottoman truce, nor did they prevent border conflicts. Nonetheless, until late 1479, Matthias did not take any major anti-Ottoman initiative. The outbreak of the war with Frederic III of Habsburg, predictable since 1476, redirected the king’s attention and main army cores towards the West. Stephen was virtually alone in front of the sultan. At least, in order to buy time until his forces were restored and his protectors decided to aid him, Stephen had to engage in negotiations with the Porte, though a truce was a very problematic issue, partially due to one peculiar matter, of private nature too for Mehmed, which was very difficult to settle<sup>15</sup>.

It was to this matter and not to Tzamplakon’s speech that Botta devoted his skills. The *boys* from Genoese Caffa which had found ‘shelter’ in Moldavia two years earlier recaptured Mediterranean attention. In July 1475, after the Ottoman conquest of Caffa, these *puti* should have reached Istanbul as personal possessions of the sultan. The captain of the ship charged with their transport had decided otherwise. The Ottoman guards were killed and the ship changed course to Moldavia. Stephen became their master. This was a personal offense for the sultan. Apparently, he reacted violently against all Christians, namely the *Latins*, living in the vicinity of his center of power. Viewed as traitors and associates of Stephen, they were arrested and remained imprisoned until autumn 1477. Their release, most likely caused by the commercial necessities, could have been also linked to Moldavian-Ottoman and/ or Venetian-Ottoman talks<sup>16</sup>.

1894), no. 21, pp. 16–18; nos. 24–25, pp. 21–22); Ş. Papacostea, ‘Venise et les Pays Roumains au Moyen Age’, in *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, editor Agostino Pertusi, 1–2, *Storia-Diritto-Economia* (Florence 1973), pp. 602–605. At the time, another Moldavian-Venetian problem was the ‘Venetian’ (*Latin*) Patriarchate of Constantinople.

<sup>15</sup> József Teleki, *Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon* [The Age of the Hunyadis in Hungary], V (Pest 1847), p. 54; Vilmos Fraknoi, *Mátyás király levelei. Küllügyi Osztály* [King Matthias’ Letters. Foreign Section], I, 1458–1479 (Budapest 1893), nos. 259–260, pp. 381–383; no. 281, p. 419 (MKL); Lajos Thallóczy, *Frammenti relativi alla storia dei paesi situati all’Adria* (offprint *ArchT*, 3<sup>rd</sup> series, VII, 1) (Trieste 1913), pp. 39–41; Gyula Ráczó, *Die Feldzüge Königs Mathias Corvinus in Niederösterreich 1477–1490* (Vienna 1973), pp. 5–7; Sándor Papp, ‘Stephen the Great. Matthias Corvinus and the Ottoman Empire’, in *Between Worlds*, I, pp. 107–122.

<sup>16</sup> See Ş. Papacostea, ‘Caffa et la Moldavie face à l’expansion ottomane (1453–1484)’, in *Atti del Colloquio Genovesi nel Mar Nero durante i secoli XIII e XIV*, edited by Ştefan Pascu (Bucharest 1977), pp. 150–152; Matei Cazacu, Kéram Kévokian, ‘Les ottomans en Crimée. La chute de Caffa en 1475 à la lumière de nouveaux documents’, *CMRS*, XVII (1976), 4, pp. 495–538; Şt. Andreescu, ‘Autour de la dernière phase des rapports entre la Moldavie et Gênes’, *RRH*, XXI (1982), 2, pp. 257–282; Andrei Pippidi, ‘Lettres inédites de Leonardo III Tocco’, *RESEE*, XXXII (1994), 1–2, pp. 69–

The magnitude of Mehmed's reaction is questionable. Botta too doubted that the persecution had reached such heights. Mehmed was known as tolerant towards Christians, *Latins* and *Greeks*, living under his authority and, most importantly, serving him. Nonetheless, the matter is eloquent for the tensions which marked the eastern policy of the Porte even after the conquest of Caffa. Unwilling to negotiate what was rightfully his, Mehmed certainly had problems to conceal his anger. This rendered Moldavian-Ottoman negotiations more difficult (late 1475–spring 1476). Alongside the release of the Ottoman prisoners or the cession the *Lycostomo castle*, the return of the boys was one of the seemingly non-negotiable Ottoman conditions. Mehmed II also played on the fact that one of Stephen's sons, probably his first born legitimate son, was his hostage<sup>17</sup>.

After he learned that Mehmed II had killed, apparently in an outburst of rage, Alexander of Theodoro, Stephen's brother-in-law, the ruler executed all Ottoman prisoners. Negotiations were broken off. According to the news which reached Istanbul and Genoese Pera, he had stated that he did not need the (ransom) money of these prisoners, but their bodies. Previously however, he had made a handsome profit with the sultan's goods on the ship from Caffa. This profit was still vivid on the regional level in spring 1477. Botta placed a great emphasis on this aspect.

*Item, per molte altre littere de persone privar de Levante, se intende el dictoTurco essere/ molto indignato et incrudelito verso Genuesi et la casone de tale indignatione afferiscono/ essere perche una nave genuese, chiamata la Nigrona, piu di sono caricho in Caffa/ robe de Turchi de valuta circha ducentomilla ducati et alcuni puti che erano/ mandati al dicto Turcho. Et post alle vele per venire ad Constantinopoli mutato/ consilio, parue al patrone d'essa che le richeze et il tempo li fusse molto comodo ad/ fare uno bono quadagona. Et cosi presi et morti tuti li Turchi erano sopra dicta/ nave. Se adrizo alla volta del Danubio et ando con tute queste faculta ad trovare il/ Vayvoda Steffano, et con esso divise la roba a suo modo. Per la quale violenta/ animosita scriveno el Turco indignato havere facto incarcerare tuti li Genuesi/ erano in Pera, in Metelino et nelli altri lochi circumstanti, et toltolli tute le loro/ faculta, et havere deliberato vedre il frie di Syo. Che se queste cosa fusseno della / natura se scrivero veramente Genuesi seriano in una miserissima*

70; Al. Simon, 'The Fall of Caffa (1475) in New Milanese Sources', *Istros*, XVIII (2009), forthcoming; G. Pistarino, 'La caduta di Caffa', pp. 481, 488–489.

<sup>17</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., Potenze estere, *Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 3, nn (23<sup>rd</sup> of May 1476; misdated in N. Iorga, *Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor* [Documents and Fragments regarding the History of the Romanians], III [-1], [1399–1499] (Bucharest 1897 [1898]), p. 56); Franz Babinger, *Mehmed der Ero-berer unde seine Zeit. Weltensürmer einer Zeitenwende* (Munich 1959), pp. 382–388; Al. Simon, 'Quello ch'è apresso el Turcho. About A Son of Stephen the Great', *AIRCROU*, VI–VII (2004–2005), pp. 141–169.

*exterminatione./ Et etiam sono alcune altre litere che dicono esso Turcho eodem modo haver facto/ incarcerare tuti li Franchi, videlicet tuti li Cristiani, erano in Pera et in quelli lochi/ circumstanti. Tamen queste ultime novelle non se hanno de lochi ben auctentii (11<sup>th</sup> of May 1477).*

Stephen III's 'booty' was worth 200.000 ducats, the estimated value of the 'goods', from men to jewelry, on the ship. Naturally, their 'market value' was smaller under those Pontic circumstances, maybe up to 50% (even though Botta apparently referred precisely to their market value)<sup>18</sup>.

### THE VALUE AND THE USES OF A SHIPMENT

200.000 ducats exceeded (by some 25%) the estimated value of Stephen's largest budget, prior to the outbreak of the war. The booty was also almost five times bigger than the, so far, estimated amount of all subsidies received (especially in 1473–1474 and 1478–1479) directly by him, not through Matthias, from Rome and Venice during his *long war* with the *Turk* (1473–1486). 200.000 ducats stood for approximately a fourth of Matthias' yearly income, for about a fifth of the revenues of Milan, Naples and Venice. The sum also stood for the (estimated) total amount of official and unofficial subsidies received by Matthias from Venice (1460–1476) for anti-Ottoman warfare and for some 65% of the money he had received, until then, from Rome. 200.000 ducats were two–three times the money Casimir IV collected in a year. Interestingly enough, 200.000 ducats also represented at least two thirds of the yearly papal budget in the 1470'<sup>19</sup>.

Last but not least, the sum recorded by Botta, based on several reports from the east, was far greater than the 2.000 ducats that, according to the 'impoverished' Stephen, in one of his blackmail letters to Casimir IV (1480–1481), Mehmed II asked of him as compensation for the *boys*. Casimir IV was 'asked' to pay Stephen that money, as a debt of honor, for Moldavia's role as Poland's *shield*. Obviously, the value of all boys largely exceeded 2.000 ducats. Mehmed's male preferences, which had made his Walachian favorite, Radu III the Handsome (*cel Frumos*) famous, and his anger upon the news of the ship's fate, support the idea. Moreover,

<sup>18</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze estere, *Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 3, nn (20<sup>th</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup> of May 1476); *Venezia*, cart. 364, fasc. 5, nn (11<sup>th</sup> of May 1477). The 'business focused' captain probably got his share of the 'booty'. On the other hand, given also Stephen's conduct in relation to the Genoese, relieved that they were in Christian hands, we cannot rule out the possibility that the captain too was put into chains by the Moldavian ruler.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. Erik Fügedi, 'Mátyás király jövedelme 1475-ben' [King Matthias Budget of 1475], *Sz, CXVI* (1982), 3, pp. 484–506; Şevket Pamuk, 'Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326–1914', in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, edited by Halil İnalcik (Cambridge 1994<sup>1</sup>), pp. 951–956; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, pp. 320–327; Simon, *Ştefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 238–239, 324–328.

following Botta's lines and tone, the sum of 200.000 ducats seemingly did not include the value of the *boys*, 127 in total, according to the report sent by Baldassar of Piscia, papal legate for Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, who had encountered some of them, to Sixtus IV (September 1476)<sup>20</sup>.

When they had reached the Danube harbor of Chilia, the boys, mostly Genoese, were certain that Stephen III would free them. They were chained and dealt with as slaves, contrary to Christian rules of slave trade. A Christian, whether Latin or Greek (but not always), could not be taken slave and if bought as slave should have been set free. In his defense, Stephen could always argue that the Genoese from the Black Sea area had often taken or traded Moldavians. Equally true was the fact that he, as most Moldavian rulers, had had several conflicts with the Genoese. Apparently, Stephen humiliated them whenever he had the chance. Especially Caffa responded in the same way. Besides, after Stephen's victory of Vaslui, Caffa had rejected his proposed anti-Ottoman alliance, in the (vain) hope that her refusal could assure her survival<sup>21</sup>.

In this political respect too, these *boys* were just goods and pawns. The fortunate ones reached *Italia* in 1476, ransomed by their families. The entire affair was a political and financial endeavor and gamble as well. Pope Sixtus IV was a Genoese proud of his origin, although Genoa and Genoese were frequently synonyms for traitors of the cross. After the 'Genoese incident of mid 1475', Stephen III received subsidies from the Italian Peninsula, only some three years later, according to information available until now. In return, Sixtus IV had no trouble, nor did he have real alternatives, in naming Stephen the Great *athlete of the Christian faith* (January 1476). Sixtus IV kept asking for support for the *Black Sea Walachians*, who together with the Hungarians, fought the Ottomans and should not be left alone. The pope's calls were directed to areas and states, such as Burgundy, from where no real aid had come in the last decade<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> BNM, Cod. Lat. X-178 (=3625), cc. 41<sup>r</sup>-42<sup>v</sup> (16<sup>th</sup> of September 1476; the best edition of the report is that of Krzysztof Baczkowski, 'Nieznane listy Baltazara z Piscii do papieża Sykstusa IV z lat 1476-1478 ze zbiorów weneckich' [Baldassar of Piscia's Reports to Pope Sixtus IV from the Venetian Archives. 1476-1478], *PH*, LXXXIX (1989), Appendix, no. 1, pp. 242-248); Ioan Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare [The Documents of Stephen the Great]*, II [1497-1503, 1457-1503] (Bucharest 1913), no. 193, p. 366; *Leben und Taten der türkischen Kaiser. Die anonyme vulgärgriechische Chronik Codex Barberinianus Graecus (Anonymus Zoras) (=OGS, VI)*, edited by Richard F. Kreutel (Graz-Vienna-Cologne 1971), p. 145.

<sup>21</sup> E.g. Raimondo Amedeo Vigna, *Codice diplomatico delle colonie tauro-liguri durante la signoria dell' Ufficio di S. Georgio. MCCCCLIII-MCCCCLXXV (=ASLSP, VI-VII)*, 1453-1459] (Genoa 1868-1870), no. 120, pp. 307-309; no. 151, pp. 364-368; no. 377, p. 815; II-2, [1473-1475; 1453-1475] (Genoa 1876-1879), no. 658, p. 338; no. 1087, pp. 103-104; no. 1102, pp. 114-116; no. 1104, p. 122; no. 1117, p. 195; *Acte și fragmente*, III, pp. 50-51, 88-89; and see in particular Șt. Andreescu, *Un nou act genovez cu privire la Ștefan cel Mare [A New Genoese Document regarding Stephen the Great]*, *SMIM*, XXII (2004), pp. 133-136.

<sup>22</sup> ASV, Misc., Arm., II-30, f. 44 (49<sup>r</sup>) (25<sup>th</sup> of February 1476; edited in Edgár Artner, *Magyarország mit a Nyugati Keresztény művelődés védobástyája: a Vatikánai Levéltárnak azo okiratai, melyek oseinknek a Keletrol Európát fen yegeto veszedelmek ellen kifejet erofeszítéseire*

### PROFITS, LOSSES AND ALTERNATIVES

In 1477, nobody in Venice or in the Genoese communities in the Levant apparently knew that some of the *boys* from Caffa had escaped during the Moldavian campaign of Mehmed II. Sixtus IV had already been informed of this by his legate, Baldassar of Piscia. Probably, few of those who had fled from Suceava had survived. Only five of them came to Wroclaw (Breslau), at the time, under the rule of king Matthias Corvinus, to the papal legate. Others may have remained under the protection of Casimir IV. Stephen alluded to them when writing to Casimir some five years after the event. Except for Stephen, who needed them for his talks in Istanbul, Krakow or Genoa, and the boys themselves, few actually cared about what had happened to them. They were not in *Pagan*, but in *Christian* hands, and this made the matter very delicate<sup>23</sup>.

In any case, Stephen III eventually managed the situation rather well, profiting also from the fact that the 'incident' was perceived as quite normal, due to the regional context and the spirit of the age. After the *liberation* of Otranto (1481), great hopes of recovering Caffa rose in Genoa. Some Genoese, namely from the diaspora, even had a very positive image of Stephen under the circumstances. It was not only a matter of necessity. A real tradition developed in Genoa that Stephen III had treated the boys fair and well. Even Baldassar of Piscia's tone had been more than neutral. Jan Długosz, Casimir IV's secretary, one Stephen III's greatest supporters, had no troubles in (partially, yet openly) presenting the 'incident', just after having proposed Stephen of Moldavia as the monarch who deserved to be leader of the (alternative) continental crusade<sup>24</sup>.

*vonatkozna* (cca. 1214–1606) [Hungary as *Propugnaculum* of Western Christianity: Documents from the Vatican Secret Archives. 1214–1606], editor Szovág Kornél (Budapest 2004), no. 101, pp. 111–112; Reg. Vat. 578, ff. 92<sup>r</sup>–93<sup>r</sup> (13<sup>th</sup> of January 1476; misdated, under 1477, as already noticed by Oskar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest. 1439–1596* (offprint from *SPM*, V) (Rome 1958), p. 104, note 14, in Augustinus Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungarica sacra illustrantia* II, *Ab Innocentio PP. VI. usque ad Clementem PP. VII. 1352–1526* (Rome 1859), no. 636, pp. 453–454). The efforts of the families to ransom the boys are documented. Yet, it could be of interest that Botta does not mention in his 'synthesis' the return of (part of) the boys to the peninsula, ransomed or not.

<sup>23</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Venezia*, cart. 364, fasc. 5, nn (11<sup>th</sup> of May 1477); BNM, Cod. Lat. X–178 (=3625), c. 41<sup>v</sup> (16<sup>th</sup> of September 1476); *Documente Ștefan*, II, no. 193, p. 366 (see the 'version' in Theodor Holban, 'Noi documente românești din arhivele polone și franceze' [New Romanian Documents from Polish and French Archives] (I), *AIHAI*, XV (1978), no. 2, p. 467; Andreescu, 'Dernière phase', pp. 277–279).

<sup>24</sup> For instance; ASG, A.S., *Diversorum*, 742, c. 4<sup>v</sup>; *Litterarum. Officium Monete*, 1804, cc. 44<sup>r</sup>–45<sup>r</sup>; *Materie Politiche. Scritti in lingua orientale ed africana*, 2737 D, nn. [Documenti Greco-Bizantini], [dos. G] (13<sup>th</sup> of September 1480, 2<sup>nd</sup> of February, 31<sup>st</sup> of December 1481); BMC, *Manoscritti*, P.D., 594, ff. 39<sup>r-v</sup>, 41<sup>r</sup> (3<sup>rd</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> of July 1481); Giacomo Grasso, *Documenti riguardanti la costituzione di una lega contro il Turco nel 1481*, *GL*, VI (1879), no. 113, p. 484; no. 119, p. 488; Długosz (1887), pp. 630–631; Gian Giacomo Musso, 'Le ultime speranze dei Genovesi per il Levante. Ricerche d'archivio', *GLO*, I (1974), pp. 22–23 (especially).

These pragmatic approaches may have had also a negative impact on Stephen, leaving aside what could be interpreted as papal reluctance towards him in autumn of 1475. After the fall of Caffa, Venice and Rome kept on praising him. He became their *athlete*. Judging from his reactions namely, no subsidy was sent (directly) to him. All funds went directly to Matthias. Officially, neither the republic, nor the papacy said a word against his Genoese business or hindered it. They could not afford to lose him. In return, they did not send him (extra) money. Even if not all goods were sold (or pawned) at their real value, even if he only a few boys (some could have valued up to 1.000 ducats) were ransomed, Stephen III may have raised around 100.000 ducats. It was more than Matthias, whose military costs were greater than those of Stephen III, received with great delay and scandal from Rome and Venice, in the late summer of 1476<sup>25</sup>.

The consequences over the time of this possible downside are difficult to estimate. In the 1470', long before 1492, when Venice sent him up to 80.000 ducats to represent her interests once again in the East (money which he used for his own purposes), the downside seems to have predominantly temporarily. Besides, it is doubtful that, in case the 'Genoese incident' had not occurred, he would have received 100.000 ducats in view of the imminent Ottoman attack. Rome's and Venice's treasury chests were increasingly empty and Stephen was not the key-crusader figure in the area, in spite of Venice's efforts. By tradition and authority, as some 70% of the anti-Ottoman land front was under his direct control, this was Matthias. Even prior to their treaty of Iași, a month after Caffa's fall, he was perceived and accepted, depending on the context by Stephen too (who controlled at best 15% of that land frontier), as Stephen's suzerain<sup>26</sup>.

### MOLDAVIA'S CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES

In the summer of 1475, had Mehmed continued his offensive against Moldavia too, the initial success of Stephen III against the Ottoman anvingarde, in

<sup>25</sup> E.g. *Veneția*, no. 47, p. 290; no. 51, p. 203; Gy. Rázsó, 'The Mercenary Army of King Matthias Corvinus', in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi. War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, edited by János M. Bak, Bela M. Király (New-York 1982), pp. 130-138; Al. Simon, 'Antonio Bonfini's *Valachorum regulus*: Matthias Corvinus, Transylvania and Stephen the Great', in *Between Worlds*, II, pp. 219-224.

<sup>26</sup> E.g. Viaceslav Makusev, *Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionahum vicinorumque populorum e tabularis et bibliothecis italicis derompta*, I-2, *Genua, Mantua, Mediolanum, Panormus et Taurinum* (Belgrade 1882), no. 15, p. 137; Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 114-118. However, the otherwise balanced 'German propaganda work' of Stephen, intended for the Habsburg milieu (*Cronicile slavo-române din secolele XV-XVI publicate de Ioan Bogdan* [The Slavic-Romanian Chronicles of the 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> Centuries published by Ioan Bogdan], edited by P.P. Panaitescu (Bucharest 1959), p. 34), offered in the early 1500; an idyllic picture of the matter, indicating that the problem posed by his conduct had not disappeared in Christian areas other than *Italia*. The question of how many of Stephen III's business partners were Christians remains also open.

particular near Chilia (where the boys had arrived), would have probably accounted for little. Stephen's chances of survival were reduced. The same was more than true in 1477, after the devastations of last year. As in 1475, after Vaslui and the initial resistance of his soldiers, Stephen III could only count on the fact that the sultan, plagued by illness, was unwilling to risk another unsuccessful attack. In Skanderbeg's case however, Mehmed had pushed until the Albanian had fallen. Stephen could not afford that risk. He needed Ottoman peace or Christian aid. Regardless of whether or not he actually thought of attacking in the Crimea, the main Moldavian issue was made very clear by Tzamplakon<sup>27</sup>.

It was hardly a coincidence that the 'Genoese incident' resurfaced in the context of John Tzamplakon's speech of May 1477. Following the path opened up by Stephen's earlier threats, Tzamplakon defended Stephen's case very well. If he got no aid, the consequences for Venice could be disastrous. The 'Genoese incident' appeared as one of the few means by which the republic could have prolonged Stephen's anti-Ottoman involvement with little or no costs on her behalf. Ottoman successes in Albania annulled any potential effects of this tactics, which may have been supported only by a minority of Venetian politicians. Stephen had stood still and allowed the *Turk* to concentrate his forces elsewhere. In his turn, Stephen focused in the following months on his relation to Transylvania. Her political and military problems had delayed the Hungarian aid in the summer of 1476, leaving Stephen very vulnerable in front of Mehmed II<sup>28</sup>.

Mehmed had apparently taken very serious the threats to his power enveloping Stephen's threats to Venice. Within a year from the Venetian embassy of Tzamplakon, the sultan's armies had intervened in the Crimean Peninsula. They put an end to the major Tartar power alternatives to Mengli Ghiray's rule. By September 1478, the Ottomans had conquered the main Venetian strongholds in Albania: Kroja and Scutari. By that time, Stephen's Walachian action of late 1477 had proven futile. The ruler he had enthroned, Basarab IV the Little Impaler (*Țepeluș*) changed sides and started acting as mediator between Buda and Istanbul. On one hand, king Matthias accepted the situation. On the other, he entrusted the

<sup>27</sup> For instance: ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647, fasc. 1, nn (20<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup> of May, 16<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup> of June, 14<sup>th</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>–27<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup> of July, 16<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> of August); *Venezia*, cart. 361, fasc. 3, nn (22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1475); Eugen Denize, *Stephen the Great and his Reign* (Bucharest 2004), pp. 99–102; O.J. Schmitt, 'Skanderbegs letzte Jahre. West-östliches Wechselspiel von Diplomatie und Krieg im Zeitalter der osmanischen Eroberung Albanien (1464–1468)', *SOF*, LXIV–LXV (2004–2005), pp. 56–123 (namely the appendix).

<sup>28</sup> In this respect: ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Venezia*, cart. 364, fasc. 5, nn (11<sup>th</sup> of May 1477); ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 28, c. 13<sup>v</sup> (8<sup>th</sup> of May 1477); MDE, II, nos. 257–258, pp. 372–374; *Actae et epistolae*, no. 29, p. 32; Andrea Navagero, *Storia della Repubblica Veneziana*, in *RIS*, XXIII (1733), col. 1147; Al. Simon, 'The Limits of the Moldavian Crusade (1474, 1484)', *AIRCRO*, IX (2007), pp. 273–326.

defense of southern Transylvania to the former Walachian ruler, Basarab III Laiotă, which he and Stephen had repeatedly dethroned<sup>29</sup>.

While Venice was pressuring the papacy so that she (too) should send Stephen money and the *Turk* pursued his conquest of Venetian Albania in mid 1478, Stephen seemingly chose not to attack. He too was alone and knew that Venice had to conclude as quickly as possible peace with the *Turk*. Before doing so (December 1478–January 1479), she managed to secure for him 10,000 ducats from Rome. Stephen used them to defensive works on the Dniestr and Danube Mounds. Until the Moldavian–Ottoman peace of 1486, through short-lived successes, long-term losses and broken arrangements between Istanbul and Suceava, Stephen III could rely on the often questionable and fragile support of Rome and Buda. Venice was no longer at his side. In the next years, he won an apostolic cross from Rome and lost his harbors and almost his life<sup>30</sup>.

## ABRIDGEMENTS

### ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIES

#### ASG Archivio di Stato di Genova, Genoa

Archivio Segreto (A.S.), *Diversorum* [reg.] 742, 1480–1490; *Litterarum: Officium Monete*, [reg.] 1804, 1481; *Materie Politiche. Scritti in lingua orientale ed africana*, 2737 D, 1188–1707.

#### ASM Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milan

Archivio Ducale Sforzesco (A.D.S.), *Potenze estere, Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640 [1450–1531] (fasc. [1], *Illiria*, [2], *Ragusa*, [3], *Polonia*, [4] *Ragusa-Ungheria*); *Roma*, cart. 79, 1475 *Maggio–Dicembre* (fasc. [1], *Maggio*, [2], *Giugno*, [3], *Luglio*, [4], *Agosto*, [5], *Settembre*, [6], *Ottobre*, [7], *Novembre*, [8], *Dicembre*); cart. 81, 1476 *Aprile–Luglio* (fasc. [1], *Aprile*, [2], *Mag-gio*, [3], *Giugno*, [4], *Lu-glio*); *Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647 (fasc. [1], *Albania*, [2], *Corfu*, *Cefalonia*, *Grecia*, [3], *Rodi*, [4], *Cipro*); *Ungheria*, cart. 650, 1452–1490 [1441] (fasc. [1], 1452–1457, [2], 1458–1466, [3], 1467–1490); *Venezia*, cart. 354, 1468 (fasc. [1], *Gennaio*, [2], *Febbraio*, [3], *Marzo*, [4], *Aprile*, [5], *Maggio*, [6], *Giugno*, [7], *Luglio*, [8], *Agosto*, [9] *Settembre*, [10], *Ottobre*, [11], *Novembre*, [12], *Dicembre*); cart. 364, 1477 (fasc. [1], *Gennaio*, [2], *Febbraio*, [3], *Marzo*, [4], *Aprile*, [5], *Maggio*, [6], *Giugno*, [7], *Luglio*, [8], *Agosto*, [9] *Settembre*, [10], *Ottobre*, [11], *Novembre*, [12], *Dicembre*).

<sup>29</sup> E.g. *Hurmuzaki*, VIII, no. 28, p. 26; XV–1, no. 176, p. 99; *MKL*, I, nos. 259–263, pp. 381–387; O.J. Schmitt, 'Die venezianischen Jahrbücher des Stefano Magno (ÖNB Codd. 6215–6217) als Quelle zur albanischen und epirotischen Geschichte im späten Mittelalter (1433–1477)', in *Südosteuropa von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinheitlichung. Festschrift für Edgar Hösch*, edited by Konrad Clewing, O.J. Schmitt (Munich 2005), pp. 173–179; Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 188–194, 360–361.

<sup>30</sup> For an overview, see also Ovidiu Cristea, 'Matthias Corvin et l'expédition de Bazeyid II contre la Moldavie (1484)', *RRH*, XLII (2003), 1–4, pp. 81–88; Al. Simon, 'The Use of the Gate of Christendom. Hungary's Matthias Corvinus and Moldavia's Stephen the Great Politics in the Late 1400', *QCR*, III (2004), pp. 205–224.

- ASV Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City  
Miscellaneorum Armarium/ Miscellanea Armadi (Misc.), Armarium (Arm.), [series] II, [reg.] 30.  
Registra Vaticana (Reg. Vat.) 578.
- ASVe Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice  
Senato Secreto [Senato Secreti] (S.S.), *Deliberazioni*, reg. 28, 1477–1478.
- BMC Biblioteca Museo Correr, Venice  
*Manoscritti*, Mss. 594 (Aquistò [Frederico] Stefani).
- BNM Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice  
Ufficio Manoscritti, Codici Latini (Cod. Lat.), classa X, *Historia profana*, no. 178 (=3625).
- ÖNB Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna (Wien, Bécs)  
Handschriften-, Autographen- und Nachlass Sammlung (Codices), Cod. 6215–6217  
(Stefano Magno, *Annali veneti e del mondo [1443–1478]*).

#### JOURNALS, REVIEWS AND COLLECTIONS (SERIES)

- AIIAI Anuarul Institutului de Istorie (și Arheologie, from 1972) “A.D. Xenopol” [Yearbook of the “A.D. Xenopol” Institute for History & Archaeology], Iași, 1964–1989
- AIRCRO Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia, Venice, 1999–
- AOASH Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Budapest, 1947–
- ArchT Archeografo triestino, Trieste, 1829–
- ASLSP Atti della Società ligure di storia patria, Genoa, 1858–1935, 1947–1957, NS 1960–
- BSHAR Bulletin de la Section Historique de la Académie Roumaine, Bucarest, 1912– 1947
- CMRS Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, Paris, 1960–
- FRT Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum. Erdélyi történelmi források, Budapest-Kolozsvár (Cluj, Klausenburg), 1911–1921
- Istros Istros. Buletinul Muzeului Brăilei [The Bulletin of the Brăila Museum], Brăila, 1980–
- JEH Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge, 1950–
- MAPS Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1933
- MHG Mélanges d’Histoire Générale, Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), [1922] 1927–1938, NS, [2004] 2007–
- MHH Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Magyar történelmi emlékek, I, Diplomataria; II, Scriptores; IV, Acta Extera, Pest, Budapest, 1857–1917
- PH Prace Historyczne [Historical Studies], Krakow, 1952–
- QCR Quaderni della Casa Romena di Venezia, Venice, 2001–
- RESEE Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes, Bucharest, 1963–
- RI Revista Istorică [Historical Review], Vălenii de Munte-Bucharest, 1915–1946, NS, 1990–
- RIS [Lodovico Antonio Muratori], Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. Raccolta degli storici italiani dal cinquecento al Millecinquecento, Mediolani (Milan), 1723–1751; Città di Castello-Bologna, 1900– (new extended edition, under the direction of Giosue Carducci, Vittorio Fiorini)
- RRH Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, Bucharest, 1962–
- SMIM Studii și materiale de istorie medie [Studies and Materials in Medieval History], Bucharest, Brăila, 1956–
- SOF Südost-Forschungen: internationale Zeitschrift für Geschichte, Kultur und Landeskunde Südosteuropas, Munich, 1936–
- Spomenik Spomenik. Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti [Cenotaph. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], Beograd, 1888–1942, 1948–1956, 1959–

- SGS Slavische Geschichtsschreiber, Graz-Vienna-Cologne, 1958–1988
- SPM Sacrum Poloniae Millenium. Rozprawy-Szkice-Materialy historyczne, Rome, 1954–
- SUBBH Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, series Historiae, Cluj <-Napoca> (Klausenburg, Kolozsvár), 1958–
- SV Studi Veneziani, Venice, 1959–1976, NS, 1977–
- Sz Századok [Centuries], Budapest, 1867–
- Turcica Turcica. Revue d'études turques: peuples, langues, culture, états, Paris, 1969
- TR Transylvanian Review/ Revue de Transylvanie, Cluj-Napoca, 1992–